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ABSTRACT 
Today, the Nigerian oil industry is dominated by MNOCs who 
provide the technology and managerial expertise for the 
running of the industry. Petroleum development is a capital- 
intensive business involving enormous sums of money in 
foreign exchange. It also involves a lot of negotiations 
between the MNOCs and Nigeria. These negotiations often end 
with signing of contractual obligations by both sides. 
Nigeria, being a Third world country is at obvious 
disadvantage compared to the MNOCs in terms of risk capital, 
technology and management skills. 
The major focus of the study is on the structure and forms 
of petroleum development contracts between Nigeria and the 
MNOCs. The scope covers contracts spanning the period when 
oil exploration first began in Nigeria to the present. 
Crucial issues such as ownership, control, transfer of 
technology, financial returns and 'indigenisation' of the 
industry under the contracts is examined against the 
background of the country's overall foreign investment 
policies, petroleum policies and changes in the global oil 
scene. The aim is to see whether the contracts strike a 
balance between foreign exploitation and national policy 
objectives. With contemporary study of law gradually moving 
towards the study of law as an interdisciplinary subject, 
the study significantly draws on political economy writings 
in economics, politics and law. 
It is found that three kinds of petroleum contracts are 
operating in Nigeria. These include - concession regimes, 
joint venture/participation agreements and production 
sharing/risk service contracts. Also that the structures of 
these contracts are largely based on the bargaining strength 
of the two parties. Although, the study argued that Nigeria 
had improved her bargaining position through her experience 
over the years and membership of OPEC, yet the study 
demonstrates that these contracts do not allow Nigeria 
enough opportunity to reduce her dependence on the MNOCs. In 
all, the study demonstrates how difficult it is for a less 
developed country such as Nigeria to gain complete control 
over its petroleum resource (even if it has the capital) if 
it lacks technological and managerial capabilities. It also 
demonstrates the role and limitations of law in fashioning 
the framework for relations between MNCs and the TWCs. 
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A NOTE ON METHODOLOGY, SOURCES AND ASSUMPTIONS. 
My choice of the subject matter of this thesis was largely 
influenced by the fact that, firstly, since the 1970s, oil 
has become a major factor in the economy of Nigeria and 
secondly, it was the rarity of a 'law-in-context' study and 
analysis of the contracts governing the exploitation of such 
vital resources in Nigeria. 
The few writings on the subject by Nigerian Scholars tend 
towards the positivist approach to law. For this reason they 
concentrate only on the doctrinal approach. This study has 
thus blended both the socio-economic and legal analysis of 
the subject. To this end, the methodology is in the main 
analytically modelled on 'law-in-context' approach. 'Law in 
context' is a specific approach to legal problems which is 
shared by all its members. In contrast to the technical and 
doctrinal style of legal analysis this approach insists on 
analysing legal phenomena in their social, political and 
economic contexts. 
Inevitably, most of the data and other sources of materials 
used in this study are documentary. The documents include 
copies of the petrole um agreements (contained in the 
Appendix), official publications and records on the subject 
as well as relevant legislation in the area. 
The study is also based on data and information collated 
through field interviews in Nigeria with Management and 
Executives of the Nigerian National Oil Corporation (NNPC) 
on one hand and those of the MNOCs operating in Nigeria on 
the other. The interviews were conducted between August 1989 
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and January 1990. At the interview sessions, questions were 
put orally to the respondents with the aid of 
questionnaires. This method was resorted to after it became 
clear to the author that written answers to the 
questionnaires were not forthcoming because the respondents 
appeared to be too busy to take the questionnaires home and 
answer item by item. 
Generally, the interviews proved quite illuminating even 
though difficult at the initial stage. Officials of both the 
NNPC and foreign oil companies were uncooperative in 
releasing information on grounds of confidentiality. Both 
sides at first thought I belonged either to one of the media 
houses or a front to an international organisation or even a 
government agent. Their general pattern of behaviour was 
that of evasiveness, suspicion and outright unwillingness to 
cooperate with people trying to conduct research into the 
oil industry. The Nigerian employees in both the NNPC and 
foreign oil companies were no much better than their 
expatriate counterparts in releasing information. 
Data has therefore generally been difficult to obtain from 
the oil companies. Where some data and information was 
given, it was generally difficult, if not impossible, to 
verify its authenticity. Indeed, some questions were ignored 
especially those on finance or remunerations with the excuse 
that the questions were too confidential. 
The difficulty of obtaining information notwithstanding, 
adequate amounts of data and information were collected from 
the interviews conducted and the visits paid to the oil 
areas. Relevant data and information were also gathered from 
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various libraries both in Nigeria and the U. K. These 
include: - 
- institute of Petroleum and Mineral law studies Library, 
University of Dundee, Scotland. 
- The Commonwealth Secretariate Library, London. 
- The Petroleum Institute Library, London. 
- The Centre for West African Studies, University of 
Birmingham Library. 
- NNPC Falomo Complex Library, Lagos. 
- Petroleum Institute Library, Warri. 
- Nigeria Institute of International Affairs Library, Lagos. 
- University of Lagos Library, Lagos. 
- University of Benin Library, Benin City (Nigeria). 
Visits were also paid to places like the Shell Centre 
London, B. P. House London, NNPC branch office in London and 
the Nigerian High Commission in London where the available 
literature on oil and Nigeria was sifted for relevant 
information on the subject area of this research. 
ASSUMPTIONS 
My interest in this area of study started when I studied 
'Legal regulation of Multinational Corporations, 
International trade and investment. ' a course at the LL. M. 
Law in Development class (Public Enterprise) in 1986/87 
session at Warwick University. I realised that most of the 
mineral resource sectors operating in TWCs and which these 
countries rely on for meeting their economic development 
objectives are largely dominated by MNCs who provide the 
wherewithal needed for the exploitation of these resources. 
As a result, these companies make immense profits which are 
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mostly stashed and transferred abroad or to their parent 
companies thereby making no meaningful contribution to the 
host countries. As profit maximisers, these companies are 
concerned with their world-wide interests which transcend 
individual national interests. To reverse this trend, the 
TWCs have to possess among other things the required 
technology and managerial expertise to be able to exercise 
complete and effective control over their mineral resource 
sectors and thereby get the full benefits therefrom. Without 
this, the MNCs will continue to control and dominate the 
development of such resources to their own credit ad 
infinitum. Ambitious as these aspirations of the TWCs may 
seem, unfortunately they find themselves operating in a 
dependant position against the weight of the MNCs in terms 
of the latter's technological and management expertise. It 
is only a question of degree as to what extent a TWC will 
find itself being integrated into the global operations of 
these MNCs. Such global integration, apart from reducing the 
developing country's fledgling industrial growth capability, 
it also reduces it to a perpetual dependency position. 
Based on the above assumption, this work is undertaken on 
the premise that law as part of the supra-structure and a 
tool for effecting social change is capable of achieving for 
Nigeria her desired interests in petroleum development. 
ORGANISATION OF THE THESIS. 
The thesis altogether consists of seven chapters. Chapters 
one and Two contain the theoretical and conceptual framework 
of the thesis. Chapter One starts with a brief analysis of 
petroleum development contracts in the context of general 
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contract law theory. The bargaining theory models operating 
between the Nigerian oil industry and the MNOCs are also 
explored. This is followed by account on the emergence of 
MNCs in general and their impact on development in the TWCs 
in which they operate. 
Chapter two deals with the Nigerian foreign investment 
policies, the country's petroleum policies and ends with the 
impact of OPEC on the latter. The background and growth of 
the Nigerian Petroleum Industry is also provided in chapter 
Two. It further contributes to the argument on whether or 
not Nigeria should quit OPEC. 
Chapter three looks at the development and growth of NNPC as 
a Nigerian state petroleum company. Its organisational form, 
corporate structure and position as agency for negotiating 
contracts on behalf of government are equally described. 
And lastly, detailed and comprehensive analysis on the 
various forms of petroleum agreements are set forth in 
Chapters four to six. The issues covered in such analysis 
include terms of the various contracts in relation to 
ownership, control, financial returns, training and transfer 
of technology, among others. Chapter Four analyses the 
traditional oil concession regimes and joint 
venture /participation arrangements. The relative merits and 
demerits of each are identified and evaluated. Chapter five 
is devoted to an evaluation of production sharing and risk 
service contracts. Possible reasons why Nigeria resorted to 
these contracts are proffered in the analysis and measures 
to improve their application in the country given. 
xv 
Chapter six investigates the thorny issue of transfer of 
technology and training of nationals in the Nigerian 
Petroleum Industry. The major question addressed here is 
whether or not the MNOCs have transferred petroleum 
technology and management skills to the country. Chapter 
seven is the conclusion and summary of findings plus 
recommendations for the future of the petroleum industry 
resulting from the study. 
xvi 
CONTENTS 
Page 
ABSTRACT 
DEDICATION 
DECLARATION 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT iv 
GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS vii 
NOTE ON METHODOLOGY OF RESEARCH ix 
CONTENTS xvi 
TABLE OF CASES xix 
CHAPTER 1 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION AND THEORETICAL SETTING. 1 
1.1 Bargaining positions of Nigeria and the Multinational 5 
1.1.2 Bargaining theory models 10 
1.2 Structure and Activities of the Multinationals 17 
1.2.1 Legal perspectives on multinational corporations 17 
1.2.2 Their organisation and structure 20 
1.2.3 The impact of multinational corporation 
activities on the Third World 28 
CHAPTER 2 
NIGERIAN FOREIGN INVESTMENT POLICIES AND PETROLEUM INDUSTRY. 
2.1 Introduction 40 
2.2 Nigerian foreign investment policies 40 
2.2.1 Account on the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Act 44 
2.2.2 Provisions of the Indigenisation Decrees 48 
2.2.3 Relaxation of the indigenisation Decrees 53 
2.3 Impact of OPEC on Nigerian oil policies 55 
2.3.1 OPEC and the changes in the world oil industry 56 
2.3.2 The pre-OPEC era in the international petroleum 
industry 57 
2.3.3 The post-OPEC era 61 
2.3.4 OPEC's influence on Nigerian oil policies 66 
2.3.5 Background Account on the Nigerian oil industry 66 
2.3.6 Government role in the petroleum industry 69 
2.3.7 
, 
Nigeria's oil policies after OPEC membership 75 
2.3.8 Production policy 78 
2.3.9 Marketing policy 85 
2.3.1 0 oil pricing policy 88 
2.3.1 1 Policy of ensuring self-reliance in the industry 92 
2.4 Recent developments 95 
2.4.1 Liquified natural gas project 96 
2.4.2 Petrochemical project 97 
2.5 Position of Nigeria within OPEC 99 
CHAPTER 3 
NNPC: THE NIGERIAN STATE-OWNED OIL COMPANY. 107 
3.1 Introduction 107 
3.2 Background account on formation of 
the corporation 107 
3.3 Duties and Powers of the NNPC 112 
3.4 The organisation of the NNPC 116 
xvii 
Page 
3.5 The new structure of the NNPC 119 
3.6 The petroleum inspectorate unit 124 
3.7 Legal and management structure of NNPC 127 
3.8 The NNPC as party to petroleum contracts 134 
CHAPTER 4 
PETROLEUM CONTRACTS I 
CONCESSION REGIMES AND JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENTS. 138 
4.1 Introduction 138 
4.2 Traditional concession agreements 138 
4.2.1 Nature of concessions 138 
4.2.2 Merits and demerits of traditional concessions 143 
4.2.3 Nigerian concession regimes 147 
4.2.4 Modernised types of concessions 151 
4.2.5 Oil Exploration Licence 151 
4.2.6 Oil Prospecting Licence 152 
4.2.7 Oil Mining Lease 153 
4.2.8 Rights, duties and obligations of the OPL 
and OML holders 155 
4.2.9 The end of the concession era 158 
4.3 Participation and joint venture agreements 165 
4.3.1 Participation agreements in Nigeria 168 
4.3.2 Nature of participation agreements in Nigeria 172 
4.3.3 The equity-share participation agreement 172 
4.3.4 Non-equity participation agreement 177 
4.3.5 Main features of joint participation agreements 
in Nigeria 180 
4.3.6 Contributions towards costs of operations 181 
4.3.7 The operator 182 
4.3.8 Rights and duties of the operator 183 
4.3.9 Management or operating committee 184 
4.3.10 Duration 186 
4.3.11 Taxation, fees and royalties measures 187 
4.4 General assessment 189 
CHAPTER 5 
PETROLEUM CONTRACTS II 
PRODUCTION SHARING CONTRACT AND RISK SERVICE CONTRACTS 194 
5.1 Introduction 194 
5.2 Production sharing contract 194 
5.2.1 Background of Nigerian production sharing 
contract 198 
5.2.2 Duration of the contract 199 
5.2.3 Rights and obligations of the parties 201 
5.2.4 Contractor's remuneration 204 
5.2.5 Title to equipment 204 
5.2.6 Employment, transfer of technology and 
training of nationals 204 
5.2.7 Other provisions 205 
5.3 A general assessment of the contract 207 
5.4 Risk service contract 218 
5.4.1 Non-risk service contract 221 
5.4. '2 Background-of Nigerian risk service contract 222 
5.4.3 Duration of the contract 223 
xviii 
page 
5.4.4 Rights and obligations of the parties 224 
5.4.5 Contractor's remuneration 225 
5.4.6 Title to petroleum and equipments 228 
5.4.7 Accounting procedure under the contract 228 
5.4.8 Employment, transfer of technology and 
training of nationals 230 
5.4.9 Insurance policy 231 
5.5 Assessment of the contract 232 
CHAPTER 6 
TRANSFER OF PETROLEUM TECHNOLOGY IN NIGERIA. 
6.1 Introduction 241 
6.2 Assessment of Nigeria's technological capability 
in petroleum operations 242 
6.2.1 Research methodology 242 
6.2.2 Research assessment 244 
6.3. Reseach findings 258 
6.3.1 Exploration and production phases 259 
6.3.2 Refining sector 260 
6.3.3 Petrochemical sector 262 
6.3.4 Marketing and distribution 263 
6.3.5 Research and Development 264 
6.3.6 Information and data processing 265 
6.3.7 Local capability areas 265 
6.4 Other suggested means of enhancing petroleum 
technology transfer 269 
CHAPTER 7 
SUHHARY CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMHENDATIONS. 276 
7.1 Petroleum and Nigerian economy 277 
7.2 Issues of ownership and control 278 
7.3 Reorganisation of the NNPC 280 
7.4 Dependency factors in Nigerian oil industry 281 
7.5 Future trends of petroleum contracts 282 
7.6 The role of OPEC 287 
APPENDICES 291 
BIBLIOGRAPHY. 331 
xix 
TABLE OF CASES. 
page 
National Westminster Bank plc V Morqan 1 All E. R. 
821 1985.8 
Macaulay V Schroeder Publishing Company Limited, 
1974 1 W. L. R. 1308.17 
Salomon V Salomon & Company A. C. 22 1897.17 
Fisser V International Bank 282 2d. 231 (2 Cir 1960). 17 
Brown V Marqrande Compania Naviera 281 F. Supp. 1004 (ed va 
1968). 17 
Smith, Stone and Kniqht Ltd V Birminqham Corporation 
4 All E. R. 116 1939.18 
Daily Cooperative Association v Brandes Creamery 147 
Oregon 488 1934.18 
Chicago M. & St. P. v Minneopolis Civic and commerce 
Association 244 U. S. 490.18 
Northern Section Company V United States 193 U. S. R. 490 
1904. is 
In Re F. G. Films Limited, 1 W. L. R. 483 1953.18 
Firestone Tyre & Rubber V Llewellyn 1957 1 WLR 464 18 
The Shell-B. P. Petroleum Development Company Nigeria 
Limited V F. B. I. R. F. R. C. /L. /IA/25 November 5, 
1976 (unreported). 188 
Lloyds Bank V Bundy 3 W. L. R. 501 1974.8 
I 
CHAPTER ONE 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION AND THEORETICAL SETTING. 
This study critically examines the petroleum development 
contracts between Multinational oil corporations (MNOCs) 
and the Nigerian oil industry against the background of 
the Nigerian foreign investment regulations, oil policies 
and changes in the international petroleum scene. The 
kinds of legal arrangements between governments of oil 
producing states such as Nigeria and the MNOCs under 
which petroleum resources are generally developed are 
important especially to the former which depend solely on 
oil rents for meeting their economic development goals. 
The term "petroleum development contract" as applied in 
this study means contractual agreements between the host 
countries and MNOCs which are generally long-term, 
involve the exploitation of petroleum resources and 
generally govern all aspects of the petroleum operations 
ranging from exploration through to the marketing stages 
of the product. 
There is no doubt that any government committed to 
petroleum development would adopt policies and measures 
which would ensure that if petroleum were discovered, the 
maximum of benefits resulting from such discovery would 
accrue to the national economy. Consequently, petroleum 
producing countries, including Nigeria our case-study as 
the study will reveal, sought as a basic objective the 
maximum development of their resources in providing a 
major source of domestic revenue and foreign exchange 
2 
earning. Other objectives include, support to domestic 
industries, employment of nationals, transfer of 
technology and skills to nationals. 
it is imperative that in attaining these objectives, the 
host oil producing state provide a stable and efficient 
legal and administrative structure. Anything else, would 
constitute too significant a risk factor to the potential 
investor (MNOC) and deter investment and development. 
Further, a proper and well-defined legal and 
administrative framework represents a strategy to 
development which uses mechanisms designed to secure 
state objectives. 
Traditionally, it is the MNOCs which provide the 
resources necessary for the petroleum development which 
include- risk capital, technological and managerial 
skills, as well as marketing outlets. In order to obtain 
these on the best terms, the host governments must be 
aware of alternative sources which they may be able to 
draw upon, and of the necessary steps that they can take 
to impose their bargaining position in negotiations with 
the MNOCs. More discussion on the bargaining positions of 
the parties is provided below. 
Generally, ever since the MNOCs started investing in 
mineral resource sectors in Third world countries (TWCs), 
there has been a proliferation in the kind of legal 
arrangements between these two. Traditional foreign 
direct investment (FDI) in the form of the old concession 
regime predominated in petroleum extraction scene until 
the late 1950s. Under these concessions, the MNOCs 
3 
secured ownership of the petroleum that was discovered, 
appropriated the bulk of the revenues and exercisea 
nearly total control over all phases of the petroleum 
operations. These concessions which have been negotiated 
during the colonial era were perceived as unfavourable to 
the host countries. The late 1960s and early 1970s 
witnessed drastic changes and shifts in the pattern of 
legal arrangements between governments and MNOCs. These, 
as we will discern later on, have been brought about by 
changes in the global enviroment, in particular in the 
conditions prevailing in the international petroleum 
industry and in the consequent shift in the bargaining 
positions of governments and the MNOCs through the 
emergence of the Organisation of petroleum exporting 
countries (OPEC) on the oil scene. These new types of 
legal arrangements also referred to in some quarters as 
new forms of investment (NFI) as opposed to the 
traditional FDI1, under which governments have been able 
to obtain the resources of the MNOCs for petroleum 
development on better terms include, "joint ventures" or 
"participation agreements", "production sharing 
contracts" and "risk service contracts". These legal 
arrangements are examined in relation to the Nigerian oil 
industry in chapters five and six of the study. 
As mentioned earlier, the primary aim of this study is to 
critically examine certain important features of the 
1' The discourse on this shift from the traditional FDI to the NFI is well 
documented in Oman, C. New forms of investment in developing country industries: 
mining, petrochemicals, automobiles, textiles, food. (OECD, 1989), particularly in 
chapter one. 
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petroleum contracts in the light of the legal, structural 
and administrative policy guidelines used in developing 
the resources in Nigeria. it also makes comparative 
analysis with situations in other OPEC and non-OPEC 
member countries*. The study also makes proposals for 
reforms in some fiscal and sectoral development aspects 
of the industry as well as for alternative sources of 
technology transfer to the country. Thus the four main 
principal areas examined in the contracts include; 
aspects of ownership, control, fiscal and transfer of 
technology in the industry. In examining these features, 
one purpose is intended. That is, to assess their 
viability in achieving' the particular objectives and 
policies of the country in its petroleum resource 
development. As a prelude to this, it is now proposed in 
this introductory chapter and chaper two to highlight the 
policy guidelines of the Nigerian government and 
practices of the institutions which characterise the 
operations of the Nigerian oil industry. This is 
necessary because they constitute the framework within 
which the petroleum contracts are shaped and also 
operate. Any changes in their directions will no doubt 
also affect the nature and structure of the contracts. 
They include: bargaining positions of Nigeria and the 
MNOCs, the structure and activities of Multinationals 
vis-a-vis development in TWCs, Nigerian foreign 
investment policies and the impact of OPEC on both the 
Nigerian oil industry and the international oil scene. 
Also it is from this background that the general 
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structure and operations of the Nigerian oil industry and 
its dealings with MNOCs can be appreciated and the 
development strategy of the country's petroleum resource 
fully understood. First, we commence in this chapter with 
a look at the bargaining positions of the two parties and 
the structure and activities of the Multinationals. The 
segment on Nigeria's foreign investment policies and the 
impact of OPEC on Nigeria and the international oil scene 
will form the subject matters of discussion in chapter 
two. 
1.1 BARGAINING POSITIONS OF NIGERIA AND THE 
MULTINATIONALS. 
Generally, the business of petroleum development involves 
the use of substantial risk capital especially at the 
initial stages, sophisticated technology, managerial 
expertise and marketing outlets. In addition, it involves 
a lot of negotiation between the Multinational oil 
companies who provide these inputs on the one hand and 
the host country which owns the petroleum resources on 
the other. These negotiations often end in the kind of 
legal arrangement under which the resource is to be 
developed. Usually, since the two parties have distinct 
objectives which each endeavours to achieve when they are 
involved in any such business relations, there arises the 
need for a legal framework which will provide a basis 
which sufficiently safeguards the interest of each to 
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provide a mutually acceptable basis for cooperation. The 
law of contract provides such a medium for the parties. 2 
For purposes of this study,, contract will be viewed as 
consisting of an exchange of promises, carried out 
through the process of offer and acceptance,, with the 
element of consideration and the intention to create 
legal relationship. When the contract is made,, it binds 
each party to performance, or, in default, to a liability 
to pay compensation. This is the paradigm model of 
contract which was inherited from the classical contract 
law model of the nineteenth century which is still useful 
and applicable today. 3 
In a nutshell, the assumptions underlying the classical 
contract theory and its basic concept of freedom of 
contract were that; (l) the parties were free to determine 
their own norms of contract, i. e. free from any social or 
economic factor determining it for them. (2) That in a 
situation of perfect competition, neither party to a 
contract has' any power over the other. This meant that 
each party was assumed to have equal bargaining power in 
the process of contract making. (3) Finally, that the 
2 It has been a contentious matter whether private contract law or international 
law should govern petroleum investment contracts. While some argue that it should be 
under the rubric of private contract law, subject to all the niceties of that regime 
of legal transactions, others insist that it comes under international agreements and 
in particular the rule pacts sunt servanda. See HcNair, A., "The general principles of 
law recognised by civilised nations", British Yearbook of International Law, 1957 
chapter I and Bowett, D. W., "State contracts with aliens: Contemporary developments on 
compensation for termination or breach", British Yearbook of International Law, 1988 
pp. 54-55. In respect of petroleum agreements concluded between Nigeria and the KNOCs, 
as will be discerned later, the laws governing these agreements are a hybrid of 
private contract law, national laws of Nigeria and international law. 
3 For fuller text an these necessary requirements for a valid contract, see 
Cheshire anf Fifoot, Law of Contract, by Furmston, H. P., 2982, E. I. Sagay, Nigerian 
law of contract, Sweet and Maxwell, 1985 and Beale, H. et al Contracts, cases and 
materials, Butterworths, London, 1990. 
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state should not intervene in the bargaining process. it 
should only provide a framework within which such 
bargaining could take place, which implies that it should 
confine itself within the functions of conflict 
resolutions. Such is 'the ideal laissez-faire state. 4 
Undoubtedtly, these assumptions are very much out of 
touch with reality in the world today, especially when 
applied in relation to contracts between giant monopolies 
such as the MNCs and smaller firms or state governments 
in developing countries where there are greater 
disparities in the bargaining power between them. For 
instance it is trite knowledge that the latter have 
lesser bargaining power at the pre-contract negotiations 
than the former on whom they rely for capital, technology 
and management skills. 
The bargaining power of parties is said to be unequal if 
the situation is such that one of the parties is so 
strong in the negotiation process and the other so weak 
that the stronger party is capable of pushing the weaker 
one to the state of adherence to the terms of the 
contract which are in favour of the stronger party. But 
just what constitutes stronger or weaker bargaining power 
if one may ask? To answer this, if one examines the 
several doctrines under which the Common Law gives relief 
to a party to an unfair contract, it becomes apparent 
that the inequality of bargaining power and the resulting 
unfairness are of different types in the various cases. 
4 Details on this classical contract theory are documented in Atiyah, P. S., The 
Rise and fall of freedom of contract, 1979, especially in chapters B-10. 
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This is so because a contract which is unfair in one 
situation may not be unf air in another. For example, it 
is observed that most of the more traditional doctrines 
of Common Law- such as . unconscionability and 
unreasonableness apply only where there is unfairness in 
the sense of inadequacy of consideration,, but that some 
rules apply to clauses which leave a party at risk even 
if he got value-for-money; and that inequality of 
bargaining power can mean 'ignorance, vulnerability to 
persuasion, desperate need, lack of bargaining skills or 
simple lack of influence in the market. '5 And Lord 
Denning in the case of LLOYDS BANK V. BUNDy6 maintained 
that many of the defences to a contract enforcement, such 
as, duress, undue influence, breach of fiduciary duty, 
were properly exemplary of a general doctrine of 
inequality of bargaining power. 
By and large, it can be seen that what constitutes a 
superior or weaker bargaining power among contracting 
parties is not precise and clearly definable. As 
mentioned above, they take various forms. depending on the 
circumstances in each case. The underlying factor, 
however, seems to be that the contractual transaction is 
not such that is based on a "give-and-take of bargaining" 
but a product of the " take-it-or- leave- it attitude" where 
outcomes were viewed as what one side obtained theý other 
5 See Beale, H., "Inequality of bargaining power". oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies, Vol. 6 No-1,1988 p. 125. 
6' 1974 3 W. L. R. p. 501, See also the case of Hational Westminster Bank V. Morgan 
1985 1 All E. R. 821. 
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side have necessarily lost. 7 And in the end, the main 
objective of each party was to maximise short-term 
profits from the exploitation of the resource regardless 
of the impact on the other party or the project. As the 
above expositions indicate, bargaining power could take 
the form of bargaining skills, sophistication, capital, 
technology, possession of relevant information, knowledge 
of market outlets, etc. When one party to a contract has 
one or all of these advantages compared to the other and 
is capable of using it to enter into bargains that are 
unconscionable, he has superior bargaining power than the 
other. Conversely, weakness of bargaining power can 
either take the form of ignorance, lack of experience, 
vulnerability to influence or lack of bargaining skill of 
one party which the other can exploit to his advantage. 
in the light of the above, our analysis of the petroleum 
development contracts between MNOCs and Nigeria will also 
take account of the superior bargaining strength which 
the former has over the latter. Petroleum investment as 
mentioned earlier, involves a complex interplay of many 
issues ranging from capital, economics, law, technology, 
politics and managerial skills. The outcome of any 
petroleum development contract between a host state and 
any MNOC will depend much on the relative strengths and 
bargaining positions in relation to these factors. 
7 The "take it or leave it " style of bargaining is also sometimes referred to an 
the "win-lose logic" or the "distributive bargaining " system and the "give and take 
attitude" as the "win-win logic" or "integrative bargaining" system. For fuller 
discussions see, Banks, J. C. "Negotiating International mining agreements: Win-Win Vs 
win-Lose bargaining", Columbia Journal of World Business, Vol, 22,1987 pp. 65-72 and 
Walton, R. E. and R. B. HcKersie, A behavioural theory of labour negotiations, New York, 
1965 , chapters 2-3. 
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Usually, the MNOCs have greater bargaining power because 
of their sophistication and access to sources of vast 
capital, technological know-how, managerial skill and 
marketing outlets which are required by the host country 
to exploit her hydrocarbon resources. On the other hand, 
the host country exercises sovereignty over its natural 
reources which is also needed to be developed by the 
MNOC. it is on this score that the whole bargainings are 
based. 
1.1.1. BARGAINING THEORY MODELS 
Studies on the bargaining theory models of multinationals 
and host countries relations in mineral resource 
investments-copper and oil have shown that the balance of 
power at the negotiation table between them begins very 
much tilted in favour of the Multinationals and tips 
inevitably away from them toward the host countries. 8 At 
the start of the business, since the Multinationals enjoy 
near-monopoly control over the wherewithal needed to 
bring the mine on-line, the host country has little 
option but to accept terms weighted heavily in favour of 
the former. But once one or more Multinationals commit 
themselves and invest, and the mines are successful, the 
bargaining strengths change instantly. At that stage, the 
elements of uncertainty and risk are reduced. The host 
For studies that document cases of such disparities and shifts in bargaining : 
trengths in the Multinationals and host country relations vis-a-vis mining 
industries, see Moran# T. H., Multinational Corporations and the politics of 
dependence: copper in Chile, Princeton University Press, 1974; Mikesell, R. F., New 
patterns of world mineral development, Washington, 1979; Wells, L. T., *The evolution 
of concession agreements in developing countries, " Harvard Development Advisory 
service, March 29,2971; Banks, J. C. "Negotiating international mining agreements, 
ibid., and 0man, C., New forms of investment in developing country industries, 
op. cit. 
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country then begins to see the industry as a profitable 
venture which is under the control of af oreign f irm. 
Hence, the terms of the original agreement are sought to 
be tightened in favour of the host country. In effect, 
what happens is that in order to attract foreign 
investors the host country loosens its investment terms 
but after they have proved successfull it tightens such 
terms. In this process of losssening and tightening of 
the investment terms, the host country gradually moves up 
a learning curve of negotiating skills and of direct 
operating skills for the industry. 9 At that level also 
the host government begins to demand for the hiring of 
its nationals in supervisory positions and participation 
in the arrangement of international marketing and 
finance. As the host country invades those areas that 
were hitherto the exclusive preserves of the 
Multinationals, it can be able to play the game of win- 
win or win-lose bargaining model with the Multinational 
in a tighter extent. , 
The kind of bargaining model referred to above which is 
conceptualised in 'take-it-or-leave-it' or 'win-lose' 
terms characterises the present relations between the 
MNOCs and the Nigerian oil industry and indeed other 
mineral resource concessions elsewhere. The win-lose 
bargaining model means that outcomes were viewed in zero 
sum terms and the portion of each party's share would be 
a direct function of its relative bargaining strength. 
Because this bargaining relationship is seen as a power 
9 See Horan, T. H. op. cit. p. 162. 
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struggle, both the MNOCs and the host countries adopt a 
number of strategies to enhance their bargaining strength 
so as to emerge winners at the negotiating table. Some of 
the common strategies adopted by the MNOCs to enhance 
their relative power included old-style concessions, 
project financing, cartel formation and research in 
extraction technology. 10 The host countries on their part 
tried project depackaging, ' state-owned enterprises and 
cartel arrangements as means of enhancing their power. 11 
It will, for instance be discovered in the study that,, 
the relationship between OPEC memberstates and the MNOCs 
correctly depicts this bargaining model at work. When the 
MNOCs were in superior initial bargaining position, they 
sought to appropriate a greater share of the surplus 
generated by the hydrocarbon resources. To do so, the 
MNOCs placed considerable emphasis on contracts 
(especially traditional concessions) as mechanisms for 
guaranteeing their long-term expectations. OPEC 
memberststes compelled to attract foreign investment and 
expertise in the development of their resources agreed to 
terms and conditions which reflected the greater initial 
bargaining power of the MNOCs but which they sought to 
modify when the bargaining power shifted in their favour. 
Bargaining positions can change due to several factors. 
For instance, bargaining power shifted in the 
international oil industry due to changes in the 
10 See Amsalem, M. A., "Bauxite, Copper and Oil: Bargaining power and the economics 
of foreign investment", Columbia Journal of World Business, Vol. 19, '19841 pp, 19-25, 
11 See Wells, L. T. Jr, Third World Multinationals, The MIT Press, 1983 and 
Mikesell, R. F. op-cit. 
industry, when the entry of a large number of the so- 
called "minors" and state-owned companies eroded the 
dominance of the "majors", led to competition for 
investment opportunities and thus enabled the host 
countries to obtain improved terms under new types of 
legal arrangements. A detailed account on the changes 
that occurred in the international oil industry is 
provided in chapter two. Shifts in bargaining positions 
can also take place due to purely local developments. An 
illustration of this is seen where a host country decides 
to nationalise its oil industry after it had acquired 
effective technological and managerial capabilities. 
Shifts in the relative bargaining. power of host countries 
and MNOCs result not only from such changes in the global 
or domestic enviroment, but from their changing role over 
the life of a concession from one phase of operations to 
another. This point was also succintly noted by one 
writer, Wells, when he described a concession contract 
as: 
"the product of a bargaining process, 
reflecting the strengths and weaknesses of 
the two parties and their bargaining skills. 
But the relative pojýtions of the parties 
change with time ...... 
It is pertinent to note that a petroleum development 
arrangenment is one which involves distinct stages of 
operations. There is the pre-exploration stage, an 
exploration stage, a development stage, a production 
stage and finally the marketing stage. As mentioned 
earlier, the relative bargaining power of a MNOC is 
12 Wells, L. T. The Evolution of concession agreements Economic Development Report 
No. 217,1971, p. 204. 
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greatest at the earliest pre-exploration where there are 
only broad indications of the possibility of the 
existence of petroleum resources. For the host country at 
this stage there is a clear interest in attracting the 
capital and oil technology of the MNOC to undertake the 
exploration job. But once the exploration is undertaken 
and the operation is a success, the whole atmosphere that 
surrounds their relations changes. The project has 
matured and it is at this stage that the pendulum of 
bargaining power swings strongly in favour of the host 
country. Basically all that is left as the bargaining 
chip of the MNOC is the threat of withholding further 
investment or withdrawing its technical and managerial 
expertise. But at this stage, the possibility of the MNOC 
to withdraw from the venture without first obtaining back 
the expected reward diminishes as its stake increases 
through the infusion of equipment, personnel and capital. 
A graphic representation of this changing balance of 
power between the MNOCs and the host countries is shown 
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below in Chart 1. 
E 
Time 
Note: Since returns are dictated by OPEC prices through 
the market forces of supply and demand, the curves will 
not be smooth. 
it needs be stressed too that the certainty or otherwise 
about the existence of petroleum resource is not the only 
variable that determines shifts of the balance of power 
between the MNOCs and host countries. There is also the 
idea of a "host country learning curve" put forward by 
MoranD which relates to the possibility of the host 
country acquiring technical and managerial capability 
over time. He noted and rightly too in my view that when 
the early international investments in oil, tin, copper 
and bauxite were undertaken, the host countries had 
little or no knowledge about the standard business 
practices in such industries. That in most cases the host 
countries were not experienced in handling issues in 
relation to technology, international corporate 
accounting or tax provisions to make the negotiation 
process meaningful. But the successful operations of the 
ventures, however, provided them with incentives to 
13 Xoran, Xultinational corporations and the politics of dependence: Copper in 
Chile, pp. 162-169, op. cit. 
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develop skills and expertise appropriate to their 
industries. Begining with attempts to re-negotiate and 
tighten the early terms of operations, the host countries 
start to move up a learning curve that leads from 
monitoring industry behaviour to handling sophisticated 
corporate functions. As Moran puts it himself, 
"As knowledge about industry operations is 
accumulated, as secrecy is dispelled and 
domestic confidence is gained, the monopoly 
position of the foreigne f4 even in his peaks 
of strength, is eroded. " 
Consequently, as the host country moves up this learning 
curve of bargaining skill and operating experience, its 
relation with the MNOC changes drastically. The result is 
a shift of power away from the MNOC toward the host 
country. In our analysis of the petroleum development 
contracts in this study, we will attempt to see how the 
"learning curve" of the Nigerian oil industry fits in 
with this hypothesis. 
With this in mind, we will in the ensuing paragraphs 
briefly outline some of the issues and debates 
surrounding the activities of Multinationals in general 
and their significance and implications for development 
in the host countries are also sketched. It is pertinent 
to state that petroleum multinationals are not different 
from other types of Multinationals. Thus, what is to be 
discussed below applies to them 
14 lbid, at p. 166. 
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as well. 
1.2 STRUCTURE AND ACTIVITIES OF THE MULTINATIONALS. 
1.2.1 LEGAL PERSPECTIVES ON MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS. 
In a strictly legal sense, a MNC can most simply be 
characterised as an aggregate of corporate entities, each 
having its own juridical entity and national origin, but 
each in some way interconnected by a system of 
centralised management. 15 Thus, even though a 
'corporation', in the true sense is a legal entity, the 
essence of the multinational enterprise is that it is a 
"political and economic fact which expresses itself in a 
variety of legal forms and devices, yet has no coherent 
existence as a legal entity. "16 This means that the 
particular legal status attributed to a corporation is 
not strictly speaking applicable to the entity as a 
whole, made up , as it is of a number of separately 
incorporated entities. 
Generally, the parent corporation and its subsidiaries 
are treated by most legal systems as separate and 
distinct legal entities. This is true even if the parent 
owns all the stock of the subsidiary and management of 
the corporations is identical. 17 However, there are 
instances when the corporate veil will be pierced, for 
15 Wallace, C. D., Legal control of the multinational enterprise Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers London. 1982 p. 22. 
26 Hadari, Y., " Legal structure of the Private Multinational Enterprise. " 
Michigan Law Review 2973 p. 729. See also Salomon V Salomon & Co. 1897 A. C. 22 which 
favours the theory of separate legal entity of a corporation. 
17 See e. g. Fisser V International Bank 282 F. 2d 232 (2 cir 1960); Brown V 
Marqrande Compania Naviera 281 F. Supp 2004 (Ed Va 1968) and Smith, Stone and Knight 
Ltd v Birmingham Corporation. (1939) 4 all E. R. 116. 
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example when the corporate device are been used to 
defraud creditors, to evade existing obligations, to 
circumvent a statute, to achieve or perpetuate a monopoly 
or to protect knavery or crime. 18 The British Courts too, 
have on some occasions pierced the corporate veil and 
found British Subsidiaries to be the agents of the 
American parent corporation. 19 
Commenting too on the legal structure of the MNC, Jessup 
remarked that, "it is the very complexity of its legal 
structures, or rather of the interplay of legal entities 
and relationships constituting that structure, no less 
than the size of its resources or the scale of its 
operations, which makes its power so elusive and so 
formidable a challenge to the political order and rule of 
law". 20 It is consequently inevitable that the economic 
strength and legal nature of MNCs should again in the 
words of Jessup, "sometimes be tempted to-take advantage 
of the complexity of political and legal systems to 
create a world of their own which must accommodate itself 
in the conduct of its operations to many legal systems 
but is not in any real sense subject to any of them., '21 
18 For evasion of contract cases see-Dairy Cooperative Association V Brandes 
Creamery 247 Oregon 488,30 P. 338.1934. For evasion of statute, see Chicago M. & 
st. P. Vx Minneopolis Civic & Commerce Association 244 U. S. 490. and Northern Sec. Co. V 
United States 193 U. S. 197 1904 for attempt to evade antitrust laws through subsidiary 
company. For detailed discussion in this area see T. Walde, "Lifting the Vail from 
Transnational Mineral Contractst A Review of the Recent Literature" I Natural 
Resources Forum 281,2977. 
19 See In Re F. G. (Films) Ltd. 1953 I WLR 483 For emphasising thin capital and 
Firestone Tyre & Rubber V Llewellyn 1957 1 WLR 464 for evasion of tax purposes. 
20 Jessup, J,. " Trananational law in a changing society. Essays edited by 
Friedmann at al. New York 1972 at p. 72. 
21 Ibid at p. 72. 
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The recognition, in the above statement that the MNC 
"must accommodate itself in the conduct of its operations 
to many legal systems " is interesting as the complexity 
of doing business simultaneously under a variety of 
differing legal systems poses its own particular 
difficulties for the centralised management which is 
characteristic of multinational operations, and provides 
a significant source of control over these operations. 
The statement that the MNC is accountable to a number of 
different national legal systems is, however, immediately 
countered by the remark that it "is not in any real sense 
subject to any of them. " one is thus left with the 
impression that the existing legal order is inadequate to 
control MNCs and that such corporations are not in the 
real sense subject to any legal system. One must guard 
against having this f alse notion that the MNC, in its 
individual corporate activities, suffers no legal 
constraints. It is, infact subject to the laws of each 
and every country in which it carries on business. It is 
only the enterprise as a complete unit- that is, in sum 
of all its individual corporate parts- which does not 
come under the control of a single comprehensive 
international authority. The only recent development or 
attempt towards that direction has been the United 
Nations Code of Conduct for transnational corporations. 22 
22 United Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations UNCTNC. U. N. New 
York Sept. 1986. But for fuller account on this see Nixson, F. I., " Controlling the 
Transnationals? The U. N. Code of Conduct in Ghai, Y. P., et al (eds), The Political 
Economy Of Laws A Third World Reader. oxford Press. Delhi. 1987. 
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The code sets out to establish international standards 
for conduct of international business conglomerates. This 
is in realisation of the difficulties facing particularly 
developing countries in regulating the activities of 
MNCs. 
The primary objective of the code include, inter alia, to 
stamp out tax evasion, restrictive business practices, 
illicit payments and abusive transfer pricing activities 
by MNCs. It also sets out to minimise any negative 
effects associated with the activities of these 
corporations as giant economic units. Thus Article 21 of 
the Code stipulates thus; 
"Transnational corporations should/shall 
make every effort so as to allocate their 
decision making powers among their entities 
as to enable them to contribute to the 
economic and social developmeýý of the 
countries in which they operate. " 
However, the snag is, as resolutions of the U. N. General 
Assembly they are merely declaratory and not legally 
binding on the MNCs. There is also no principle of 
international law that can be relied upon by a host state 
to compel these corporations to abide by it. Thus, as it 
stands, the host countries have no other option than to 
try and regulate the activities of the MNCs on an 
individual country or through regional basis, e. g. by way 
of exchange of information, tax securities, etc. 
1.2.2 THEIR ORGANISATION AND STRUCTURE. 
The growth and spread of MNCs, their organisational form 
23 Ibid Article 21 U. N. Code of Conduct. 
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and success stories in terms of huge profits have 
engendered considerable concern not only in the host 
countries where they operate but also in their home 
countries. The concern stems from certain features of 
these corporations and their implications, which will 
form the subject of our discussion in the following 
paragraphs. 
A central characteristic of the very large MNCs is their 
tendency to have a sizeable cluster of foreign branches 
and affiliates. It is contended that while almost half of 
some 7,300 MNCs have subsidiaries in one country only, 
nearly 200 MNCs, among the largest in the world, have 
subsidiaries in twenty or more countries. 24 The control 
which the parent companies are able to exercise over 
their subsidiaries as a result of modern communication 
facilities means that subsidiaries in foreign countries 
are generally simply branch offices obeying the dictates 
of their parents. Thus decisions, such as, on output 
levels, product lines, markets served, investment and re- 
investment, financial flows and choice of techniques, 
etc, are all ultimately decided by the parent in the 
metropole. By implication, such decisions are less likely 
made by the executives of the parent company in the 
metropole with the welfare or interests of any particular 
host country and its , citizens as the primary 
consideration. Rather, the entity whose interest will be 
24 Taken from Jenkins, R. O., Transnational corporations and uneven development. 
The internalisation of capital. and the Third World. Hethuen London 1987. p. 5. 
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paramount in such decisions is the global corporation 
itself. 25 
The decision variables of the MNCs may have profound 
significance for the host country of its subsidiary. This 
is particularly so when the subsidiaries are large in 
relation to the host economy and when they are concerned 
with the exploitation of the country's major and most 
lucrative resource. A classic example is the control by 
the multinational oil corporations of operations of the 
Nigerian oil industry, where oil is the mainstay of the 
country's economy. 
Closely related to their large size is the predominantly 
oligopolistic character of the multinational 
corporations. 26 When a company is an industry which is an 
international oligopoly, and especially one with 
extensive vertical integration like oil, the decision, 
for instance,, to restrict its operation to a particular 
market in order to prevent competition or to hold its 
output for other reasons may have very negative effects 
on the host country. Also, the large size of the global 
corporation, its financial muscle. enables it to stifle or 
destroy local competition in some cases, and its 
marketing ability and zeal combined with heavy 
advertising help to sustain and maintain their 
oligopolistic nature. 
25 Ibid. 
26 The word 'oligopoly' is a term commonly used in economics to describe a 
situation in which firms involved in a particular business are so few that each is 
aware of and therefore takes account of, the repercussions of its own actions on other 
partners, and adjusts its own strategy in the light of anticipated or actual actions 
of partners. 
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A further characteristic of MNCs is that they are in 
27 general products of developed -countries. The high 
percentage of concentration of MNCs in the developed 
countries is even more clearly revealed by the 
distribution of the stock of foreign investment of these 
firms as measured by estimated book value. For instance, 
in 1986, out of a total estimated stock of foreign 
investment of about $800 billion most of which was owned 
by MNCs, the U. S. accounted for more than half, and over 
four fifths the total was owned by five countries, the 
U. S., the U. K., France, Germany and Japan. 28 This in 
itself too reflects the high concentration of the parent 
companies in the developed countries where the advanced 
economic level and similarities in institutional and 
social structures have facilitated the operation of the 
multinational corporate system. Although a high 
percentage of MNCs are concentrated in the developed 
countries, in 1980s just under a quarter of all foreign 
subsidiaries of MNCs were located in the Third World. 
29 
Within the Third World, two countries -Brazil and Mexico 
account for over a quarter of the total stock of foreign 
investments by MNCs and eight other countries make up 
over half. Most of these countries fall into two 
categories viz, (1) those which have a large and rapidly 
27 For instance, it is contended that eight of the ten largest HNCs are based in 
the U. S. The U. S. alone accounts for about a third of the total number of these firms, 
and together with the U. K., France, Germany and Japan they account for over three 
quarters of the total. See HNCs in World Development U. N. Report. op. cit. p. 171. 
28 See World Development Report 1986, Published for the World Bank, oxford 
University Preast P. 37. 
29 This information draws on UNCTC Transnational Corporations in World 
Development. Third Survey. New York. U. N. ST/CTC/46 1983. 
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growing industrial sector and (2) petroleum exporting 
countries. For instance,, it is estimated -that, in the 
Middle East which accounts for 9.4 per cent of the total 
foreign investment in developing countries, petroleum 
accounts for approximately 90 per cent of the total stock 
of foreign investment. On the other hand, in Latin 
America (with 36 per cent of the total) 39 per cent of 
foreign investment is in manufacturing 28 per cent in 
petroleum, and 10 per cent in public utilities. In 
Africa, (with 20 per cent of total) 39 per cent is in 
petroleum, 20 per cent in mining and smelting, and 19 per 
cent in manufacturing. 30 This aggregate picture shows 
that the MNCs are concentrated mainly in the extractive 
industries. These include e. g. the Copper Mines in Zambia 
and Chile, precious stones (gold) in South Africa, 
bauxite in Jamaica and oil in the Middle East. 
Sporadic data examined also show that despite their 
presence and operations in such key sectors, the 
contribution of foreign subsidiaries to the total Gross 
National Product (GNP) in most host countries is 
relatively small. 31 Indeed, it is stated that, in 'the 
1980s the sales of the largest 100 MNCs grew faster than 
the GNP of the non-socialist countries of the world. 32 
These MNCs are said to earn a higher rate of return f rom 
their subsidiaries in TWCs than they get from their 
30 Taken from Stopford, J and Dunning j, j Multinationals: Company performance and 
global Trends. London, Macmillan, 1983. 
31 See UNCTC Third Survey 1983 op. cit. and also Times 1000 Leading Companies; A 
World Bank Publication, 1986 cited in R-Jenkins Transnational corporations and Uneven 
Developmentj op, cit, p, 8. 
32 Jenkins Ibid p. 9 
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parent companies in the developed countries. U. S. data 
show the following dif ferences in the rates of return of 
the MNCs operating in the different regions of the world. 
Table 1.1 
Rate of return(%) 
1979 1980 
All Areas 21.8 18.3 
Advanced Countries 32.7 37.1 
Third World Countries 45.5 44.6 
TOTAL 100% 100% 
Source: U. S. Depar ment 03F Commezce, Survey of Current __FM_ 
Business. August, 1981. Volume 16. No. 8 (Table 7)p. 27. 
The high rates of profit overseas plus cheap raw 
materials coupled with cheap labour are amongst the 
reasons why the MNCs operate in different countries. 33 
Given such huge profits, their sizes, their need for 
global planning, etc, the MNCs are led to desire to 
control their operations and this will engender political 
interference in the host countries. 34 The size of these 
corporations and their financial muscle give them the 
means to manipulate the political situation in a country 
to their advantage. For example in 1970,, the 
international Telephone and Telecommunications Company 
(I. T. T. ) was said to have meddled greatly in Chilean 
politics. The company campaigned adversely against the 
re-election of President Allende because of his 
nationalisation of American MNCs operating'in Chile. When 
33 For more discussion on this see Lall, S and Streeten, P., Foreign investment, 
Transnationals and Developing countries. Macmillan. London, 1977, Chapters 1 and 2. 
34 This discussion draws on Fortin, C., "Law and economic coercion as instruments 
of international control. The nationalisation of Chilean copper in Picciotto, S. and J. 
Faundez (ads), The nationalisatioý of Multinationals in peripheral economies. 
Macmillan London, 1978, See also J. Faundez, Marxism and democracy in Chile, from 1932 
to the fall of Allende, New Haven, London, Yale University press, 1988, especially 
chapter 2. 
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he was finally elected, the I. T. T. plotted his overthrow 
and murder because his policies threatened the company's 
economic interest. 35 Also, in Nigeria, the overthrow of 
Gowon's military regime and the counter abortive coup of 
1976 have been attributed to disagreements between top 
Nigerian state bureaucrats on the one hand and the 
multinationals and their home governments on the other 
hand. 36 
Another feature of the MNCs which deserves comment and 
has important implications for the MNCs impact on 
development in TWCs is that they tend to be concentrated 
in technology-intensive industries and engage enormously 
in research and development (R & D). 37 It is, thus, not 
surprising that a substantial proportion of R&D 
activities in the developed countries is accounted for by 
MNCs. This does not necessarily mean that they are the 
major originators of inventions and innovations. In fact, 
it is noted that only about af if th of a sample of post 
World War Two innovations were actually introduced by 
MNCs. 38 But yet they have played and still do play a 
major role in commercialising the technology. Through 
this practice of selling technology, they are viewed as 
being important conduits, actual or potential, for the 
transmission or transfer of technology to the TWCs. Many 
writers, however, differ on the specific mechanisms by 
35 Ibid. 
36 See Turner, T., "Multinational corporations and the instability of the Nigerian 
state. " 5 Review of African Political Economy. 63 1976. 
37 These include mostly industries such as oil Exploration Companies, Automated 
manufacturing, Telecommunications and Civil Engineering Construction. 
38 Vernon, R,, Sovereignty at Bay, New York: Basic Books, 1971, p, 40 
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which such technology may be expected to be transferred 
to and diffused into the host Third World economies- 
whether it will be by deliberate or through contractual 
means. 
It seems quite unlikely that the MNCs will deliberately 
transfer dynamic technology to anyone. The reason simply 
is due to the fear of building up potential competition 
and threat of eventual erosion of the advantage they 
possess of acquiring such know-how. In his argument 
supporting this view, Johnson posited that the MNC "has 
no commercial interest in diffusing its knowledge to 
potential native competitors" and argued that it cannot 
be expected to invest in creating new technology which 
might be suitable for the factor-proporýions of the 
39 developing country when it already has its own. 
Therefore, if the MNC has no commercial interest in 
transferring technology, then it either does so because 
it is obliged to e. g. through contractual means or 
because such a transfer and consequent diffusion occurs 
in some unintended fashion. As far as the latter solution 
is concerned, that can happen, for instance, through 
concerted efforts on the part of the TWCs themselves to 
acquire the necessary technology. I agree with one 
writer, killing, when he states that the problem of 
technology transfer does not lie in the "hardware, blue 
prints, specifications, price lists, product samples,. but 
lies principally in the dissemination of the intangible 
39 Johnson, H. G. " The Hultinational Corporations as an agency of development, in 
Barbara, Ward. et al (eds), The widening gap. Development in the 1970s. New York, 
Columbia University Press. 1971. 
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know-how which is in the minds of those who use the 
hardware". 40 For this to be realised there need be 
preparedness on the part of both the seller to actually 
disseminate the necessary know-how and the buyer to 
acquire the capability. 
This and other matters in relation to transfer of 
technology in general are examined in chapter Seven with 
emphasis on transfer of petroleum technology to Nigeria. 
1.2.3 THE IMPACT OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION ACTIVITIES 
ON THE THIRD WORLD. 
The debate over the significance of MNCs as agents of 
development or underdevelopment in the Third World has 
generated a vast literature consisting of a large number 
of conflicting arguments and positions. It is not 
possible in a brief overview to deal at any length with 
the comments of the many different writers on the 
subject. Howeverr in the analysis that follows attempt is 
made to classify the writers in accordance with their 
emphasis on either the merits or demerits associated with 
MNCs and their activities in the Third World. Generally, 
a two-fold classification is made between those writers 
whose main emphasis is on the benefits which MNCs bring 
to TWCs and those who adopt a more critical approach, 
stressing on their demerits. Eventhough in practice there 
are many writers also who discuss both the benefits and 
the costs of these firms and differ only over the degree 
to which they want the host countries to intervene in 
40 Killing, P., " Technology acquisition licence agreements and joint ventures. 
columbia journal of world Business. 1980 at p. 43. 
I 
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order to ensure that the benefits outweigh the costs. I 
have observed, however that the particular emphasis 
chosen by a writer seems in general to be related more to 
political ideology than to theoretical or empirical 
analysis. Such ideological difference is most noticeable 
between Marxist and non-Marxist writings, which 
invariably has important implications on their analysis 
of the MNCs. 
For purposes of this study, I will refer to those writers 
who emphasise on the positive aspects of the MNCs as 
'Pro-MNCs'41 whereas those who adopt the critical 
approach as 'MNCs Critics. '42 And writers that fall 
between these two groups will be referred to as 
Imetropolitan writers' . 
43 This last group consists of 
writers who concede to both benefits and costs of MNCs, 
but disagree on which predominates. 
The majority of the 'Pro MNCs' writers are uncompromising 
in their support of MNCs. The benefits associated with 
41 These include writers such as Reuber, G. L., Private Foreign investment in 
Development, oxford Clarendon Press, 1973; Vernon, R., Storm over the Multinationals: 
The real Issues, London Macmillan 2977; Balasubramanyan, V. N., Multinational 
Enterprises and the Third World. Thames Essay. No. 26 London 1980 and Jenkins, R. O., 
Transnational Corporations; competition and monopoly. University of East Anglia, 
momeo. 2986, etc. 
42 These include, inter alia, Lall, S, and Streeten, P., Foreign investment, 
Transnationals and developing countries. Macmillan 1977; Helleiner, G. K., The role of 
MNcs in less developed countries trade in technology, World Development. 1975; Vaitos, 
c., Employment problems and transnational enterprises in developing countries: 
Distortions and inequality, Geneva. I. L. O. 1976; Sunkel, 0,, "Transnational capitalism 
and national disintegration in Latin America. " Social and Economic Studies. 1973; 
Frank, A. G., "The development of underdevelopment in Latin America: Underdevelopment 
or Revolution? " New York, Monthly Review Press 1969; Onimode, B., et al (eds), 
Multinational Corporations in Nigeria. Ibadan. Les Shyraden Nigeria Ltd 1983; and 
picciotto, S. and Faundez, J. (eds), The nationalisation of multinationals in peripheral 
economies, op-cit. 
43 See for example- Biersteker, T., Distortions or development? Contending 
perspectives on the Multinationals corporation. Cambridge Hass H. I. T. Press 1978; Ghai 
Y. P., "Management cotracts" in Ghai, Y. P. et al (eds), The political economy of law 
op. cit., and Nwankwo A. A., After oil what next? op. cit. 1982. 
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MNCs are extolled and criticisms of their disadvantages 
derided by these writers. They perceive the MNCs as 
partners in development because they argue that these 
firms help convey foreign capital to TWCs, transfer 
technology, create jobs, pay wages and taxes and above 
all promote industrialisation. The above expectations are 
derived from the roles which the MNCs have played in the 
past and their likely future pattern based on the 
orientation and economic goals of the TWCs. 44 
To most advocates of the merits of MNCs, investments 
overseas by such firms is a means of international 
capital flow which can bring about increase in foreign 
exchange in the host country. As a result of the capital 
inflow the total output of the host economy is expected 
to increase, and given some assumptions including that of 
perfect competition and no negative effects on the stock 
of locally owned capital, the income of host nationals 
after deducting the profits of the MNCs would rise too. 
commenting on this point, Jenkins stated that "at a time 
when shortage of capital was regarded as a major obstacle 
to development in the Third World, foreign investment by 
MNCs seemed to offer an attractive way of breaking out of 
the vicious circle of poverty., '45 Also Reuber46 and May47 
in their studies treat foreign investments by MNCs as 
additional means of foreign exchange to the host economy, 
with resultant increases in income and employment 
44 Jenkins op. cit. FN. 41 at p. 8 
45 Ibid at p. 19. 
46 Reuber op. cit. FN 41. 
47 may, Hol Hultinational Corporations in Latin America. New York. council of 
America. 2975. 
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opportunities. In other words, through such foreign 
investments, the host economy would benef it in the form 
of taxes and wages. These benefits along with the 
possible transfer of technology to the host country are 
seen as the most beneficial effects from MNCs activities. 
The employment benefits alluded to above by Reuber and 
May are also echoed in the arguments of other 'Pro MNC' 
writers, - Johnson48 and Caves. 
49 They see the employment 
benefits as one of the three important benefits likely to 
accrue to a host country from MNC activities. The second 
benefit, in their opinion, is the diffusion of technology 
to consumers who may need to be taught how to use the 
firm's products effectively e. g. agricultural machinery. 
The third benefit is the provision of 3ýevenues through 
the means of taxation, which Johnson and Caves see as the 
basic mechanism for engendering the general development 
desired as opposed to the uneven development the direct 
effects of the MNC is likely to foster. 50 
In another contribution on the benefits of MNC 
activities, Vernon mentions the importance of these firms 
in providing access to overseas markets for Third World 
products. He argues that manufactured or primary 
products, despite increasing competition, are 
characterised by many barriers to entry especially at the 
marketing stages. Therefore, in' his view, without the 
international linkages through MNC activities, firms in 
48 Johnson op. cit. 1971. 
49 Caves, R. E., "International Corporation: The Industrial Economics of Foreign 
investment. " Economia Volume 38 No. 149 1971. 
so This discussion draws on Johnson and Caves op. cit. 
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the TWCs would find it difficult to penetrate some 
markets especially those of the developed countries. 51 
The global market reach of the MNCs is perhaps 
explainable by the advantages which these firms possess 
such as access to capital, marketing through advertising, 
control of technology, and access to raw materials. 
The effects of MNC activities in bringing "otherwise 
unobtainable technology and managerial experience" to 
TWCs is also stressed by several writers. The 
multinationals' capacity for large scale research and 
development as well as easy access to the most advanced 
technologies are said to commend them for enlistment in 
the team of partners for Third World development. 52 
Notably, writers like Streeten,, 53 Hood and Young54 and 
Balasubramanyan55 all stress the importance of MNCs, 
particularly as bearers of technology to TWCs. They argue 
that transfer of technology can help stimulate local 
efficiency and increase production in the host countries. 
Such increases in production or local efficiency says 
streeten may arise from the greater competition which the 
entry of Multinational's subsidiary will induce, or by 
its stimulation of growth of linkages by creating 
opportunities for local industries to develop. 
on the other hand, Hood and Young while accepting that 
through market competition the MNC can as well stifle or 
51 Vernon op. cit FN 38 p. 105-107. 
52 See Onimode op. cit. FN 42 pp. 31-41 for detailed account. 
53 See Streeten, P. and Lall, S. op-cit. FN 42. 
54 Hood, N. and Young, S., The Economics of Multinational Enterprise. Longman 
London. 2979- 
55 Balasubramanyan OP-cit-FN 41. 
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destroy local entrepreneurship argue that on balance, 
foreign investment through the MNCs creates more local 
entrepreneurs than it displaces. 56 This view on the 
negative effect of the MNC on local entrepreneurship is 
shared by another author, Warren, 57 who indeed describes 
it as the most negative effect of the activities of MNCs 
on the host countries. It is to more on this critique of 
the MNC activities that we now turn our attention. 
It can be realised that the above arguments are largely 
sanguine about the net benefits to be gained from the MNC 
activities. However,, other writers are critical of the 
MNC activities or more concerned to catalogue their 
costs. This approach to MNC operations is represented by 
writers listed in footnote Number 42. The common thread 
that runs through their arguments is that they view the 
MNC as a major mechanism blocking development in the 
Third World and an important obstacle to socialist 
transformation. They contend that the adverse 
consequences of activities of MNCs on TWCS include, inter 
alia, the pillage of natural resources, exploitation of 
labour, huge capital transfer from TWCS, structural 
distortions, political instability and cultural 
degradation. 
The origins of this critical view can be traced back to 
the classical Marxist writings on imperialism in the 
nineteenth century with their emphasis on the 
concentration and centralisation of capital exports and 
56 Hood and Young op. cit. p. 49 
57 Warren, B., "Imperialisift and capitalist industrialisation. " New Left Review. 1973 
P. 81. 
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colonialism. 58 Those who belong this school of thought, 
argue that monopoly capitalism led to profits in the 
developed countries, while at the same time limiting the 
possibilities of expansion at home due to the 
restrictions imposed on expansion by cartels and trusts. 
This led firms to seek outlets for their surplus of 
capital overseas. Marx himself had associated the origin 
of monopoly capitalism to colonialism and considered 
foreign capital as a little more than an agency of 
imperialism. 59 This view was re-echoed by notable Marxist 
authors as Lenin60 and Bukharin. 61 Lenin, in particular, 
emphasised on the parasitic nature of imperialism stating 
that the development of monopoly capitalism inhibits 
technical progress and leads to a state of stagnation and 
decay (underdevelopment) in the host countries. 62 
While Lenin emphasised on the export of capital rather 
than on commodity goods, subsequent writers like 
Luxembourg, 63 picciotto64 and FaundeZ65 stressed on the 
process of capitalist competition which drove it outward 
in search of new markets for its products, and described 
in detail the process by which the traditional economy of 
the colonial territories were integrated within the 
58 See Marx, K., Capital Volume 1 1867 Harmandsworth, penguin. 
59 Ibid at p. 18- 
60 Lenin, V. I., Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism. Moscow Progress 
Publishers 1917. 
61 Bukharin, N., Imperialism and World Economy. London. Merlin 1917. 
62 Linen op. cit. See Chapter 8 
63 Luxembourg, R., The accumulation of Capital. New York 1964. 
64 Picciotto, S. et al (eds), State and Capital: A Marxist Debate. Edward Arnold. 
London 1977. 
65 Faundez, J., " A decision without a strategy: Excess profits in the 
Nationalisation of copper in Chile. " in Faundez, J. et al (eds) The Nationalisation of 
Multinationals op. cit. 
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capitalist fold-with the appropriation of land, 
66 
introduction of taxation, 67 use of cheap labour, and a 
commodity economy. 
68 
Yet another renowned Latin American author, Frank69 holds 
similar critical view of the MNCs. He rejects the 
advocacy of MNC as an agent of development on the ground 
of it being simple imperialism. Frank's main thesis is 
that "the underdevelopment of the underdeveloped world is 
directly connected to the development of the 
developed". 70 The same argument is echoed by Amin. 71 They 
both maintain that development of the industrialised 
world and the underdevelopment of the TWCs are two 
phenomena resulting from the same historical process, and 
for the development of the TWCs to take place, it must be 
done independently of the developed world. Most 
proponents of this view always cite as examples the 
history of Japan, the former Soviet union and China, all 
of whose periods of industrial development took place in 
the absence of foreign capital or investment. 
Similar comment on the activities of MNCs is documented 
in the works of other contemporary Marxist writers like 
Sweezy,, 72 Hymer, 73 Onimode74 and Rodney. 7-9 According to 
66 see Picciotto op. cit. FN 42. 
67 See Luxembourg op. cit FN 63. 
68 See Faundez op. cit FN 42. 
69 Frank op. cit. FN 42. 
70 Ibid at p. 149. 
71 Amin, S., Imperialism and Unequal Development New York Monthly Review 1974. 
72 Sweezy, P. 1and Magdoff, H, Notes on Multinational Corporations Monthly Review 
1973.21. 
73 Hymer, S., The Multinational corporation: A Radical Approach, Cambridge 
University Press, 1979. 
74 onimode op. cit. FN. 42 
75 Rodney, W., How Europe underdeveloped Africa. Dare Salam Tanzania Publishing 
House 1970. 
36 
these writers, MNCs are interested in investing in TWCS 
because these countries are seen as (1) sources of raw 
materials which could be profitably sold on world 
markets, (2) outlets for capital investment and (3) 
Markets for manufactured goods. Foreign capital, to them, 
is inevitably tied to its home government and its 
operation is antithetical to the host country's 
development. 
Another criticism of the MNC activities is that far from 
supplying basic goods for the mass of the population 
these firms tend to concentrate only on the production of 
luxuries for a small elite group. The activities of the 
oil multinationals is cited as a classic example. it is 
contended that the tendency for the subsidiaries of such 
firms to generate links primarily with the parent company 
or other affiliates and only to a little extent with host 
economies, leads to development of economic structures 
which are not integrated at the local levels. 76 
Despite all the costs that the 'MNC Critics' have 
associated with the MNC activities, it might still be 
argued that they constitute the "wheel" of development in 
TWCs. Subtle defenses of their operations in this regard 
78 come from writers such as Biersteker77 and Nwankwo, who 
can be described as 'metropolitan writers'. Both authors 
contend that whatever the demerits associated with MNC 
activities in the TWCs, their benefits are certainly 
better than nothing at all. This view is also shared by 
76 Sunkel, op, cit, FN 42 p. 257. 
77 Bierstaker op. cit. FN 43. 
78 Nwankwo op. cit. FN 43. 
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ardent defenders of MNCs who maintain that the road to 
development through relying on MNCs for industrialisation 
is a viable strategy as shown by the experiences of the 
newly industrialised countries of Latin America, South 
East Asia as well as Israel and South Africa. If the MNCs 
can achieve these (success story) results, so the 
argument goes, then they must be effective and reliable 
agents for the industrialisation and development of the 
79 TWCs. 
on the whole, while the debate over the impact of MNC 
activities rages on, the position of the metropolitan 
writers who emphasise on ways in which to maximise its 
benefits and minimise its costs seem in my opinion the 
most appropriate for policy makers and policy framers in 
the host countries. This is because, if one might borrow 
the words of Kolde, "The fact of the matter is,.... the 
MNC is neither all good nor all bad, and what all nations 
should be seeking through international law and other 
channels is to increase and consolidate the benefits 
while decreasing and eliminating the abuses". 80 And in 
this connection, the most influential of the arguments in 
defence of MNC activities, in my view is that by 
Vernon. 81 He reckons that in course of the historical 
process of relations between MNCs and host countries, the 
balance of bargaining power will shift to the host 
country over time. To buttress his argument, he cited the 
79 Akeredolu-Ale, E. O., The Underdevelopment of Indigenous Enterpreneurship in 
Nigeria. Ibadan university Press. 1985. 
so Kolde, E. J., International Business Enterprise . Englewood Cliffs. Prentice 
Hall. 1973 at p-186- 
81 Vernon op. cit. FN 38. 
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demise of the days of 'foreign investment and its 
partnership with the flag' i. e. direct foreign investment 
as an example. 82 Furthermore, the historical trend that 
Vernon sees f or host countries to re-negotiate the early 
contracts with MNCs and demand more of the profits 
realised f rom exploitation of their resources when that 
time reaches is also in my opinion accurate. The 
Organisation of petroleum exporting countries'(OPEC) 
assumption of power of control of world oil market from 
the erstwhile powerful international 'majors' (MNOCs) is 
a classic example. (This and other changes that have 
occurred in the history of the international petroleum 
industry are discussed in chapter Two. ) The tendency to 
re-negotiate or take other measures to ensure greater 
benefits for the host country comes about largely because 
most of the initial agreements in TWCs were negotiated 
with the MNCs under colonial or neo-colonial auspices. 
The emergence of more independent states, their growing 
expertise and increasing awareness of how unfavourable to 
the host countries the early contracts or agreements 
were, and coupled with the swings of the balance of 
bargaining power in their favour inevitably engender 
moves to redress the inequities. The international oil 
industry, which is uppermost on the mind of Vernon, is in 
fact a classic example of exactly this process at work. 
Thus we will come to realise this fully when we examine 
the petroleum development contracts between Nigeria and 
82 lbid p. 49. 
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the MNOCs as a model of the relations between them based 
on their bargaining strength over the years. 
40 
CHAPTER TWO. 
NIGERIAN FOREIGN INVESTMENT POLICIES AND PETROLEUM INDUSTRY. 
2.1 INTRODUCTION: 
in this chapter, a broad overview of Nigerian foreign 
investment policy in general and Government's policies in 
the petroleum industry is provided. Since Nigeria is a 
member of OPEC, the role of 'the Organisation in influencing 
these policies as well as its impact on the structure of the 
international oil industry are also discussed. Government 
policies in these areas are regarded as important for two 
reasons: (1) The policy guidelines of government towards the 
industry are crucial factors in understanding the 
development and evolution of the industry. (2) As already 
mentioned in chapter one, a look at the government policies 
towards foreign investments will also serve as pointers to 
our understanding the framework within which the petroleum 
contracts we will later examine are shaped. 
2.2 NIGERIAN FOREIGN INVESTMENT POLICIES. 
Nigeria's foreign investment posture have been a subject of 
much documentation over the years, especially since oil 
became a major part of its exports. 1 our aim here is not to 
treat the subject in detail but to highlight some of the 
important policy areas that relate to this study. 
1 See Proehl, P. O., Foreign enterprises in Nigeria: Laws and Policies, Chapel Nill, 
University of North Carolina Press, 1965; Akeredolu-Ale, E. O., "Private foreign investment 
and the underdevelopment of indigenous entrepreneurship in Nigeria" in Williams G., (ed) 
Nigeria: Economy and society, Rex Collins, London, 1976; Akinsanya, A., Economic 
independence and indigenisation of private foreign investments: The experiences of Nigeria 
and Ghana, Praeger, New York, 1983; Teriba, 0. and Kayode, M. O., Industrial development in 
Nigeria: patterns, problems and prospects, Ibadan Press, 1977 and Sanda, A, O,, The 
challenge of Nigeria's Indigenisation, 2982 to mention but a few. 
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Like in most past colonies, the colonial and immediate post 
colonial economic scene in Nigeria was characterised by 
technological limitationst capital shortages, lack of 
expertise and a paucity of skilled manpower. It was against 
this background that the British Colonial government adopted 
a "liberal" (i. e. "open door") policy toward private foreign 
capital. 2 Undoubtedly, the foreign investors took advantage 
of the policy and invested in manufacturing, commodity 
processing and mineral extraction, and in consequence, they 
became dominant in the Nigerian economy. The immediate post- 
independent Nigerian government saw the policy as 
appropriate and continued to maintain it. But the government 
added the requirement that these foreign investors should 
provide jobs to as many Nigerians as possible, which later 
was intensified and became known as the "Nigerianisation" 
policy. 3 
The major policy objective of the government at the time was 
to industrialise as a means of promoting rapid and orderly 
economic development. It introduced measures to involve both 
public and private foreign investors in the economic 
development scene. This was well spelt out in the country's 
First National Development Plan as follows, 
"Nigeria's economy is a mixed one. The 
government have taken an active part not only 
in providing the social but also the basic 
economic services, such as electricity and 
ports. The attitude of the government however, 
is entirely pragmatic and accepts the 
2 See Proehl op. cit. p. 159. 
3 Ibid, p. 24. 'Nigerianisation' means the replacement of foreign manpower by 
Nigerians in various levels of government and management. This policy was originally 
conceived in the wake of the various nationalist movements which preceded the grant of 
political independence in 1960. This pressure for Nigerianisation intensified even after 
independence especially on the part of the opposition party. 
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desirability of a mixed economy. At the same 
time, the government is convinced that no 
amount of government activity can effectively 
replace the efforts of a broadly based and 
progressive private sector". 4 
At the same time, efforts were made to create conducive 
atmosphere for direct foreign investments and protecting 
local industries. This was backed by liberal industrial 
legislations granting economic inducements to investors 
ranging from complete tax exemptions, tariff protection 
schemes, tax holidays, guarantees on capital transfer and 
protection against expropriation. 5 In return for these 
series of incentives provided by government, the country 
witnessed a tremendous upsurge in the number of private 
foreign enterprises in the country. 
An industrial and financial survey of 625 manufacturing 
firms operating in Nigeria in 1968 showed that out of a 
total paid-up capital of $179.8 million, private foreign 
investors accounted for almost 70 per cent. Of this figure, 
about 51 per cent was British, 20 per cent American and 22 
per cent Western European. The remaining 7 per cent was held 
between Syrians, Lebanese and Indians. 6 In another 
independent study of the ownership and control structures of 
1,320 companies (80 per cent) of all companies registered in 
the country in 1970 it was found that on estimate non- 
Nigerians held 40 per cent of the total value of shares as 
4 First Nigerian National Development Plan 1962-68, Lagos, Federal Ministry of 
information, at p. 21. 
5 These legislations included the Aid to Pioneer Industries Act 2952; the industrial 
Development (Import Duties Relief) Act 1957; the Industrial Development (Income Tax 
Relief) Act 1958; and Customs (Drawback) Regulations 1958, among others. 
6 industrial Survey of Nigeria, Lagos, June 1968; Federal office of Statistics, 
Lagos, 1970; Economic and Financial Review, Central Bank of Nigeria, Lagos, 1969 at p. 77 
and Hilton, F., Perceptions of Foreign Investment in Nigeria in Sauvant and Lavipour (eds) 
1976 p. 146. 
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against 33 per cent by Nigerians. Similarly, foreign 
institutions and f irms held 29 per cent as against 7 per 
cent by Nigerian f irms and institutions. Thus, whereas the 
combined holding of non-Nigerians was above 60 per cent that 
of Nigerians was below 40 per cent. 7 The overall pattern of 
ownership in these investments were foreign dominated. There 
was no change in the picture of large foreign ownership and 
participation even as late as 1971, eleven years after 
Nigeria's independence. 8 It is quite clear in the light of 
these facts, that members of the indigenous business 
community, government officials, politicians and the 
intelligentsia in Nigeria should demand a change of the 
country's investment policies in favour of Nigerians. 
in the early 1960s Chief Awolowo, the then Federal Minister 
of Finance is on record as having said to foreign investors: 
"Come to our aid in the meantime but in due course we will 
buy you out. "9 In 1970, a military government in which 
Awolowo was one of the most influencial figures in the 
economic policy-making, now started to put into effect the 
view which he had first expressed at a time well before the 
country's oil potential was fully appreciated. With 
increasing petroleum exports and substantial foreign 
exchange inflow in the 1970s, it was not surpising to see a 
7 See Teriba, Edozien and Kayode, "Some Aspects of Ownership and control structures 
of business enterprise in a developing economy: the Nigerian case", 14 Nigerian Journal 
of Economic ans Social Studies, 1972, p. 3 reprinted in Teriba and Kayode, (eds), 
industrial Development in Nigeria: Patterns, Problems and Prospects, p. 89, op. cit. 
8 Another writer notes that at the begining of the 1970s a majority interest was 
held by the United Africa Company (UAC) Group in 29 companies, by Lonrho in 24 companies 
and by John Nolt in at least 10. All the oil industry was in foreign ownership. See Sands, 
A. O., The challenge of Nigeria's indigenisation, op. cit., pp. 12-13. 
9 Awolowo, 0. quoted in Phillip, C. S. Jnr., The development of Nigerian Foreign 
Policy, Evanstone 1964, p. 46. 
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military government which comprised of some politicians 
including Awolowo who had been outspoken towards private 
foreign investment in the past, pursue a path that 
ultimately led to the policy of indigenisation to be 
adopted. A new breed of civil servants, professionally 
qualified and trained, working under a strong nationalistic 
sentiment at the time, lent their support to the 
introduction of such policy. This was how the Nigerian 
Enterprises Promotion Decrees 1972 and 1977,, which still 
form the bedrock of the country's investment policy came to 
be introduced. 10 This and other recent steps taken to 
encourage investment and measures by which the policy of 
indigenisation is to be attained in Nigeria will be 
considered in the ensuing paragraphs. 
2.2.1. ACCOUNT ON THE NIGERIAN ENTERPRISES PROMOTION 
DECREES. 
The Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree (NEPD) 1972 was 
the first practical legislative step taken by Nigeria 
towards the development of an economy largely dominated by 
Nigerians. The objectives of the Decree were derived from 
the Second National Development Plans of 1970-74 which 
conceived "indigenisation" as a logical continuation of the 
"Nigerianisation"11 policy on the political front which 
started soon after the World War 11. The NEPD was 
promulgated in February 1972 to fulfil the Second 
Development Plan's objectives. These objectives are: the 
10 They are commonly referred to as the Indigenisation Decrees'. 'Indigenisation' in 
this context refers to the indigenisation of ownership of foreign investment and can 
therefore be defined for present purposes as the transfer of proprietary interests in 
economic enterprises located in Nigeria from foreign into indigenous ownership. 
11 ror the meaning of 'Nigerianisation', see FN 3 supra. 
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creation of opportunities for indigenous businessmen; the 
maximisation of local retention of profits through a 
reorganisation of the ownership structure of the economy in 
favour of domestic capital; and the raising of the level of 
industrial intermediate capital goods production. The last 
was to be achieved by compelling the alien business 
community to move into more capital-intensive and more 
technologically advanced production, particularly in 
manufacturing. 12 
To compound the overall intentions of indigenisation, in a 
widely quoted speech, General Gowon, then head of state, 
during a state visit to Britain in 1973 provided an official 
summary of the perceived essence of the 1972 Indigenisation 
Decree. He posited that the government was consolidating 
political independence by doing all it could to provide more 
participation by Nigerians in economic life while attracting 
investment in sectors of the economy where Nigerians are not 
yet able to rely on themselves. 13 Furthermore, a strong 
economy controlled by the indigenuos business sector was 
seen by officials of the Gowon government as a cornerstone 
of domestic political stability and economic independence. 
Indigenisation, as an expression of economic nationalism, 
therefore, is meant to remove the dominance of the economy 
by foreigners and to put ownership and, 'as much as possible, 
control into the hands of Nigerians while leaving room for 
foreign participation or partnership in those sectors where 
12 See The Federation of Nigeria Second National Development Plan 1970-74, Federal 
Ministry of Information, Lagos, at p. 3 
13 General Y. Gowon as quoted by Collins, P., "The Policy of indigenisation, An 
overall view, " 9 Quarterly Journal of Administration, 1975 , p, 137, 
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this was considered desirable. 14 Successive Nigerian 
governments have also been quite clear on the necessity of 
economic independence and domestic political stability, 
which is hardly surprising given the traumas which were 
experienced by Nigeria during her civil war years from 1967- 
70. Accordingly,, it has been argued that while political 
self-determination is desirable as the inalienable right and 
ultimate goal of any country,, what is needed to make it 
meaningful, and to translate available resources into 
national prosperity is a firm economic base. Thus, in the 
government's view this economic base can only truly benefit 
the country if it was formed and controlled largely by 
Nigerians. 
The foreign investment regulatory regime in most developing 
countries nowadays usually operate on similar premise. 
Depending on each individual countries' political ideology 
or investment policy, the threats from foreign domination 
through foreign investment are met by either "expropriation" 
of the investment,, "indigenisation" or "cartelisation" on 
the OPEC model. As we will later discover, Nigeria in 
addition to choosing the indigenisation policy, adopts the 
cartelisation policy with respect to her oil industry 
through her membership of OPEC. Thus, the common denominator 
of these countries' responses is a policy of less dependence 
by greater or exclusive involvement of domestic capital,, 
14 see Brigadier Shehu Yar'Adua, Keynote Address to 
' 
the conference on Indigenisation, 
in Nigerian Institute of Hanagement in Nigeria, September, 1976, p. 11, 
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technological and managerial expertise in their development 
process. 15 
The right of Nation States to regulate foreign investment in 
any of the aforementioned ways is well established and is 
regarded as an attribute of Statehood itself. The competence 
of States in this area has been recognised in numerous 
General Assembly Resolutions16 and international 
conventions, 
17 and is attested to by the vast number of 
measures taken, unilaterally or on an international basis, 
which presuppose the competence of the State in the economic 
sphere. For example, State sovereignty and the principle of 
sovereign equality of states are translated in the economic 
arena into, inter alia, the right to regulate foreign 
investment and the right to nationalise foreign investment 
provided that "prompt,, adequate and effective" compensation 
is paid for any property taken from the foreign investor. 18 
Having said that, we will now proceed to examine the 
provisions of the NEPD 1972 and its subsequent amendments 
and partial repeal in the 1980s, ending with the NEPD 1989. 
15 See, Osunbor, O. A., "Nigeria's investment laws and state's control of 
Multinationals", 3 I. C. S. I. D. Rev. Foreign Investment Law Journal, 1988, p. 40. 
16 see for example, G. A Resolutions on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural resources, 
G. A. Ran. 1803 (XVII) of 1962, G. A. Declaration on the establishment of a New 
international Economic Order, G. A. Res. 3201 (S-V) 1974, the Charter of Economic Rights and 
Duties of states, G. A. Res. 3291 (XXIX) 1974 and the U. N. Code of Conduct for Transnational 
corporations, especially article 52, (U. N. Doc. E/ClO/AC. 2/8 of 1978). 
17 See the Articles of Agreement of the World Bank, Convention on Settlement of 
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other states 1965 (U. N. T. S. 159), 
Treaty of Rome (U. K. T. S. 15 1979, U. N. T. S. 298) and other such agreements that provide for 
regional economic cooperation and investment promotion and protection agreements of Nation 
States. 
is See Beveridge, F. C., "Taking control of foreign investment3 A case study of 
indigenisation in Nigeria", 40 international and Comparative Law Quarterly, 1991, p. 303. 
it needs be stressed here that the protection of investments (whether local or foreign) 
from expropriation has always been maintained in Nigerian Constitutions and in the current 
1979 Nigerian Constitution as amended by Decree No. 1 of 1984, such guarantee is set out in 
Section 40(l). 
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2.2.2. PROVISIONS OF THE INDIGENISATION DECREES 
The NEPD 1972, launched on the 13th of February 1972, as 
expected, listed those enterprises that are within the 
competence of Nigerians and are not capital intensive. Such 
enterprises were assumed to be within the ability of 
Nigerians to buy directly or with money which the government 
was willing to lend, or with credits which the government 
decreed the commercial banks to provide. The Decree 
categorised the enterprises into two Schedules according to 
their level of complexity and capital intensity. it reserved 
wholly for Nigerians all the 22 enterprises listed in 
Schedule 1. These included advertising, bread and candle 
making, road transport, laundering, the media and retailing, 
to mention a few. Under Schedule II of the 1972 Decree, 33 
types of businesses were to be owned and managed on a 
partnership basis. The NEPD required that all those 
businesses under Schedule Il that were owned by foreigners 
must sell 40 per cent of the equity shares of their 
businesses to Nigerians. The Decree barred aliens under 
Schedule II if their turnover or share capital were not more 
than N1,000,000 and N400,000 respectively. What it sought to 
achieve under this Schedule was the retention of the 
expertise and capital of the former foreign owners, by 
allowing them to own 60 per cent interest in the businesses. 
The businesses listed in Schedule Ii included, inter alia, 
domestic air traffic, shipping, construction and a wide 
range of basic commodity producing low technology 
manufacturers (furniture, matches, cement, etc. ). 
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Above all, the aim of the 1972 Decree was clearly to put 
small and medium-scale businesses into Nigerian, control. But 
by implication, businesses not listed by either schedule 
permitted 100 per cent ownership by foreigners. Such 
businesses not mentioned in the Decree include high-profile 
foreign subsidiary firms operating in high-technology, 
capital intensive activities like the oil industry, banking, 
insurance and large-scale manufacturing industries. 
For the purpose of implementing and enforcing its provisions 
the -Decree established the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion 
Board (NEPB) at the federal level, which in turn was 
assisted by Committees at the state levels. However, a 
number of problems were identified in the course of 
implementation of the Decree. The provisions themselves 
contained a lot of loopholes amongst which were lack of 
machinery for proper valuation of enterprises up for sale, 
lack of credit facilities from banks to most potential 
buyers, the arbitrary scheduling of the businesses and the 
omission of some. f rom the schedules and inadequate 
monitoring due to absence of inspectors. 
19 While a number of 
foreign firms doubtless availed themselves of the 
opportunities provided by these loopholes in the Decree, 
others were prepared to flout the provisions. ' Some 
commentators averred that implementation was also marred by 
some Nigerians through such acts as the amassing of shares 
by few individuals, fronting20 and corruption. 
21 Thus the 
19 Hegwa, S. A., 'Foreign direct investment climate in Nigerial The changing law and 
development policies% 21 Col. Journal of Transnational Law, 1983, pp. 498-489. 
20 See Sands, op. cit. p. 40. 
21 Bierstaker, T. J., "The illusion of state powert Tranonational corporations and the 
neutralisation of host countries", 17 Journal of Peace Research 1980, p. 207. 
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indigenisation programme was criticised for failing to widen 
Nigerian participation in the economy. There was clearly 
general concensus that the NEPD 1972 had failed to achieve 
its purpose. After three separate ammendments, it was 
repealed and replaced by the NEP Act 1977, following the 
recommendations of the Industrial Enterprises Panel which 
was set up to examine the 1972 NEPD implementation. 
The 1977 NEP Act provided for a continuity of the 
indigenisation policy following the pattern of the former 
legislation but it added new provisions that both tightened 
up and increased the restrictions on foreign investors in 
the country. The major addition in the 1977 Act was the 
increase in the number of Schedules from two to three. The 
Schedule 1 of the 1977 Act included all activities which had 
been covered by Schedule 1 of the 1972 Decree and also some 
which had appeared in the earlier Schedule II. It also added 
some new businesses such as hairdressing, radio, newspaper 
and television operation. Again the emphasis was on small 
and medium-scale enterprises. Schedule II comprised 
businesses in which though within the competence of 
Nigerians, foreign participation is considered desirable 
from the point of view of their potential capital 
contribution as well as managerial and technical expertise. 
While under the earlier; legislation (NEPD 1972) a 40 per 
cent Nigerian interest in the businesses listed in Schedule 
II were required, the 1977 Act provided that a 60 per cent 
indigenous holding should be achieved in the businesses 
listed under the new Schedule II. The new Schedule III 
consisted of businesses previously unaffected such as the 
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technology-intensive sectors- manufacturing of chemicals, 
drugs, glass, motor vehicles, oil servicing and marketing, 
among others. It stipulated that ownership of these by 
Nigerians must not be less than 40 per cent, since it is 
realised that the local capital and technology required to 
operate these businesses are lacking and the only way they 
can be developed is by encouraging and permitting the 
highest level of foreign participation. Thus contrary to the 
1972 Decree which permitted complete foreign ownership in 
residual enterprises, foreign investment in Nigeria today 
can in theory only be in a 'joint venture' form. 22 Any 
business not specifically mentioned in either Schedule I or 
II of the 1977 Act is deemed to fall within the ambit of 
Schedule 111.23 For instance, whereas most multinational 
investments in the commercial and manufacturing sectors now 
take the form of joint venture equity participation, 
investment in the petroleum exploration and production 
industry is undertaken by way of joint participation 
agreements, production sharing and risk service contracts 
with the MNOCs. 24 Companies engaged in petroleum exploration 
and production were allowed to engage in such other 
investment agreements as production sharing and risk service 
contracts as a form of inducement, cohsidering the strategic 
importance of that sector as the commanding height of the 
country's economy. 25 
22 See Osunbor, op. cit, p, 53, 
23 A clause to this affect is listed as item 43 in Schedule 112. 
24 Hors, discussion of these petroleum development agreements are contained in 
chapters 5 and 6 infra. 
25 This is because since 1982 crude oil exports accounted for not less than 90 per 
cent of Nigeria's GDP. 
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Generally, apart from the stiff resistance by few local 
26 subsidiaries and affiliates of MNCs. the rate of 
implementation of the 1977 Act is said to have been much 
higher than under the 1972 Decree. For example it is 
estimated that 1,200 foreign firms were affected by the 
provisions of the 1977 Act and that over 800 new foreign 
firms have come into existence between that time and 1983.27 
The NEPB in its Eighth Progress Report on the implementation 
of the 1977 Act recorded a satisfactory level of compliance 
by the businesses affected and added that most have been 
issued with either a provisional or final certificate of 
compliance with the Act. 28 The level of success achieved may 
not be unconnected with the fact that most MNCs had already 
become familiar with the tide of indigenisation or 
nationalisation elsewhere even before the maturing of 
economic nationalism in Nigeria. Most MNCs had conditioned 
themselves to demands for local participation in the older 
nations of Latin America and India , and were no longer 
reluctant to share their ownership of subsidiaries so long 
as there were other means of retaining control. 29 Commenting 
on this point with reference to Nigeria, Biersteker posited 
that MNCs in Nigeria have "developed a range of defensive 
strategies which effectively neutralise the Nigerianisation 
policy". He itemised these strategies as technical service 
26 For instance when the 1972 Act increased indigenous holdings in the banking and 
insurance sectors from 40 to 60 per cent, the Chase Manhattan Bank and American 
International Insurance Company refused to accept the increase and subsequently pulled out 
of the country. 
27 See Sands, op. cit. pp. 61-62. 
28 NEPD Sth Progress Report on the implementation of the 1977 Act, 1983 at p. l. 
29 Wallace, C., Legal control of the Multinational Enterprises, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1983, p. 54. 
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agreements, fronting, alteration of voting rights, bribery 
30 and flagrant violation. 
2.2.3 RELAXATION OF THE INDIGENISATION POLICY IN THE 1980s. 
The investment climate in Nigeria witnessed a considerable 
decline during the 1980s. The global recession and a chronic 
shortage of foreign exchange, resulting in particular from 
the fall in the price of oil, combined to produce a shortage 
of investors willing to enter the country. In order to 
improve the situation, the Nigerian government made no 
attempt to intensify f urther the indigenisation programme, 
instead many of the restrictions imposed on the foreign 
investments were relaxed or removed. 31 This process began in 
1981 when a number of activities were reclassified from 
Schedule II to Schedule III of the 1977 Act, thereby 
increasing the degree of participation of foreign interests 
in those activities from 40 per cent to 60 per cent. Other 
measures were taken by Government in the face of such 
falling investment flows to encourage foreign investment. In 
1986, Government established the IMF-World Bank sponsored' 
Second Tier Foreign Exchange Market (SFEM) to try and 
improve the availability of convertible currency. 32 In 1987, 
the amended Nigerian Enterprises Promotion (Issue of Non- 
voting Equity Shares) Decree provided that enterprises could 
raise capital by the issue of non-voting shares from 
indigenous or foreign sources in spite of the provisions of 
30 Bierstaker, op. cit. p. 3. 
31 Beveridge, op. cit. p. 320. 
32 see Second Tier Foreign Exchange Decree 1986, Decree No. 23 of 1986, Federal 
Republic of Nigeria, official Gazette No. 47, Vol. 73. As a consequence, the Nigerian 
currency-(Naira: N) suffered a heavy devaluation against the US$. The rate of exchange of 
the Naira is now determined at a weekly auction (FOREX market) supervised by the Central 
Bank. 
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the NEPD 1977, provided that the shares were paid for in 
foreign currency. 33 In 1988 steps were also taken to 
facilitate the establishment of new enterprises in Nigeria 
by streamlining approval and screening procedures. As part 
of this package of measures a new Industrial Development Co- 
ordinating Committee was established to ensure that new 
investments could be screened within 60 days and to cut down 
on unnecessary bureaucracies at this stage. 
34 And in the 
same year, Government signed a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU) with the foreign oil companies which contains fiscal 
incentives for new investments. 35 This was necessary because 
by the 1980s, oil had become the centre piece of the 
nation's economy by accounting for over 90 per cent of the 
country's foreign exchange earnings. 
The biggest move, however, came in 1989 when the 
indigenisation Act was amended so that only one list of 
scheduled enterprises has been retained, instead of three. 36 
The scheduled enterprises are those exclusively reserved for 
Nigerians. Foreign participation in those businesses are 
prohibited unless the value of the enterprise exceeded 
N20,000,00O. -In addition, foreign investors are permitted to 
own up to 100 per cent equity in any unscheduled enterprises 
with the exception of banking, insurance, petroleum 
33 See Section 6 of the NEPD 1987, No, 34, Federal Republic of Nigeria, Official 
Gazette, Vol. 74 No. 66. 
34 These measures were set out in the Industrial Development Coordination Decree 
1988, Decree No. 36 of 1988, Federal Republic of Nigeria, Vol. 75, No. 64. 
35 The HuO guarantees a minimum after-tax profit margin of $2 per barrel for the oil 
companies in exchange for stipulated exploration commitments. it also maps out five-year 
plan of exploration and capital investment designed to increase production and reserves. 
For more on this, see, Financial Times Harch 16,1990, Supplement on Nigeria, pp. vii-vii. 
36 See Section I of NEPD 1989, Federal Republic of Nigeria, Decree No. 54 of 1999, 
supplement to Official Gazette No, 76, Vol. 76. 
55 
exploration and production, where a 40 per cent limit on 
foreign involvement remains in place. 
These measures, according to incumbent President Babangida, 
are designed to boost the country's privatisation programme, 
speed up a debt-conversion scheme and reinforce the role of 
the foreign investment in the economy. 37 
There is no doubt the above measures will serve as the focal 
points for private capital flows to the country. In all 
probability Nigeria will continue to rely on foreign 
investment especially in its oil sector to finance her need 
for capital investment necessary for her economic growth for 
the forseeable future. Nevertheless, the conditions that 
impeded foreign investment flows in the past decade will not 
vanish simply because the indgenisation programme has been 
liberalised. Since the indigenisation policy is shaped in 
the larger political and economic context, its success in 
attracting foreign investors and meeting its objectives will 
depend to a large extent on whether broader regulatory 
reforms in other areas, political stability and 
diversification of the economy are instituted to improve the 
overall investment (whether local or foreign) climate in the 
country. 
2.3. IMPACT OF OPEC ON NIGERIAN OIL POLICIES 
Because of the vital role of OPEC in the formulation of 
Nigeria's oil policies or operations, discussion on OPEC 
becomes essential as a prelude to our analysis of its impact 
37 This was contained in the President's Budget Address on January 10,1989 reported 
in Financial Times January 17,1989 p. 12 under the caption, "Nigeria eases curbs on 
foreign investment". All these measures announced by the President were necessary because 
for instance figures for Nigeria's foreign debt as at March 1992 stood at $35 billion. See 
Financial Times March 23,1992, Supplement on Nigeria. 
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on Nigerian oil policies. it is now proposed to devote the 
following paragraphs on the evolution of OPEC and its impact 
on the international oil scene in general. 
2.3.1. OPEC AND THE CHANGES IN THE INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM 
INDUSTRY. 
The petroleum industry is one of the world's largest and 
most important. This is because modern civilization depends 
on petroleum and natural gas more than any other single 
commodity. Since its arrival on the global scene, it has 
become the world's principal lubricant, and in industry it 
is the largest source of energy. For instance, petroleum is 
used as fuel for all forms of transportation; it is an 
important source of energy for electricity generation and it 
is the basis from which such diverse products as plastics, 
fertilisers, detergents, explosives, cosmetics, 
pharmaceuticals, pesticides, etc, are made. Given its 
usefulness and essentiality in many areas, it is not 
surprising that the demand for petroleum has been soaring 
tremendously. World oil demand that was 21'billion barrels 
in 1973 rose to 45.6 billion in 1986 notwithstanding the oil 
glut that resulted from the world-wide economic recession 
and the concerted efforts at the substitution of alternative 
energy sources for oil. 
38 
From the time of the first major discovery of petroleum in 
Titusville, Pennsylvania in 185739 to the present, the 
structure of the international petroleum industry has 
38 This information is taken from Lukman, R., World Energy Market supply, OPEC 
Bulletin No. 34 1987 p. 24. 
39 The first major oil discovery is recorded to have taken place in 1857 by Colonel 
E. L. Drake in Titusville Pennsylvania. For an elaborate account see Tugendhat, C. et al, 
oil, the Biggest Business, Eyre & Methuen London 1975 chapter one, 
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undergone several changes. In this brief discussion on OPEC 
and the international oil scene, such changes will be 
highlighted from a historical perspective. For ease of 
presentation,, the discussion will be conveniently' divided 
into two phases in terms of shifts in power of control over 
the petroleum industry: 
(i) The Pre-OPEC era, when the world oil market was totally 
controlled by multinational firms known as the "majors"; and 
(ii) The Post-OPEC era, when many new competitors called 
"minors" arrived on scene in the oil market in addition to 
the "majors" producing an era of declining oil prices which 
led to the formation of OPEC; and the Organisation became 
stronger, relegating the MNOCs into the background in the 
oil market and the emergence of national oil companies in 
both oil producing and consuming countries. 
2.3.2 THE PRE-OPEC ERA IN THE INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM 
INDUSTRY. 
The scramble for the control of the world's oil began in 
i890 when Henri Deterding chartered a small Indonesian 
company to exploit the oil of the Dutch East Indies. This 
company was the seed for subsequent growth by amalgamation 
into the Royal Dutch/Shell. 40 By the turn of the century 
then, the company which is still among the top three in the 
world today had been joined by others, mainly American 
companies, in the oil exploitation business. Between 1918 
and 1945, by dint of colonial control over the Middle East, 
the four major Middle Eastern oil producers, Saudi Arabia, 
40 See Sampson, A., The Seven Sisters (The great oil companies and the world they 
make. ) Hodder & Stoughton. 1975 p. 23. 
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Iran, Iraq and Kuwait were divided up among the companies. 
At that time there were seven leading firms dominating the 
industry usually referred to as the "majors" or "Seven 
Sisters". 41 Five of these are American- Standard Oil (New 
Jersey), Texaco, Gulf, Mobil and Standard Oil of California; 
then there is British Petroleum, which is British owned and 
Royal Dutch Shell, which is Anglo-Dutch. In addition to the 
traditional seven, there was a French company called CFP- 
(Compagnie Francaise des Petroles), often referred to as the 
"eighth major", which though less important in international 
terms at that time nevertheless owned a significant share in 
Middle East oil production. 42 These companies were all 
vertically integrated entities and by mid-fifties they were 
in control of over 90 per cent of production, refining and 
marketing facilities in the non communist world outside the 
United States. They owned two-thirds of the world's tanker 
fleet and every important pipeline at the time. They 
produced oil in the Middle East, Africa, Latin America and 
the Far East, and transported it through owned or controlled 
pipelines, tankers and refineries to markets throughout the 
world. Their vast size and financial resources enable them 
to enter into high-risk and capital-intensive ventures such 
as petroleum exploration and production. Their research 
activities also help to maintain their technological 
superiority over the host countries. 
41 These companies are also referred to as the "Big Seven". see Tanzer, X., The 
energy crisis: World struggle for power and wealth, Honthly Review Press, 1974. 
42 A brief History of each of the international 'majors' can be found in Edith 
T. Penrose, The Large International Firm in Developing Countries: The International 
Petroleum Industry, Allen & Unwind, 1968 especially in chapter 4. 
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Furthermore, at that time too the price of oil was dictated 
by them under a basing point system centred on the U. S. Gulf 
irrespective of where the oil actually came from. one 
consequence of this price policy, from the point of view of 
many oil importing countries, was that they did not benefit 
from their proximity to oil producing areas, since for the 
purpose of price of oil it was only their distance from the 
U. S. Gulf which mattered. After World War II,, the Persian 
Gulf was made the second basing point for the Eastern 
Hemisphere market. By mutual consent, the majors declared 
the same price centred on Persian Gulf for crudes of 
different variety; these were then taken as bases for price 
fixation in the oil market. 43 
Added to their economic power and technical expertise, the 
majors derived invaluable political backing of their home 
governments, notably the U. S. and Great Britain. Indeed, the 
entire oil mining agreements in the early years, called 
'concessions', beginning from the Middle East through to 
Africa and Latin American oil producing countries, evolved 
under the regime of colonial rule which at the time wielded 
great influence in the areas of international relations. All 
these fact6rs contributed and provided the majors with a 
high degree of horizontal integration (i. e. ownership of and 
access to widely diversified sources of crude oil supply) in 
addition to their vertical integration through ownership of 
both upstream (crude production) and downstream (refiningr 
transport, and marketing) facilities. 
43 This discussion draws on Tanzer; op. cit,, chapter 2 and Hossain, K., Law and policy 
in Petroleum development. Frances Printer London 1979 chapter 1. 
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The dominance of the world oil market by the majors 
continued until after 1959, when they began to face 
challenges. The period from 1959 to 1960 marked a watershed 
in the international petroleum industry. The Middle Eastern 
countries soon after attainment of political independence 
began to mount challenges to the existing organisation of 
their oil resources. The old concession agreements concluded 
under colonial regime had originally given the oil firms 
(majors) proprietary rights to Middle Eastern oil for terms 
like sixty to seventy years not to mention the duration of 
extension of such agreements. The payment of taxation under 
the concession system was non-existent., instead the host 
countries were paid a fixed royalty per barrel. Factors such 
as this made the host countries to clamour for control over 
the organisation and development of their oil industry. 
Another challenge faced by the majors was caused by the re- 
entry of Soviet oil exports into the world market in 1958, 
and on a large scale in 1959. After the Russian Revolution, 
Soviet oil exports stopped until 1959, when their oil began 
once again to be sold to non-Soviet markets; and these were 
sold at a price lower than prevailing world oil price at the 
time. Furthermore, the final challenge, and no less 
important too,, was the emergence of new competitors from 
America and some state oil companies like the E. N. I. of 
Italy, whose search for cheap sources of oil abroad proved 
successful. The new comers are generally referred to as 
44 'international minors' or 'independents'. unlike the 
44 Among the oil firms known as the 'Kinors' were Phillips, Standard oil of Indiana, 
occidental, Pan American, otc. 
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@majors', who 'Possessed their own marketing outlets, the 
'minors', because they had none were prepared to sell their 
crude at a much lower than the prevailing price to 
independent refineries in Western Europe and Japan. In 
addition, they were willing to assist the host countries 
with exploratory activities as contractors or in joint 
ventureship deals with these countries, terms which were 
unacceptable to the 'majors. ' 
All of these factors made the petroleum industry more 
competitive, particularly from the point of view of the oil 
importing countries, who were now presented with many 
alternative sources from which they could buy oil. The 
'majors' were as a result forced to reduce oil prices in 
order to meet this competition. This, however, led to 
serious conflicts with oil producing countries, who had been 
since the early 1950s entitled to a '50/50' share of profits 
f rom oil, and the reduction in oil prices meant for them a 
lower return of oil revenue. Therefore, the reduction in oil 
revenues was unacceptable to the host countries' governments 
who responded with the formation of the OPEC. 
2.3.3 THE POST-OPEC ERA. 
As mentioned above, the formation of OPEC was as a result of 
a protest against the actions of the MNOCs (particularly the 
erstwhile 'seven majors') who hitherto alone determined the 
prices and level of oil produced. What can be described as 
the last straw occurred when in 1959, and again in 1960 the 
miocs unilaterally reduced the prices at which they sold 
venezuelan and Middle East oil. 45 This frequent reductions 
45 See Danielson op. cit. p. 223. 
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in oil prices without consultation with the oil producing 
countries led to five major oil producing countries 
comprising- Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela 
to meet in Baghdad on September 14,1960 and founded OPEC to 
46 defend their interests. 
The raison de'tre' of the organisation as spelt out in the 
statute creating it are as follows: 
" (i) The coordination and unification of the 
petroleum policies of member countries and the 
determination of the best means for 
safeguarding their interests individually and 
collectively; 
(ii) devising ways and means of ensuring the 
stabilisation of prices in international oil 
markets with a view to eliminating harmful and 
unnecessary fluctuations and 
(iii) ensuring a steady income to the producing 
countries and also an efficient, economic and 
regular supply of petroleum to consuming 
nations and a fair return on their capital to 
those investing in the petroleum industry. " 7 
The organisation now has a 
Apart from the five founding 
are: Qatar (1961), Indonesia 
(1967-which merged with the 
Algeria (1969),, Nigeria (1! 
(1975). 
total membership of thirteen. 
members, the other full members 
(1962). Libya (1962), Abu Dhabi 
United Arab Emirates in 1974), 
)71),, Ecuador (1973) and Gabon 
46 The tight Conference (Zxtra ordinary) of OPEC hold in Geneva In 2965, adopted the 
statute of the Organisation. OPEC Resolution Vill 56 (April 2965). 
47 Taken from Article 2(A) (B) and (C) of OPEC Statute. Ibid. 
63 
Table 2.4 
OIL RESERVES, POPULATION AND GNP PER CAPITA IN OPEC MEMBER 
COUNTRIES,, 1990. 
Country Reserves Population GNP per capita 
(billion/bris) (millions) (U. S. $) 
Saudi Arabia 260.04 16.5 56,380.2 
I. R. Iran 92.86 55.3 4,306.1 
Kuwait 97.00 3.0 8,318.7 
Iraq 100.00 18.8 1,933.7 
Venezuela 60.05 19.7 437.2 
Qatar 4.50 5 16,551.1 
S. P. Libya A. J. 22,80 4: 2 6jO88.4 
Indonesia 2.90 191.3 528.4 
U. A. E 98.10 2.2 19,805.3 
Algeria 9.20 25.6 11637.4 
Nigeria 17.10 88.5 201.2 
Ecuador 1.43 10.4 944.9 
Gabon 1.77 1.6 31804.2 
Sources: International Petroleum Encyclopedia, 1990, an 
OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin 1991. 
OPEC was the f irst institution created on the international 
level aimed at safeguarding and defending the common 
petroleum interests of underdeveloped producer countries. 
Since its creation, the Organisation, on the whole, has had 
two main goals- to raise the taxes and royalties earned by 
member states from crude oil and to assume control over 
production and exploration from the MNOCs. 48 
These objectives were achieved to some extent between 1970 
and 1973. They were achieved fully in the aftermath of the 
Arab-Israeli war of that year. 49 And from that time on the 
structure and operation of the international petroleum 
industry began gradually to change. For instance, whereas 
OPEC's demand for higher prices failed in the sixties 
48 The following discussion draws an Ajomo M. A. "An appraisal of the OPEC. Vol. 23 
Texas international Law Journal 2977 p. 14. 
49 The combined effects of the closure of the Suez canal in 2970 following the 1967 
and 2970 -73 Middle East wars and the embargo placed on supplies of Arab oil to the U. S. 
for supporting Israel led to the increase In oil price which OPEC had been seeking. 
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because of their inability to control production, after the 
1973 war it has been possible both to increase the price and 
to regulate production. Aside from the increase of crude oil 
prices from about $1.28 in 1970 to $11.65 per barrel after 
October 1973f state-owned oil companies were formed by 
member-countries which entered into many joint exploration 
agreements with the 'minors'. 50 Perhaps more remarkable 
development than these two was the increasing participation 
by governments in running their respective oil industries. 
in 1971, Algeria nationalised its oil industry, and by 1973, 
the Libyan government had 51 per cent ownership in her oil 
concessions. Nigeria took over 35 per cent of Shell-B. P. 
concessions, now increased to 60 per cent. Saudi Arabia,, 
Qatar, Abu Dabi, Iraq and Kuwaiti governments took over 51 
per cent of equity in oil companies operating in these 
countries. Indeed Seymour summed up the whole event in these 
words, 
"When the OPEC member governments took over 
full responsibility for the pricing of their 
crude oil exports in 1973-4, it marked the end 
of an era as far as the major international oil 
companies and the industrialised consuming 
countries were concerned. some of the 
implications of this momentous decision took a 
few more years to work themselves out. But 
basically, it was clear that the timespan of 
control by the major multinationals over the 
oil resources of the main exporting area was 
drawing to an Tnd after nearly three quarters 
of a century. "S 
The situation as it is today contrasts sharply with that 
prevailing in the international petroleum industry three 
decades ago. Oil prices are no longer f ixed by the old oil 
50 Seymour op. cit p. 5. 
51 Seymour I., OPEC Instrument of change op. cit. p. 247. 
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cartel, the 'majors', this role having been taken over by 
the OPEC. The MNOCs no longer control oil production in oil 
producing countries and majority ownership has passed into 
the hands of the host governments. This will become evident 
in our discussion on the Nigerian oil policies below. Again, 
whereas the home countries of the MNOCs were so vigorous in 
the past in defending these companies' interests in the host 
countries, now these governments are often more concerned 
with maintaining good relations with, and flow of oil from, 
the oil producing countries. 
Thus, the assumption of ownership and control of their oil 
industries' operations by the governments of oil producing 
countries broke a link in the integration that had 
characterised the operations of the MNOCs notably the 
@majors'. Although this in itself does not affect the 
lucrative profits these companies have made, caused by 
higher oil prices; the MNOCs are said to have increased 
their profit by 50 to 70 per cent in recent years. 52 The oil 
producing countries do need the MNOCs in spite of this. Most 
of them are still greatly dependent on these firms in three 
key areas: (a) oil technology, (b) management skills, and 
(c) marketing. Their control over these areas will continue 
to give good profit figures and bargaining power for them 
for some years to come. The nationalisation of their 
interests in some countries has not jeopardised their access 
to crude oil; in such cases they resort to buying a bulk of 
the oil from oil producing countries in order to refine and 
resell for profit elsewhere. But where their interests have 
52 see oprc Annual statistical Bulletin 1991 at p. 139. 
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not been fully nationalised, they continue to manage the 
industry until the locals through their National oil 
companies are capable to run their own oil industries 
independently of them. Nigeria is an example par excellence 
of the latter position as we will see in our discussion on 
activities of NNPC-her state-owned oil company in chapter 
three. 
2.3.4 OPEC'S INFLUENCE ON NIGERIAN OIL POLICIES 
2.3.5 BACKGROUND ACCOUNT ON THE NIGERIAN OIL INDUSTRY. 
Nigeria was under British rule when the f irst discovery of 
oil in commercial quantity was made in 1957. The terms and 
agreements under which the oil was exploited were worked out 
between the Shell-BP and the British Government. Shell-BP 
was the principal company undertaking oil exploration and 
production operations in the country then.. although there 
has been sporadic exploration by others prior to that date. 
such monopolistic position held by Shell-BP in the past with 
respect to rights of oil exploitation accorded it a position 
of dominance in the history of oil development in Nigeria 
which it still enjoys to-date. 
53 
At that time, because Nigeria was still a British colony, 
only British companies and those of other Western nations 
duly permitted by Britain were allowed to engage in oil 
operations in the country. After attaining independence in 
1960, the Nigerian government became concerned over the 
long-term economic and political implications of Britain's 
53 According to the migerian oil Directory 199o, the total Crude Oil production 
figure for that year was 23o6 aillion barrels per annum, and out of this, Shall alone 
accounted for 49.2 per cent, Gulf contributed 25.9 per cant, Mobil's was 22.3 per cent and 
the others contributed the rest. 
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major influence over oil operations in the country. Because 
of the advantages that could be derived by opening up 
business links with other countries of the world, the policy 
of multilateral economic relations with the rest of the 
world was adopted. one Nigerian writer also described it 
simply as an 'open door policy'. 54 That marked the end of 
Shell-BP's hitherto virtual monopoly. In 1961, the Nigerian 
government granted Mobil Exploration Nigeria Ltd, a 
subsidiary of the American Socony-Mobil oil company (one of 
the "majors"), licence to join in the exploration search. 
Thereafter, other MNOCs (both "majors" and "minors" 
included) joined in the search, viz. SAFRAP, a French oil 
group, AGIP, a subsidiary of Italian state oil company, 
Phillips, a Subsidiary of American Phillips oil company, 
Tenneco, a subsidiary of Tenneco Incorporated of America, 
Japanese petroleum company, Occidental, a subsidiary of 
Occidental of America, Ashland, subsidiary of Ashland of 
America and a host of others. See Appendix C which shows the 
oil companies and their activities in Nigeria. 
The operational activities of these companies were governed 
by government licences and legislation which prescribed 
areas of operation for each of them. The principal 
legislation under which these companies operated at the time 
was the Mineral Oils Act 1914 and their profits were taxed 
in accordance with the Petroleum Profits Tax Act 1959. 
Because Nigeria lacked the technology, managerial expertise 
54 Samegbon, X. r., 'Current development in oil and gas law in Nigeria with comparative 
analysis with other African oil producing countries. " Energy Law, vol. 1 2981 p. 365 
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and Initial capital needed to exploit its petroleum 
resources, she had to grant initially favourable concessions 
to these companies to assist in that regard. A detailed 
analysis on the nature of the early concession agreements 
Nigeria had with these companies is contained in chapter 
Four of this study. 
With the earlier surge in the number of MNOCs in Nigeria 
coupled perhaps with the bargaining experience gained by 
Nigeria from the conditions that existed between her 
affiliates of the multinationals in the Middle East and 
their host Arab oil producing countries, some changes to the 
petroleum operations regime at the time became necessary. it 
was clear to Nigeria that the liberal nature of the Mineral 
oils Act 1914, which was passed when Nigeria was under 
colonial rule, could not sustain much longer the modern 
pressure and trends then in the industry. Hence, in 1969, 
the first major attempt at enacting a detailed and 
comprehensive statute for the grant of rights to petroleum 
development in Nigeria was made with the promulgation of the 
Petroleum Act 1969.55 The 1969 Act introduced many major 
changes compared to the 1914 Act especially in such matters 
as duration, rent and royalties, employment terms, training 
and transfer of technology, etc. 56 These changes in the 
legislation were necessary due to the fact that by 1969, 
there were as many as fourteen MNOCs from six different 
55 Petroleum Act No. 51 (Petroleum Drilling and Production Regulations) 1969. Laws of 
the Federation of Nigeria. Lagos 1969. 
56 Similarly, the Petroleum Profits Tax Act 1959 was amended in 1967,1977 and in 
1979. This is a legislation which imposes tax upon profits from petroleum operations in 
Nigeria. 
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countries engaged in petroleum development activities in 
Nigeria, either in partnerships or on their own; and besides 
at that time Nigeria had began to feel the impact of oil 
proceeds on her economy and therefore wanted more control 
and regulation of the operations of the industry. 
2.3.6 GOVERNMENT ROLE IN THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY. 
Even after independence, the Nigerian government did not 
embark on or concern itself with making oil policies for the 
country until 1967.57 Attention of government at the time 
was on the agricultural sector, which as seen in the 
preceding chapter, was hitherto the mainstay of the nation's 
economy. The advent of oil with the surge in oil revenue for 
the country led to the relegation of agriculture to the 
background. Attention began to be iocussed on oil with the 
establishment of a Petroleum Division under the ministry oi 
Mines and Power in 1967. The late sixties witnessed 
substantial discovery of oil in the Middle East, Latin 
America and consequently, a number of MNOCs (the 'minors') 
having their own. equity crude were looking for avenues to 
dispose of their surplus oil in the market. 58 This situation 
led to intense competition and the MNOCs resorted to 
incessant cuts in oil prices without consulting the oil 
producing countries whose revenue derive, from such prices. 
As a result, the Nigerian government, through the Ministry 
of Mines and Power began to review financial agreements with 
57 For a fuller discourse on the role of the technocrats and oil administrators in 
the Ministry of Mines and Power in moving the government into policy-making for the oil 
industry, See Turnerl T., "The transfer of oil technology and the Nigerian state" 7 
Development and change 1976 pp. 365-375. 
58 For a more extended discussion on this see Tanzer, M., The political economy of 
international oil and the underdeveloped countries. Beacon Press 1969 pp. 29-79. 
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the MNOCs. 59 Influenced by the attention OPEC was devoting 
to the problem of increasing oil revenues for its member 
countries, the ministry spearheaded the government into 
policy making for the oil industry. 60 
The situation at the time, as we saw earlier, was such that 
the OPEC countries had no influence whatsoever on the 
conduct of operations or in the determination of the prices 
paid for the oil. By the same token, government revenue was 
determined more or less unilaterally by the MNOCs; any 
attempt by any producing country to interfere as Nigeria did 
was considered an affront and was dismissed. 61 In the 
absence of a unified resistance by the oil producing 
countries, the MNOCs were under no constraint in determining 
the level of production and oil prices. Such action was 
perceived as undermining the sovereignty of these countries. 
Hencer the formation of OPEC and the increasing dependence 
of the world on OPEC oil gave the members an avenue by which 
they could unify and coordinate their oil policies with a 
view to exerting control on the exploitation of their 
resources. 
An important milestone in the history of the Nigerian 
petroleum industry took place in July 1971 when Nigeria 
formally became the eleventh member of the OPEC. Nigeria 
joined OPEC at a time when memberstates were consolidating 
oil policies in their respective states with a view to 
59 This was when the terms under the traditional concession regime were reviewed and 
replaced by the oil Mining Lease (OML) and oil Prospecting Licence (OPL) agreements 1969. 
it was the same time too that the Petroleum Profits Tax (PPT) Act 1959 was repealed and 
replaced by the 1967 PPT Act. 
60 See Turner op. cit. p. 366. 
61 See Nwankwo, A. A., After oil, what next? oil Multinationals in Nigeria. Fourth 
Dimension, Enugu 1982 p. 32 
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exercising greater control in the exploitation of their 
petroleum resources. Prior to her membership of OPEC, 
Nigeria had participated in the organisation's deliberations 
in 1968 as an observer. 62 Since becoming a member, Nigeria 
has structured her oil legislation, fiscal policies and even 
petroleum development -contracts in tune with the trends in 
OPEC. Perhaps why it took Nigeria more than a decade after 
attaining independence to join the OPEC might be due to the 
influence of the British Government's policies on Nigeria 
then, which so long as Nigeria still adopted those policies, 
such membership would not have come about. 
The first effort of Nigerian government in playing a 
regulatory role over oil operations started in 1971, 
following the example of OPEC memberstates, with the 
creation of a state oil company - the Nigerian National oil 
Corporation (NNOC). But it was not until 1975 that the 
Petroleum Division under the Ministry of Mines and Power was 
accorded the status of a full-fledged Ministry - the 
ministry of Petroleum Resources. By 1977, the Ministry was 
merged with the NNOC to form the Nigerian National Petroleum 
Corporation (NNPC), the activities of which today, cover all 
facets of the integrated oil industry. The NNPC serves as 
the main agency through which government strives to achieve 
its policy objectives, and it also engages on behalf of the 
government in negotiations and signing of all petroleum 
development contracts with the MNOCs. 63 
62 See Understanding the Nigerian oil industry: NNPC Publication. Public Affairs 
Department, Lagos 1986 p. 53. 
63 For a detailed analysis on the activities of NHPC see Chapter Three infra. 
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Even though signs of Nigeria's participation in the 
operations of the oil industry first appeared in 1962, when 
the government was given an option to participate in AGIP's 
operations should the latter's exploration efforts prove 
successful, this option was not exercised until 1971.64 
Under the old concession regime, the idea of state 
participation hardly ever existed. At that time, the MNOCs 
not only prevented Nigeria and indeed other host countries 
from obtaining a meaningful share in the equity ownership 
but also denied them effective participation in the 
management and control of the various operations of the 
industry. The reason behind AGIP's offer for participation 
at the time might not be unconnected with its position as 
one of the "minors" in competition with the erstwhile "Seven 
Majors" for exploration opportunities in Nigeria. However, 
whatever the reason, it was a landmark. 
The aims of Nigeria for seeking participation is discussed 
at length in Chapter four. Hence,, there is no need f or a 
repeat here. Suffice it to state here that, generally, 
Nigeria, like other oil producing countries seems to look at 
state participation as a political as well as an economic 
necessity. In brief, it can be stressed that the desiderata 
of the government have centred on control and financial 
returns accruing to it through participation. This is 
premised on the argument that the government could receive, 
in addition to tax and royalties, dividends proportionate to 
its interest in the venture. 
64 See the discussion on participation agreements generally in chapter four of this 
study. 
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The first participation arrangement effected by Nigeria was 
with SAFRAP (now ELF) in 1971. Government acquired 35 per 
cent participation interest in ELF's operations as a 
precondition for allowing the company to resume operations 
in Nigeria after the civil war. 65 In October of the same 
year its option to acquire 33 1/3 per cent interest in 
AGIP's operations was implemented. The decision in 1971 to 
take active part in the oil industry was prompted by two 
OPEC Resolutions; the f irst Resolution was passed in June 
1968 which embodied a policy statement calling for 
renegotiation of concession arrangements between 
memberstates and MNOCs, and the second Resolution in 1971 
re-emphasised that members should take steps to acquire 20 
per cent participation interest by 1981.66 The first- OPEC 
Resolution which urged participation by government state oil 
companies in the oil production operations in old 
concessions clearly stated as follows: 
"Where provision f or Government participation 
in the ownership of the concessions-holding 
company under any of the present petroleum 
contracts has not been made, the Government may 
acquire a reasonable participation (not equity 
shares) on the grounds of the principle of 
changing circumstances". 67 
in keeping with OPEC Resolution on participation, government 
increased its participation interests from 51 to 55 and then 
65 During the 30 months Nigerian civil war (1967-70) ELF was found to be in support 
of the Biafran side against the Federal side. That was a sort of penalty to the company 
for such action. 
66 OPEC Resolution VXVI, 90 (June 1968) and OPEC Resolution XXIV 135 (July 1971) 
respectively, Most importantly, the June 1968 Resolution emphasised, inter alia, that 
member governments should endeavour to explore for and develop their hydrocarbon resources 
directly, acquire reasonable participation in the ownership of the oil companies and base 
the assessment of the companies' income taxes and any payments to the government on a 
posted or tax reference price for those hydrocarbons produced under contract. 
67 OPEC, Resolution xvi, 90 of June 25,1968; OPEC Resolutions, Vol. 2, p. 12. 
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to 60 per cent in 1972,1974 and 1979 respectively. As a 
result, todayr in all the ten joint venture agreements 
operating in the country, government via the agency of NNPC 
has 60 per cent interest. 
68 Nowadays, the trend in petroleum 
development agreements is towards Production Sharing and 
Risk Service contracts as that negotiated between NNPC and 
ASHLAND in 1973 and with AGIP in 1979 respectivL.. Ly. These 
contracts, as we will see in chapter five where they are 
treated in detail, originated and had earlier been in 
application in some OPEC countries. In effect, Nigeria got 
the idea of such contracts from those OPEC member countries. 
Notable among these countries is Indonesia where the 
production sharing contract is said to have originated. The 
most recent joint venture agreement in the Nigerian 
petroleum industry, however, is that between NNPC on the one 
hand, and SHELL,, AGIP and GULF on the other, which was 
signed in 1988 for the development of gas liquefaction plant 
for Nigeria. 69 All these participation policy measures are 
geared towards effecting Nigeria's active participation in 
the oil industry and ensuring that the government derives 
maximum benefits from its petroleum resources. As a result, 
the policy of making participation agreements is formally 
embodied in the Petroleum Decree 1969 (As amended) in 1979. 
Under Section I paragraph 34(a) of the Decree, the Minister 
for Petroleum Resources, may whenever he considers it to be 
in the public interest impose on a licensee or lessee 
68 This in graphically illustrated in Appendix c on activities of the oil companies 
in Nigeria. 
69 This discussion in further broadened supra under the section on Recent 
Developments. 
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special terms and conditions not inconsistent with the 
Decree as to participation by the Federal government in the 
venture. 
2.3.7 NGERIA'S OIL POLICIES AFTER OPEC MEMBERSHIP 
Generally, there are three important aspects of the Nigerian 
petroleum industry which form the basis to official action 
on policy matters. First and foremost, the entire ownership 
of all Mineral oils and gas in, under or upon any lands in 
Nigeria vest in the state. 70 Mineral oils and natural gas 
under the territorial waters of Nigeria or found in, under 
or upon any land which forms part of the continental shelf 
are also owned by the state. The Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria 1979 (as amended in 1986) further 
emphasised the state ownership in section 40 (3) which 
provides that 
"[t]he entire property in and control of all 
minerals, mineral oils and natural gas in, 
under or upon any land in Nigeria or upon the 
territorial waters and the Exclusive Economic 
zone of Nigeria shall vest in the government of 
the Federation and shall be managed in such 
manner as may be established by law. "71 
As a result, any organisation or group of persons who wishes 
to undertake any activity for the exploration for or 
production of mineral oils or natural gas requires af ormal 
authorisation by the state. 
72 As has generally been the 
practice with most former British colonies, Nigeria 
inherited this policy f rom Britain. As in Britain, the 
70 Petroleum Act 1969 section 1. 
71 See Section 40(3) The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979 as 
amended in 1988. 
72 For a thorough and incisive analysis on the legal aspects of ownership of 
petroleum resources in Nigeria, see Momodu, K, M,, "Legal Aspects of Ownership of Natural 
gas in Nigeria" 6 JENRL No. 4 1988. 
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essence of the policy lay in the vesting of all petroleum 
interest in the Crown. 73 This was part of the general 
colonial mining policy at the time. 
74 Secondly, owing to the 
dearth of managerial expertise and technological know-how, 
the country's petroleum resources are at present largely 
developed and controlled by the MNOCs. 75 The same can be 
said of most other oil producing developing countries- 
Libya, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Iran, Saudi Arabia 
and the Caribbean. 
The net effect of this is that in Nigeria, as in those other 
countries mentioned, the government plays a dual role. In 
the first place, it formulates policies and lays down rules 
which regulate the operations of the oil industry. 
Similarly, being the sole supplier of mining or exploration 
licences, the government is invariably a party to all 
petroleum development contracts through the NNPC- the 
national oil company. The position in Nigeria which is same 
as in the U. K. and also in most oil producing developing 
countries thus differs from that in the US where mining 
agreements are generally entered into between prospectors 
73 This is set out in Petroleum (Production) Act, 1934,24 and 25 Geo. 5 C. Section 
61. a u. K. Government Legislation. 
74 See colonial Office, Memorandum on Colonial Mining Policy, colonial No, 206, 
H. M. S. O., 1964, p. 4. one of the reasons profered by the colonial Government in support of 
this policy is that "Minerals are important economic assets to a territory and being the 
gift of nature, their benefits should be shared by the community generally, to whom they 
belong and not to be enjoyed merely by limited groups of private individuals who are not 
members of the community concerned". Taken from the Memorandum on Colonial Mining Policy. 
75 The discussion here in extremely terse. For a detailed and balanced treatment see 
chapter Seven infra. 
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and landowners, and where ownership in oil is vested not in 
the state or the Crown but in the discoverer. 76 
The third important aspect of the Nigerian petroleum 
industry is that owing to lack of a big internal market, in 
contrast to the U. S. A., only a very small proportion of its 
oil is consumed locally, the rest is sold in world markets 
in competition with oil from other countries. This has 
important implications because the demand for oil from any 
one producing country is highly elastic to changes in the 
terms on which oil in another producing country is produced 
and made available to consumers. 
77 For instance, if the cost 
of any one country's oil is significantly higher than the 
cost of oil in other sources then, customers will shift to 
the. cheaper sources. Nigerian oil, as we noted above is 
largely produced by the same group of integrated MNOCs who 
produce oil in other host countries and buy back the bulk of 
it themselves. From the point of view of these MNOCs, the 
relevant considerations when making decisions about the 
geographic pattern of their commitments,, are not only the 
comparative costs of producing oil in various areas and 
bringing it to the consumers, but also the comparative terms 
of their mining agreements especially the fiscal obligations 
78 
which will ultimately affect their net integrated returns. 
Fourthly, Nigeria exhibits a classic example of an oil- 
dominated economy. Hence I the need to maximise returns f rom 
76 See Blinnj K, W, et al, International petroleum exploration and exploitation 
agreements. Euromoney Publications 1986 p. 25 
77 This scenario occurs most between OPEC and non-OPEC nations, for a more lucid 
account on this see Seymour, I, "OPEC and Structural changes" in Hawdon, D., The changing 
structure of the world oil industry, Croom Helm London. 1985 p. 71. 
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oil has been the top-most feature of the country's oil 
policy. As the largest single contributor to the country, s 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), oil has enabled the country to 
pursue ambitious development programmes in the past as well 
as the present. In 1990, for instance, it contributed over 
96 per cent of the country's total export and over 90 per 
cent government revenue. 79 Thus, from 1957 to the present, 
the policy posture of Nigeria has shifted from the initial 
position of a collector of royalties and regulator of MNOCs 
operations to that of a participant in the exploration for 
and production and marketing of oil. In addition, through 
her membership of OPEC, Nigeria, collectively with other 
member countries are able to influence the price of oil in 
the world market. Nigeria's membership with OPEC and 
formation of NNPC., all in the same year (1971), largely 
contributed in bringing about this shift. 
The Nigerian government's ef forts to maximise its returns 
from oil can be seen in the light of the country's 
participation, production, marketing and pricing policies 
which are discussed below. It is in this context that our 
discussions on the impact of OPEC on Nigerian oil policies 
are to be understood. 
2.3.8 PRODUCTION POLICY 
Since more than 90 per cent of Nigerian crude oil is 
exported, the issue of determining the level of production 
of such oil acquires special importance. This is because the 
78 See Nwankwo op. cit. p. 37. 
79 Takcn from Financial Timcs. London (hcreafter FI) March, 12 1991 
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level of production takes into account the demand for oil at 
domestic level and in the world at large as well as the 
financial return that accrues to the country. Especially so 
if one considers that the objective for development of 
petroleum resources in Nigeria as stated in the country's 
Second National Development Plan is, "to earn foreign 
exchange through its local processing to reduce import bills 
and to provide funds for financing expanding investments in 
the economy as a whole. "80 In pursuance of this objective, 
NNPC on behalf of government, initially encouraged a large 
scale production and export of oil to earn more foreign 
exchange. Production figures, in daily average and yearly 
totals from 1958 to 1990 are reflected in Table 2.2 below. 
80 See The Second National Development Plan document. Plan 1970-74 ( Lagos, Federal 
Ministry of information 1970. p. 143. 
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TABLE 2.2 
NIGERIA: CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION-1958- 90(THOUSAND BARRELS) 
YEAR DAILY AVERAGE ANNUAL TOTAL 
1958 5.1 1,876 
1959 11.2 5,950 
1960 17.4 12,318 
1961 46.0 29,108 
1962 67.5 53,745 
1963 76.5 81,668 
1964 120.2 125,661 
1965 274.2 225,744 
1966 417.6 378,168 
1967 319.1 494,640 
1968 141.3 546,355 
1969 540.3 743,565 
1970 11083.1 1,138,896 
1971 1,531.2 1,697,784 
1972 11815.7 2,362,331 
1973 2,054.3 3,112,150 
1974 2,255.0 3,935,225 
1975 1,783.2 4r586,093 
1976 2,066.8 5,342,537 
1977 2,085.1 6,103,598 
1978 1,897.0 6,796,000 
1979 2,302.0 7,636,228 
1980 2,058.0 8,389,456 
1981 1,439.6 8,914,910 
1982 1,287.0 9,384,665 
1983 1,235.5 9,835,622 
1984 1,388.0 10,343,630 
1985 1,498.9 10,890,729 
1986 1,466.6 11,426,038 
1987 1,323.0 11,908,933 
1988 1,367.6 12,409,461 
1989 1,716.3 13,035,910 
1990 1,726.7 13,666,156 
Source; Petroleum Inspectorate, NNPC,, Falomo Office, Lagos 
and OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin 1991. - 
Since the first export of oil began in 1958, production had 
increased steadily. Production commenced that year at a 
modest rate of 5,100 barrels per day. That figure doubled 
the following year and as shown in Table 2.2, it reached its 
daily peak of 2.5 mb/d of production in April 1974. There 
has been a decline in production since 1982. Although the 
optimum production capacity of the country currently stands 
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at 2.2 mb/d, the current production rate as dictated by OPEC 
is about 1.6 mb/d. 81 The drop in production after 1979 is 
explainable by the impact on the importers of the rise in 
oil prices in 1973/74,82 and by the growing conservation 
tendencies among the exporters. The price increase had the 
double effect of inhibiting consumption and simultaneously 
making the increase in production at pre 1970s' rates 
unnecessary because of the increased return per barrel of 
exports, and the rise in total revenues collected by Nigeria 
and other OPEC member countries. 
in effect, the conclusion to be deduced from the foregoing 
is that in the decades preceding the 1970s, the production 
policy of Nigerian government seems to have been to produce 
and sell as much oil as possible in order to earn a 
considerable amount of revenue with no concern for depletion 
or conservation. But a departure from this policy occurred 
from the 1970s,, with some concern "for conservation, thus, 
leading to a reduction in the level of production. Perhaps 
the production policy of the post 1970s was easy to adopt in 
as much as the price increases permitted Nigeria and other 
exporting countries to make substantially increased revenues 
without a proportional increase in production. However, it 
was not price developments alone which led to the decrease 
in the level of production by Nigeria. In addition to price 
developments, there was the growing awareness among 
81 Taken from the FT, London March 12,1991. 
82 The rise in oil prices was caused by the aftermath of the embargo placed on oil 
exports by the Gulf states to the US and The Netherlands for their support of Israel 
during the Arab/Israeli war of 1973. This action led to panic in the oil market that 
resulted in a dramatic increase in the price of oil from $2.30 to $11.00 per barrel. For 
details on this see Danielsen, A. L, The Evolution of OPEC. Harcourt Brace Publishers 1982 
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exporting countries in the 1970s which began to dominate 
thinking about reserves and production in relation to the 
finiteness or exhaustion of oil resources. Hence, the need 
arose to extend the life-span of oil reserves in order to 
enable social and economic development in oil exporting 
countries to catch up with or match with the extensive 
depletion of their reserves. 
: Et is also pertinent to note that even before the 1970s,, 
there were stirrings among OPEC members for some control 
over production, with a view to increasing prices and 
avoiding competition for control of the export markets, as 
it were,, by the MNOCS. The overriding objective of this 
control, (then called 'prorationing) was to ensure a fair 
sharing among OPEC members of the fast growing oil market at 
the time. 83 The subject of prorationing was first introduced 
within OPEC in 1961, but nothing was done beyond preliminary 
discussion. The reason according to Seymour was the 
reluctance among most members to allow the subject of 
regulation of or control over production to pass from 
individual governments to a collective authority. 84 
Collective policy formulation by OPEC on the matter however 
was made only in 1968, when the "Declaratory statement of 
petroleum policy" in member countries was passed. 
85 This 
statement concerned itself with the exercise of permanent 
sovereignty over hydrocarbon resources by OPEC governments 
through a number of policy orientations. The section 
83 This was brought about by the impact of OPEC Resolution IX 61 (July 1965) on 
memberstates. 
84 Seymour, 1, OPEC: Instrument of change. Macmillan London 1980 p. 82. 
85 OPEC Resolution VXI 90 (June 1968) 
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addressing the issue of conservation practices required the 
MNOCs to observe and pursue the principle of conservation in 
order to safeguard the host country's long term interests, 
and enable the government to lay down the necessary rules 
and procedures on the matter. Thus, this means that. it took 
the whole of 1960s and the more than tripling of production, 
before concern over depletion and the need for conservation 
began to be felt strongly enough to lead to protective 
action within OPEC. As such, conservation measures became a 
compelling objective of all OPEC member countries from the 
1970s and beyond through setting a production ceiling on 
their output. Nigeria for example, has had a production 
ceiling (quota) of 1.61 mb/d since 1974; Saudi Arabia has 
its ceiling at 8.5mb/d while Kuwait's is 2 mb/d to mention a 
few. 86 Neverthelessr these production limits have been, and 
could be relaxed as goodwill gestures. Such goodwill was 
shown at the beginning of 1991, when a 7.7 per cent increase 
of OPEC's output came to off-set some of the shortfall 
caused by the Gulf crisis following the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait which had induced a temporary uncertainty in the 
market. 87 Nigeria's average daily production at the time was 
1.83 mb/d as against the OPEC quota of 1.61 mb/d. 88 
The proven oil reserves of Nigeria, both onshore and off- 
shore which was 300 million barrels in 1961 increased 
systematically to 18 billion barrels at the beginning of 
1980. The net remaining established reserves in 1984 stood 
at nearly 13 billion barrels. There has been a decline in 
86 The following discussion draws heavily on Danielsen op. cit. pp 117-119. 
87 Taken from FT London Harch 12,1991, 
88 ibid. 
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the country's reserves from 1980 except for a substantial 
discovery in 1983. (See Table 2.3 which depicts the oil 
reserve situation in Nigeria) However, 1990 was the most 
successful of the last decade, in terms of addition to the 
country's petroleum reserves. Over 2.5 billion barrels of 
oil equivalent was added to the natural reserve that year 
through new discoveries and conservation measures, making 
the total reserves to stand at 17 billion barrels. 89 
Table 2.3- 
NIGERIAN PROVEN CRUDE OIL RESERVES (1970-1990) (MILLION 
BARRELS) 
YEAR REMAINING PROVEN OIL RESERVES 
1970 6,940.9 
1971 8,308.6 
1972 7,680.6 
1973 6,359.7 
1974 6,004.6 
1975 6,271.6 
1976 6,113.8 
1977 5,349.8 
1978 8,679.0 
1979 10,575.6 
1980 9,022.9 
1981 12,468.2 
1982 12,467.9 
1983 13,333.2 
1984 12,958.5 
1986 16,000.0 
1987 15,980.0 
1988 16,000.0 
1989 16,000.0 
1990 17,100.0 
Source: Direct communications to NNPC during field research 
and OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin 1991. 
An estimate by Adams, a former NNPC Managing Director, 
indicates that if Nigeria continues constantly to produce at 
OPEC ceiling of 1.6 mb/d the country's reserves will last 
89 The following discussion is largely based on the address of minister of Petroleum 
Resources Professor J. Aminu on Activities of the Nigerian oil industry , See West Africa 
magazine Hay 5,1991. 
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for at least the next 25 years. 90 Of course it is not 
technically feasible to produce at constant rates throughout 
the life-span of a reserve. It is also possible that more 
reserves would be found as it happened in 1990. Thus, in the 
next 25 years, unless more reserves are found, Nigeria would 
still be producing oil but almost certainly at a declining 
rate. Hence the need arises for diversification of the 
country's economy instead of total reliance being placed on 
a single depletable resource-oil. 
2.3.9 MARKETING POLICY 
Active participation by the Nigerian government through NNPC 
in the marketing of crude oil only started in 1973. Prior to 
this time, oil was marketed by the MNOCs through their 
integrated system using transfer pricing methods. Following 
the acquisition of participation interests in the major oil 
marketing companies i. e. SHELL/B. P., GULF and MOBIL, 
91 a 
substantial amount of equity oil became available for direct 
marketing by the government. Initially, special arrangements 
were made between NNPC and the same oil companies to buy 
government equity oil. Since crude oil is not used directly 
but in the form of ref ined products, it could only be sold 
to owners of refineries at the time, that is, to the oil 
companies themselves, their partners or their subsidiaries. 
Thus under such arrangement, the MNOCs purchased substantial 
quantity of government equity oil under a 'buy-back' 
system. 
92 The remaining government equity oil known as the 
90 interview information with Hr G. A. Adams in Lagos November 1989. 
91 This became effective from April 1,1973. 
92 The buy-back system was adopted in Nigeria from 1973 to 1975 when it was 
discontinued. This was necessary because initially Nigeria had no facilities and outlets 
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'Retained' oil was marketed directly by NNPC. The first 
third party buyers of Nigerian oil were TENNECO Oil Company 
(March 1973) and GELSENBERGY MINERAOTOIL (GMBS) of Germany 
(April 1973). 93 
From the 1980s, however, the government decided to diversify 
the direction of its crude oil exports. By this time, 
government's participation policy had extended,. into all 
operations of the oil industry. For instance, in the 
marketing sector, out of seven marketing companies operating 
in the country, B. P. was taken over in 197994 and ESSO chose 
to give up its entire marketing interests to the government, 
while 60 per cent of the remaining five belongs to the 
government. 
As a matter of policy, currently NNPC deals directly with 
the ultimate buyers of Nigerian crude oil. Any potential 
buyer only needs to apply to NNPC indicating its intention 
to purchase Nigerian crude oil. So far,, only the NNPC as 
well as the MNOCS in Nigeria (in respect of their equity 
oil) have the legal right to export oil from the country. No 
other Nigerian companies or individuals can legally export 
Nigerian crude other than these two. 9-5 This change came 
about due to several factors. First, there was the factor of 
construction of many new refineries in both the exporting 
formarketing its equity crude whereas under the buy-back arrangement the HNOCs were given 
the option to buy such equity crude. 
93 interview Information with D. A. Makama, NNPC official. Lagos September 1989. 
94 The taking over (i. e., nationalisation) of BP assets in Nigeria at the time was a 
political move against the Britain's policy of supplying oil to South Africa. However, 
following the recent changes in South Africa, BP has been allowed to resume operations 
again in Nigeria. 
95 For further details on this point see Understanding the Nigerian Oil Industry 
op. cit. pp. 24-27. Also see Olisa H. H., Nigerian Petroleum Law and Practice. Fountain 
Publishers, Ibadan 1979 pp. 214-219. 
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and importing countries of the world with the resultant 
opening of new marketing outlets other than those owned by 
the MNOCs. Secondly, the emergence of smaller, independent 
oil companies (the 'minors') that led to many free outlets 
to be available; and thirdly, the emergence of national oil 
companies in exporting countries for whom the outlook 
brightened as the widened outlets made opportunities 
available for them. 
As a result, currently the bulk of Nigerian oil is sold to 
the US and West European markets. For instance in 1980,54 
per cent of Nigeria's crudes as against 34 per cent in 1979 
went to Western Europe while 33 per cent instead of 49 per 
cent went to the US. In 1980, Nigeria exported 3.9 per cent 
of its crudes to Japan and her export to other African 
countries rose from 2.7 per cent to 3 per cent. Western 
Europe is still the largest importer of Nigeria's crude oil. 
In 1988,, 75 per cent of Nigeria's crudes export went to 
Western Europe. In 1990, the share of Nigerian crude oil 
export to Af rica stood at 6 per cent and those to Latin 
America and the Caribbean stood at 8 per cent whereas export 
to the US dropped drastically to 11 per cent. 
96 The drop in 
exports is attributable to the increased availability of 
cheaper crude oil from Mexico and Alaska close to the US 
market. Also, the North Sea oil which is of comparable 
quality to Nigerian oil is said to have effectively competed 
to replace Nigerian oil in the US market. 
97 
96 interview information with an official of SHELL Oil Company Lagos. September 1989. 
97 These markets comprise the Non-OPEC exporting countries. 
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2.3.10-OIL PRICING POLICY 
oil pricing occupies a central position among oil policies 
of exporting countries. It is the determinant of the volume 
of revenue earned from exports, which in turn has weighty 
implications for a wide range of issues, chiefly that of 
development and industrialisation. On the other hand, the 
determination of oil prices and the tax intake by exporting 
countries has been the issue over which the governments of 
exporting countries and importing countries (and MNOCs) have 
had their protracted, bitter and inconclusive battles over 
several decades. But through the turn of events in 1973, 
OPEC memberstates took over the decision to determine 
prices, and brought the seemingly interminable battle to an 
end. 
it will be recalled that in the decades preceding the 1970s, 
prices of oil used to be determined by the erstwhile oil 
"majors" without consultation with the exporting countries. 
The latter's return under such arrangement was very 
minuscule- according to Al-imadi, "this did not exceed $1.17 
per barrel in the early phases of exploitation. ', 
98 For 
instance, the price of oil per barrel had been at $1.75 in 
1951, rose to $1.93 in 1953, rose again to $2.08 in 1957, 
then dropped to $1.93 in 1959 and to $1.80 in 1960 to stay 
unchanged at that level until 1971 when it rose to $2.18.99 
The rise in oil price in 1971 was associated with the 
98 Al-Imadi, M., "Oil and Arab Development" OAPEC Papers an Arab oil Industry. 
xuwait 1981 at p-289 in Sayigh, Y. A., Arab oil Policies in the 1970s, Croom Helm 1983, 
p. 127. 
99 Taken from Seymour, OPEC op. cit. at p. 285. 
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overthrow of King Idris of Libya and the assumption of 
control by colonel Qadhafi in 1971. The new regime demanded 
both higher prices and a 58 per cent share of company 
prof its which eventually led to the 25 per cent increase. 
The second and more dramatic price increases occurred in 
association with the Arab-Israeli conflict which began 
October 6,1973 and the consequent Gulf members of OPEC's 
(Arabs) oil embargo to some Western countries for six 
months. The result was the quadrupling of prices to a level 
of $11- $12 per barrel. 
100 This was significant because it 
firmly established OPEC's position in regard to its ability 
to set prices. 
Similarly in Nigeria, prior to 1973, the MNOCs operating in 
the country produced and marketed all the crude oil at 
prices fixed by them alone. By 1973, however, the position 
changed, apparently in line with OPEC demands. In March of 
that year, a more systematic method of fixing prices for all 
the crudes from OPEC member countries was evolved. It was 
called the "posted prices system. "101 When posted prices 
were first introduced, they approximated "market prices" 
i. e. the price at which oil could actually be sold taking 
into consideration all factors of economics of sale. 
Most of Nigeria's crudes are light and of low sulphur 
content which have very high yield of gasoline. Because of 
these characteristics Nigeria's crudes are rated as being of 
100 Taken from Danielsen op. cit. at p. 175. 
101 "Posted Prices" means the price fixed for crude oil by individual exporting 
countries for the purposes of computing the revenue derivable from the oil. such prices 
are fixed according to the quality or grade of the crude in question. 
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high quality. 102 Nigeria's major crudes and their 
characteristics are shown in Table 2.4 below. 
Table 2.4 
CRUDE TYPE SPECIFIC GRAVITY SULPHUR 
BONNY LIGHT 0.8398 - 370 API 0.14 
QUA IBOE 0.8398 - 370 API 0.14 
ESCRAVOS 0.8448 - 360 API 0.14 
BRASS RIVER 0.8063 - 440 API 0.07 
BONNY MEDIUM 0.8984 - 260 API 0.28 
FORCADOS 0.8708 - 310 API 0.2 
Source: Understanding the Nigerian oil industry 
NNPC Publication,, Public Affairs Department, 
Lagos. 1986 at p. 26. 
In 1974, two posted prices were fixed for Nigeria's Bonny 
light and Bonny medium crude oil through the OPEC. 103 The 
pricing formula consisted of fixing a price for each crude 
to reflect the quality of the crude due to its chemical 
characteristics and its export location vis-a-vis the 
reference crude. Saudi Arabia determines the price level by 
specifying the price of its most high quality crude, 'Saudi 
Light' with 340 API gravity. This is known as the 'marker 
crude' or 'reference crude', that is, the crude which forms 
the basis for the pricing of OPEC oil. The difference 
between the price of a given crude and the price of the 
marker crude is called the "differential". The consumer's 
decision to purchase one crude rather than another depends 
102 See Understanding the Nigerian Oil Industry, op, cit. p. 24. And also Danielsen 
op. cit. P. 166. 
103 The prices were $5.12 per barrel and $5 per barrel respectively. 
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on relative prices of the crudes available. crudes yielding 
large quantities of highly valued products, such as gasoline 
command a higher price than other crudes. The same can be 
said of crudes which have a low sulphur content. 104 
The price of the marker crude was of ten determined at the 
level of OPEC conferences to reflect currency fluctuation 
and the level of inflation in individual countries. However, 
in January 1976, OPEC discarded the system of fixing posted 
prices to remove the stalemate in the oil market caused by 
the multi-tier pricing system under the posted prices 
method. In its stead, the 'official selling price'(OSP) 
system was introduced. This refers to the price at which 
governments sell their crude to customers dictated by the 
prevailing market conditions (of supply and demand) and 
galloping world inflation-105 
As a consequence, a single selling price was also set for 
each grade of Nigerian crude. All third party buyers 106 of 
Nigerian crude, irrespective of their countries of origin 
and domestic market conditions now have to pay the same 
price for a given grade of crude. In other words., all third 
party buyers are subject to the same standard crude oil 
sales contract. 107 
Prices of Nigerian crudes as that of other OPEC member 
204 1 owe this knowledge to Danielsen op. cit. chapter Seven. 
105 Ibid. 
106 Third party buyer here refers to crude oil sales contracts where the buyer is a 
foreign company or any organization that does not carry out petroleum operations in 
Nigeria. 
107 it is noteworthy that the NNPC has a printed standard form crude oil sales 
contract which consists of two parts. Part I of the contract covers matters such as 
duration of contract, quantity and quality of the grade of oil, price and currency of 
payment. Part 11 deals with general conditions of sale of Nigerian crudes. 
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countries have always been designated in the US dollars. But 
since 1978, in an attempt to diversify the country's foreign 
exchange holdings, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) also 
accepts payments made in pounds sterling, Deutch marks, 
French Francs as well as Japanese Yen. Payment for crude oil 
liftings are by letters of credits in respect of those 
countries which have no significant assets in Nigeria. 
2.3.11 POLICY OF 'ENSURING SELF-RELIANCE IN THE INDUSTRY. 
Policy aimed at Nigeria becoming self-reliant in the running 
of the oil industry will occupy the discussion in this 
section. And that is,, Nigeria's technology policy and the 
attendant "Indigenisation" of the industry. The aim of 
ilindigenisation" in the present context involves much more 
than the control by Nigerians of equity and the heavy 
participation of Nigerian manpower in the labour force of 
the industry; it also involves the effective acquisition of 
technological capability by the Nigerian component of this 
force at all levels of skill and responsibility. it is 
necessary to point out at the outset that we shall not go 
into detail discussion of this because it is treated 
sufficiently in Chapter Six. Only the basic points will be 
looked at. 
We noted earlier that inspite of more than three decades of 
petroleum activities in Nigeria, there is still a heavy 
reliance by the nation on foreign oil technology- technical 
and managerial skills and equipment. The government is bent 
on improving on the rate of acquisition or absorption of oil 
technology especially as petroleum has remained the mainstay 
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of the country's economy. By way of illustration, six ways 
in which government's policy on manpower development and 
transfer of technology vis-a-vis the oil industry was 
vigorously pursued can be briefly mentioned. 
First, in 1969, under the Petroleum (Drilling and 
Production) Regulations, MNOCs operating in the country were 
obliged to Nigerianise their staff, from managerial to both 
the skilled and unskilled level within fixed periods. 108 
That means under the Act, the MNOCs are expected to employ 
and train Nigerians who would within the stipulated periods 
assume the responsibility of running the industry from the 
exploration to marketing stages. Although, it appears at the 
time that, the emphasis of the government seemed not to be 
very much on acquisition of oil technology per se but rather 
on employing as many Nigerian citizens as possible to the 
industry. The desire to acquire technological know-how in 
the field of petroleum arose later in the 1970s. 
Secondly, in 1972, the government established the Petroleum 
Training Institute at Warri. Its main functions according to 
the law establishing it were to "provide courses of 
instruction, training and research in oil technology and to 
produce technicians and other, skilled personnel required to 
run the oil industry. "109 
Thirdly, government established the Petroleum Development 
Fund in 1973 for the training of nationals to qualify as 
graduates, professionals, technicians and craftsmen in 
108 These issues are addressed at length in Chapter seven infra. 
109 see Section 17 of the Petroleum training institute Act 1972. Laws of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria 1973. 
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engineering and management studies in the oil industry. 110 
The government is not the only contributor to this fund; the 
MNOCs also make contributions as they may freely wish to. 
Fourthly, the 1972 and 1977 Nigerian Enterprises Promotion 
Act (NEP Act) also known as Indigenisation Acts, were 
promulgated and require in defined degrees Nigerian equity 
participation in the country's business enterprises-111 The 
. raison 
de'tre' of the Indigenisation Laws, as seen above, is 
to raise the proportion of indigenous ownership of 
industrial investment in the country. The degree of 
participation in each case depends on which of the three 
separate schedules the specific enterprise belongs to. Some 
of these participation agreements involve shared 
technological secrets and research, acquisition of patents, 
manufacture, installation of existing or new technological 
innovations in the industries concerned. 
Fifthly, through the instrumentality of the National Office 
of industrial property Act, (NOIP Act) the Office of 
industrial Property was established. 112 The office is 
. responsible 
for the registration of technology transfer 
transactions in the country. Part of its functions is to 
ensure that training clauses are inserted in agreements 
submitted for registration. It also monitors the businesses 
110 This was established by the Petroleum Technology Development Fund Act 1973 No 25. 
Laws of the Federal Republic Of Nigeria. 
ill For detailed exposition an this see Tobi, N. "The Nigerian Enterprises Act" 1981, 
15 jwTL 543-581. 
112 The National Office of Industrial Property Act 1979 Laws of the Federal Republic 
of Nigerial 1979. 
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involved in the agreements to ensure continued adherence to 
and discharge of obligations by the parties involved. 113 
Sixthly, in 1989, government through the NNPC signed a 
technology transfer and training agreement with BECHTEL 
which led to the formation of a company called NETCO. 114 
Under such agreement,, BECHTEL is obliged to transfer oil 
technology to NETCO through a specific training programme 
which will ensure that both employees of NETCO and NNPC 
benefit under the scheme. 
Aside from the afore-mentioned efforts by government, we 
shall see that provisions in every petroleum development 
contract between the NNPC and the MNOCs contain provisions 
on training of manpower for the acquisition of technological 
capability in the oil sector. On the whole, government seems 
to place greater emphasis on development of manpower and 
technology transfer in its efforts towards attaining self- 
reliance in the running of the oil industry. 
2.4 RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
The changes that have occurred in recent years in 
international oil Market indicate that there is need for 
Nigeria to diversify her economy since total dependence on 
oil cannot go on ad infinitum. This is partly due to the 
f act that the growth of world demands for oil is on the 
decline as alternative sources of energy like gas,, coal,, 
nuclear and solar energy are being developed. 
115 Also it is 
113 This discussion draws on 0sunbor O. A. "Laws and Policy on the Registration of 
Technology Transaction in Nigeria" 1987,12 JWTLI p. 125 See also Date-Bah, S. K,, "Transfer 
of Technology to Nigeria and Patents And Designs Act 1970" 25 JAL 1981 p. 112. 
114 See Article 4 Of NNPC/BECHTEL Agreement. February 21 1989. 
115 For a lucid account on developments in relation to alternative sources of energy 
see Hamilton, A., (Ed) Oil the price of power. Michael Joseph/Rainbird. 1986 ppl49-171. 
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partly because petroleum is a wasting or finite resource and 
cannot be extracted for over an interminable timespan. A 
statement by Marinho in a paper on "Oil politics and 
National development in Nigeria" is even more explicit here. 
He posits that, 
"For the next generation of Nigerians, oil is 
not going to play any significant role in the 
national development effort. Therefore how that 
generation of Nigerians will survive will be 
largely based on te developments that are put 
in place today. "11ý 
in the light of the above, therefore, government is making 
several moves to diversify the oil industry in order to 
generate other sources of income. Currently, the government 
is committed to the completion of its natural gas and 
petrochemical projects. 
2.4.1 LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS PROJECT. 
Natural gas can be harnessed and exported just like oil to 
earn more foreign exchange for an oil exporting country. To 
do this the gas has to be liquefied. When natural gas is 
cooled to very low temperatures and brought to a liquid 
state, it is called liquefied natural gas (LNG). Presently, 
plans for Nigeria, s LNG plant are in progress. Nigeria is 
endowed with abundant natural gas which is produced in 
association with petroleum, although the gas is largely 
flared-off. 117 It was in order to stop the further wastage 
of such a valuable resource that the LNG Project was 
conceived. In the words of the Minister of Petroleum 
Resources; 
116 Quoted in "Nigeria :A regenerative economy or vegetative existence? 1985 Alumni 
Lecture delivered by Chief F. R. A. Marinho. rormer Managing Director NNPC at University of 
Ibadan, Nigeria June 14 1985 p. 3. 
117 See G, Etikerentse,, Nigerian petroleum law. Macmillan publishers 1985 p. 117. 
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"The LNG project is a top priority project of 
the federal government. It is one of the 
national strategies to diversify the foreign 
exchange earnings and enhance the exploitation 
of the abundant gas resources. Although this 
project has long been on the drawing board, the 
present Administration is P&ghly committed to 
its total implementation. "l 
Thus,, the government's f irst step was the incorporation in 
1990 of the Nigerian LNG Company (NLNG) as a joint venture 
project between NNPC on the one hand and SHELL ELF and AGIP 
on the other. The participation interests of the parties in 
the project are: the government of Nigeria-60%, SHELL-20%, 
AGIP-10% and ELF-10%. The participants have signed an 
interim services agreement or contract which defines the 
priorities and procedures for project development. 
119 
Plans are now at advanced stages for the f irst delivery of 
the Nigerian LNG in 1995/96. Markets have been identified in 
Western Europe. These include major gas companies in 
Germany, France, Italy, Belgium Spain and the UK. So far, it 
seems Nigeria's LNG project will be a profitable venture and 
worthy of the huge investment involved in it. Not only are 
the reserves abundant, the participation of experienced 
joint venture partners will enable it attain competitive 
levels of efficiency when operational. 
2.4.2 PETROCHEMICAL PROJECT. 
The same considerations of the need to diversify the natural 
resource base of the country lie behind Nigeria's long 
standing plan to establish a petrochemical industry. The 
petrochemical industry is conceived by government as a major 
lie Address by Professor Aminu J., Hinister of Petroleum Resources on the activities 
of the Nigerian oil industry. West Africa Hagazine Hay 5 1991 (Advertiser's Announcement) 
119 interview information with NLNG Company official at Lagos. November 1989. For more 
discussion on the joint venture agreement in the NLNG company see chapter 5. 
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investment, because of its role as input generator f or a 
variety of industries such as agricultural and 
pharmaceutical industries. The Nigeria Second National 
Development Plan (1970-74) recognised the importance of 
Petrochemical industries in the rapid industrial 
transformation of the nation and stated that the project is 
"designed to broaden the industrial base of the economy and 
promote a better use of the country's mineral resources like 
natural gas and petroleum. 
120 During this plan period, the 
first significant feasibility study of the project was 
carried out and it was concluded that the economic viability 
of the project depended on finding an outlet for one of the 
natural gas components- 'methane', which normally accounts 
for over 85 per cent of gas-121 The study observed that the 
outlet for the methane gas, which is equally an 'excellent 
combustible hydrocarbon for generating electricity could be 
used at the country's power stations. Other potential 
outlets envisaged at the time included the Steel Projects 
and the Fertilizer company in the country. 
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During the Third National Development Plan (1975-80) the 
project continued to be recognised as a key project which 
will help transform the economy and provide the much needed 
base for industrialisation. Hence, in 1976, government 
appointed CHEM SYSTEMS of UK as technical adviser on the 
project. The Company produced a number of reports including 
those on the project implementation, market potential, 
120 The second National Development Plan document. Plan period 1970-74 Federal 
ministry of information Lagos 1970. 
121 The feasibility study was conducted by a company called Foster Wheeler Ltd. For 
details see , Understanding the Nigerian oil industry op. cit. pp. 52-53. 
122 interview information. 
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process review, selection of technical partner etc. Based on 
the reports, a three-phase programme of implementation was 
devised. The first phase which was attached to the Warri and 
Kaduna Refineries have been completed. It came on stream in 
1988 with the Linear Alkyl-Benzene Plant which is vital for 
producing inputs used for the manufacture of products such 
as bottles cratesj, automotive products and floor carpets, 
having a capacity of 30,000 metric tons per year. 123 The 
second phase, when completed, is aimed at satisfying the 
growing national demand in the building, automotive, 
agricultural, electrical, textile and other industries. It 
is expected to be completed by the end of 1991, while the 
third phase which comprises the rest of the complex is 
planned to be completed by 1995. 
Though these projects will involve huge capital investments, 
when operational, they will in turn yield much more in terms 
of their economic value to the country. By producing raw 
materials for use by local industries (for the manufacture 
of a variety of items) at competitive prices, they would 
certainly strengthen the country's economy. 
2.5 POSITION OF NIGERIA WITHIN OPEC. 
Perhaps, before analysing the position of Nigeria within 
OPEC and the arguments for and against Nigeria's continuous 
membership of the organisation, it is plausible to look at 
the underlying reason why Nigeria joined OPEC. The reason 
for Nigeria joining the organisation is proffered by 
Ajomo-124 He explained that it was as a result of Nigeria's 
123 Ibid. 
124 AJoMoj op. cit p. 13. Professor Ajomo in currently the Director of institute of 
Advanced Legal studies, Lagos. 
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desire for cooperation among all exporting countries to put 
up unified resistance against the MNOCs' control over 
production exports and governmental revenue that made her to 
join the Organisation.. To quote him, "... Nigeria, together 
with the rest exporting countries (OPEC) realised that they 
had to hang together or be hanged separately". 125 
Nigeria's relations with OPEC is such that her fortunes 
grows with the success of the organisation and also declines 
as the fortunes of OPEC declines. For the sake of 
illustration,, in the wake of the oil price increases of 
1973/74 and 1979, Nigeria all of a sudden became so wealthy 
and affluent. Billions of pounds from oil receipts were 
poured into her economy. With the capital thus made 
available, enormous development programmes were embarked 
upon. But also the oil glut of 1979 and the global recession 
in the oil market since 1980 affected Nigeria so adversely. 
The oil glut reduced the demand for OPEC oil from 30 mb/d in 
1979 to about 16mb/d in 1984. Non-OPEC oil on the other hand 
increased from 18 mb/d to over 25 mb/d during the same 
period. 126 As OPEC is producing less than 30 per cent of 
total world oil production, it has consequently lost its 
strong foothold of the oil market and its role in 
stabilizing the market also weakened. Crude oil prices have 
been falling since the end of 1981,127 and the only way to 
maintain prices at a reasonable level was for OPEC to 
125 ibid 
126 The data were taken from Danielsen op. cit. p. 113. 
127 This is attributable to the downward pressure on international oil prices exerted 
by World over production in the 1980s. 
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allocate quotas among its members so as to control the 
supply of oil in the market. 
Nigeria, (along with Indonesia), is one of the most 
populated ' of the OPEC member states. This fact is 
accompanied by Nigeria's ambitious development plans 
continuously exposes her to the volatility of international 
oil market because of the predominance of oil revenues in 
her national earnings. As a result of this dependence and 
the effect it has on the economy, Nigeria is described as 
the weakest link in OPEC's price chain. 128 Commenting on 
such reliance on oil revenues and its effect on Nigeria, 
Quinlan averred that, 
"President Shehu Shagari's civilian government 
(1979-83) ... is being forced to slash vital development spending in response to the slump 
in Nigeria's oil earnings. The move together 
with the 10 per cent discount 
introduced ... makes Nigeria as OPEC's weakest 
member in time of stress although the 
government has played an increasingly hawkisk 
role when world oil supplies have been tight. 
The key to both stances is Nigeria's teeming 
population and the desperate lack of other 
significant industritl or agricultural exchange 
earning ventures. "149 
The above scenario therefore necessarily exposes the 
development plans of Nigeria to insecurity. An example of 
this could be taken from the country's Fifth Development 
Plan (1986-90). The projected cost was N80 billion and a 
projected monthly import of N1.3 billion. These figures were 
premised on a projected crude oil production of 2.3 mb/d at 
$35.00 per barrel-130 Thus with the advent of oil glut and 
228 petroleum Economist at p. 154 in an Article entitled- "Nigeria -weaklink in opEc's 
price chain. " April 1982. 
129 ibid at p. 425 in an Article entitled- " Nigeria- Market slump slashes revenue, " 
October 1981. 
130 interview information. 
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with it a fall in oil price, there was not much the 
government could do under the circumstance. 
Therefore, the present bleak future of the oil market, the 
decrease in demand of OPEC oil and the major new discoveries 
in Non-OPEC countries -Mexico, Alaska and the UK- all led to 
the rationale of Nigeria continuing as a member of OPEC to 
be questioned. opinions are, however, divided between 
whether Nigeria should quit OPEC or continue its membership 
in the Organisation. 
The "quit OPEC school" of thought argue that in the face of 
Nigeria's current economic problems, she would be better off 
quitting OPEC and thereby free herself from both the OPEC 
production quotas as well as OPEC's pricing policies. By 
leaving the Organisation,, they argue further that Nigeria 
could be able to produce as much oil as she chooses and the 
resultant inflow of revenue would contribute immensely to 
economic recovery. In other words, the country would then be 
left to make both production and pricing decisions in its 
own interest. By taking that course of action, the argument 
goes, Nigeria would be able to reap any benefits of OPEC's 
actions without being subjected to the dictates of the 
Organisation. Such countries as Norway, Mexico, Egypt, 
Malaysia, Brazil and Britain are cited as examples of 
countries that reap such benefits. It is further argued that 
by quitting, Nigeria would be in a better position to 
contract as many counter-trade deals or discounts 
arrangements as she deems fit without the fear of having a 
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body constantly reviewing the country's production and 
pricing systems. 131 
on the other side of the coin, the "pro OPEC" school of 
thought argue that Nigeria has more to gain in the nation's 
continued membership of the organisation. The arguments in 
support of this pro-OPEC stance will be adduced shortly. 
Suf f ice it to mention here that I belong to this school of 
thought. 
it is my opinion that adhering to the arguments advanced by 
the "quit OPEC school" would be counter productive to the 
country. infact, doing so will be equivalent to Nigeria 
turning to bite the fingers that had been feeding her. This 
is because, it cannot be guaranteed that all the oil 
produced can be sold much less sold at an attractive price. 
The law of over-supply would lead to a further depression in 
the market and the resulting price decrease would harm 
Nigeria immensely. Since Nigeria has very little oil 
reserves compared to the rest members of OPEC,, (See Table 
above) and it sells to the same Western market, the OPEC 
members might decide to act against Nigeria by under cutting 
Nigerian prices and frustrate her efforts to sell more oil. 
Further, one must take into account the fact that the 
Production cost per barrel of crude oil is much higher in 
Nigeria (though cheaper than in Alaska or the North Sea) 
than it is in the major gulf OPEC states. 132 In addition, 
131 see Akinbobola. A., Should Nigeria be in OPEC? NIIA, Monograph Series, 1979. '. 
132 This point is taken from Jallo, S*M,, " The development of the petroleum industry 
and Petroleum Law in Nigeria. LL. M. Thesis 1989 Centre for Petroleum and mineral Studies. 
University of Dundee p. 83. Also in my view this might not be unconnected with the fact of 
the differences in the terrains in which exploration works are carried out in these 
countries. For example, whereas the exploration and production of oil in the U. K. is 
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Nigeria's withdrawal might also trigger off other 
withdrawals. Such a move would no doubt lead to the 
disintegration of OPEC. When this happens,, each exporting 
country will now deal individually with consuming countries 
and MNOCs on issues of price and quantity. This will be 
worse for countries like Nigeria and Indonesia, with limited 
reserves, high population and total dependence on oil. 
indeed according to Onoh, 
11 A break up of OPEC will open up the f lanks 
once more for the oil majors who have been 
waiting on the side lines for over a decade to 
start a fresh manoeuvre for I onopoly in order 
to play their former roles. "lh 
Thus, it is submitted that the benef its of membership byf ar 
outweigh the current problems of Nigeria resulting from its 
membership. The popular adage 'unity is strength', still 
holds good f or OPEC inspite of its present problems. For 
instance, through unity OPEC members have been able to 
destroy the monopoly status of the Seven majors who in the 
past exploited the resources of memberstates paying what 
amounted to token. rents and royalties and refusing any 
participation by governments of these. countries in the 
industry. But through unity of purpose OPEC memberstates are 
now participating in petroleum production and refining and 
in other allied industries such as the LNG and Petrochemical 
projects. In the same vein memberstates have bef itted from 
each other through adopting petroleum development agreements 
initiated and operated satisfactorily by other members. 
largely carried out off-shore, in Nigeria most of the oil is produced on-shore with a 
little in off-shore areas. 
133 Quoted in Onoh, J. K., The Nigerian Oil Economy. From Prosperity to Glut. St. 
Martin's Press, New York. 1983 at p. 143. 
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Similarly, by coming together OPEC memberstates have been 
able to coordinate and unify petroleum ýrices. From merely 
$1.80 per barrel of oil in 1960 the price of oil per barrel 
reached the bench mark of about $41 in 1982. Even though at 
present the price of oil per barrel ranges between $18-20 
per barrel. 134 This price level . would have been unattainable 
if OPEC memberstates had entered the oil market as 
competitors. OPEC still maintains a monopolistic position in 
the world oil market since it has a combined total oil 
reserves of about 60 per cent of the world and controls 
about 90 per cent of the total world traded oil. 135 Its 
position as a monopolist has helped it fix oil prices which 
are* consistent with the inflationary prices of imported 
manufactured goods from the industrialised countries and 
enabled it to match the established prices with the 
appropriate production quota for the entire members of the 
Organisation. 136 
OPEC memberstates also derive benefits in the area of 
research, specialised technical advice, technological 
transfer, manpower development and world economic analysis 
by pooling their resources together. Through exchange of 
programmes OPEC members have benefited tremendously from the 
experiences of memberstates at very least cost. A country 
like Nigeria, as yet still backward in oil technology, 
stands to gain more from the above areas of cooperation. 
134 This information drawn on Newswatch Hagazine (Nigeria)June 17 1991. 
135 The following discussion draws on international Petroleum Encyclopedia, 1986 Tulsa 
Oklahoma. Pennwell Publishing company. 
136 Ibid. 
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it remains to be said that the solution for Nigeria is not 
in quitting the Organisation but in her effective management 
of the oil resources through diversification of her oil 
dominated economy. Since oil is the main engine of growth of 
the economy at present, and since it is government's 
objective to "transform the country into a modern state, 
technologically and industrially, " 137 the prospects for the 
realisation of these objectives, in my view, lie in her 
continuous membership of the Organisation and not outside 
it. 
137 Quoted in The Second National Development Plan document. op cit. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
N. N. P. C.: THE NIGERIAN STATE-OWNED OIL COMPANY. 
3.1 INTRODUCTION: 
In all the oil producing countries,, State oil companies 
(S. O. C)l were formed for a variety of economic or political 
reasons. The governments of such countries use these 
companies as a medium to partake in and in the long run take 
charge of the operations of their oil industries. In this 
chapterf I discuss the establishment and development of the 
Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) as a state- 
owned oil company. The organisation, management and legal 
structures of the corporation and its relation with the rest 
of the industry are also examined. The discussion ends with 
a look at the NNPC as a party in the negotiation of 
petroleum development contracts with the MNOCs. 
3.2 BACKGROUND ACCOUNT ON FORMATION OF THE CORPORATION 
over the past seven decades, many SOCs have emerged in both 
the oil producing and non-oil producing countries of the 
world regardless of the economic strengths or political 
ideology of their respective governments. In fact, the first 
purely SOC to appear on the international petroleum scene 
was. in Argentina in 1910.2 The Italian Azienda Generale 
Xtaliana Petroli (AGIP) was formed in 1924. From then on, 
other SOCs were established. For example, the British 
1 The term 'state oil company' (SOC) is used here to denote oil companies owned by the 
state and subject to total or a substantial degree of political or economic control 
by the state. 
2 The company is called the Yacimientos Petroliferos de la Argentina. It was 
established as a measure to transfer the supply of fuel for the armed forces from 
foreign companies to a government owned company. 
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National Oil Corporation (BNOC) was established in 1976. In 
all, it is estimated that to date there are about 70 SOCs in 
the world excluding those of the former Soviet Union. 3 The 
activities of these companies range from full scale 
monopolies running an integrated operation of their state 
oil industries to joint participation with MNOCs in their 
operations. The desire of governments to enter the oil 
business is based on a variety of reasons. On the part of 
non-oil producing countries,, their reasons for setting up 
SOCs has been to engage in petroleum operations for the sake 
of ensuring to their respective governments the security of 
oil supply and to search for oil in their countries as well 
as overseas. 4 As in the case of oil producing countries, the 
arguments often advanced in defence of the establishment of 
the SOCs are varied and have changed as the structure of the 
international petroleum industry moved through different 
stages of its development. Some of these arguments include: 
(1) the MNOCs may f ail to develop the oil resources of the 
country fully because they have other interests elsewhere; 
(2) the establishment of the SOC satisfies national pride 
and a sense of achievement where domestic control of 
national resources is regarded by the government as an 
affirmation of nationalism; 
3 The information in this paragraph is owed to Grayson, E. G., National oil companies. 
John Wiley & Sons New York 1981 chapters 1 and 7 and Ferrier, R. W. and A. Fursenko 
(eds) oil in the world Economy, Routledge, London, 2989 chapters 1 and 2. 
4 See Khan, K. I. F., "National oil Companiess form, structure, accountability and 
control, " in Khan, K. I. F., Petroleum Resources and Development: Economic Legal and 
Policy Issues for Developing Countries, Belhaven Press London 1987, chapter 11; R. 
Bentham, "Legal Status of State Petroleum companies" in T. Walde & N. Beredjick (eds) 
Petroleum Investment Policies in Developing Countries, Graham & Trotman, London 1988, 
chapter 12 and Grayson op. cit. p. 8. 
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(3) the SOC can enter into a variety of agreements e. g. 
state-to-state deals, something that MNOCs do not engage in; 
(4) for political reasons some governments do not want to be 
seen as leaving their major economic resources entirely to 
the discretion of the foreign MNOCs; 5 and above all 
(5) to maximise their benefits from petroleum operations 
because of the expectation that these corporations would 
bring additional revenue. In my view, this seems a logical 
expectation, since oil rents constitute the financial basis 
for implementation of their economic growth plans, and these 
corporations being public enterprises closely related to 
their governments, will naturally desire the maximisation of 
income from their resources. 
In the main, historically, the emergence of SOCs in oil 
producing developing countries, such as Nigeria, is linked 
to the struggle against the old traditional concession 
regime whose terms were unfavourable to these countries. I 
will not dwell much here on the inequitable nature of the 
old concession regime because it is treated in the 
succeeding chapter. But suffice it to say that under such 
regime there was virtually no role for the producing 
countries to play except to receive the modest fees for the 
surrender of the exploitation rights over their hydrocarbon 
resources to the MNOCs for sometimes as long a duration in 
certain countries as 99 years. Also, as we saw in chapter 
three, from the late 1950s and early 1960s oil producing 
5 This is explicit in the preamble to the statutes that created many of the OPEC States 
oil companies as noted by Adeniyi, K., "The legal anatomy of OPEC state oil 
Corporations: Perspectives on the Nigerian National Oil corporations. " East African 
Law Review 1975 Vol. G. 
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countries of Latin America, Middle East and Af rica, thanks 
to the "minors", began to challenge the "majors", who were 
the sole concessionaires at the time. These countries were 
concerned with extricating themselves from the bondage of 
the early concessions regime and wanted better deals which 
if possible would involve them participating too in the oil 
operations. 
in reviewing the background on the emergence of a SOC in 
Nigeria, a special credit must be paid to the OPEC. Right 
from its inception, OPEC had enjoined all its memberstates 
to, inter alia, participate in the activities of the 
concessionaires in their respective countries. Infact it is 
said that one of the main considerations for establishing 
SoCs within the OPEC community was in anticipation of 
introducing state participation in their prevailing 
concession agreements-6 OP . EC formally endorsed state 
participation policy in its Declaratory Statement of Policy 
of 1968. Consequently, today, all OPEC member countries have 
set up their own SOCs. 
As a member of OPEC,, Nigeria complied with the 
Organisation's Resolution and established her SOC, the 
Nigerian National oil Corporation (NNOC) in 1971. The NNOC 
was the fore runner of the present day NNPC. As intimated 
also in the preceding chapter, the NNOC was established as a 
state agency with the power to engage in all phases of the 
oil industry (from exploration to marketing). But in 
practice, the operations of NNOC were restricted to oil and 
6 See Adeniyi, K., "The legal anatomy of OPEC, op. cit. p. 51 and also Zakarlya, H. S., 
"State Petroleum Companies" 12 Journal of World Trade Law 1978 p.. 482-483. 
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gas exploration and drilling activities. Due to lack of 
finance, technical know-how and capability, the rest part of 
the oil operations (refining, distribution and marketing) 
were carried out largely by the MNOCs. NNOC had no statutory 
duty to regulate and supervise the operations of the oil 
industry in Nigeria. The regulatory and supervisory 
functions of the government as they affect the oil industry 
were the responsibilities of the former Ministry of 
Petroleum Resources. Since the NNOC at the time,, operated 
alongside the Federal Ministry of Petroleum Resources, - 
with the latter limiting its functions to regulating the 
operations of the foreign Oil Companies; and because of the 
dichotomy created by their existence and seemingly 
independent operations, administrative conflicts and 
ineffective control characterised the oil industry. The 
government then thought that the higher standard of the 
goals and policies set for the petroleum industry would be 
better achieved if a single body were put in charge of this 
important sector of the economy. Thus in April 1977, a fully 
integrated agency of government to engage in oil and gas 
operations as well as regulate the operations of the 
industry, - the NNPC was established through the amalgamation 
of the former NNOC with the then Ministry of Petroleum 
Resources by the NNPC Act 1977 (Decree No. 33 of 1977). 7 The 
NNPC Act vested all the assets, funds, resources and other 
movable and immovable property which before that date was 
vested in and held by the dissolved Ministry of Petroleum 
7 in affect, NNPC combined all the NNoc's roles together with the regulatory functions 
of the former ministry of Petroleum Resources, -( such functions are currently 
performed by the Petroleum Inspectorate Division of the NNPC. ) 
112 
Resources for and on behalf of the Federal Government in the 
new corporation. 8 NNPC - also assumed all rights and 
interests, obligations and liabilities of the Government 
under all contracts entered into by the dissolved Ministry 
of Petroleum Resources f or and on behalf of the Government 
for any purpose for which the dissolved Ministry had 
responsibility immediately before April 1977.9 Provisions 
were also made in the Act to vest in NNPC, the assets of 
dissolved NNOC and for NNPC to assume all the duties and 
obligations of NNOC. 10 
it was stated in this regard that 
"The inception of the NNPC marked a radical 
shift in the administrative structure of the 
public sector of the oil industry since under 
Article 21(l) and (2) of the Act both the NNOC 
and the Federal Ministry of Petroleum Resources 
were merged to form the new body. The decision 
to merge the two institutions was inspired by 
the desire to achieve a measure of unified 
control... and Government also felt that this 
action would make optimum use of the relatively 
few trained personnel then available in the 
Nigerian Oil Industry. "" 
3.3 DUTIES AND POWERS OF THE NNPC. 
From its inception, the NNPC was designed as its forebearer 
(the NNOC) to be a fully integrated corporate entity charged 
with the duty of engaging in all aspects of the petroleum 
operations in Nigeria. This ranges from performing the 
operational and commercial functions to those of supervisory 
8 see schedule ii section 8 (2) of the NNPC ACT No. 33 1977. 
9 Ibid Section 8(3)(a). 
10 1 owe the account of the events between 1968 and 1977 that led to the formation of 
NNPC to Turner, T., oil and Government: The making and Implementation of Petroleum 
policy on Nigeria, Ph*D, thesis, 1977, University of London. Her account, I believe, 
is the only comprehensive study of the period. 
11 See OPEC Bulletin July/August 1985 at p. 24. 
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or regulatory nature in the Nigerian Oil Industry. The NNPC 
Act 1977, the statutory instrument establishing the 
Corporation sets out the duties in detail as if to emphasise 
the fully integrated nature of the Corporation. In order to 
fully understand the extent of these duties and also the 
powers of NNPC to exercise them, it is necessary to quote 
verbatim from the statute. 
(1) Subject to the provisions of the Act, the 
Corporation shall be charged with the duty of: 
(a) exploring and prospecting for, working, 
winning or otherwise acquiring, possessing and 
disposing of petroleum; 
(b) refining, treating, processing and generally 
engaging in the handling of petroleum for the 
manufacture and production of petroleum products 
and its derivatives; 
(c) purchasing and marketing petroleum, its 
products and by products; 
(d) providing and operating pipelines, tanker 
ships or other facilities for the carriage or 
conveyance of crude oil, natural gas and their 
products and derivatives, water and any other 
liquids or other commodities related to the 
corporation's operations; 
(e) constructing, equipping and maintaining tank 
farms and other facilities for the handling and 
treatment of petroleum and its products and 
derivatives; 
(f) carrying out research in connection with 
petroleum or anything derived from it and 
promoting activities for the purpose of turning 
to account the results of such research; 
(g) doing anything required for the purpose of 
giving effect to agreements entered into by the 
Federal Government with a view to securing 
participation by the Government or the 
Corporation in activities connected with 
petroleum; 
(h) generally engaging in activities that would 
enhance the petroleum industry in the overall 
interest of Nigeria; and 
(i) undertaking such other activities as are 
necessary or expedient for giving full effect to 
the provisions of this Act. 12 
12 section 4 (1) NNPC Act 1977. 
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Similarly, the powers of the Corporation are stipulated 
under section 5 of the NNPC Act 1977 as follows: 
5(l) The Corporation shall have powers to do 
anything which in its opinion is calculated to 
facilitate the carrying out of its duties under 
this Act including without limiting the 
generality of the following, the power: 
(a) to sue and be sued in its corporate name, 
(b) to hold, manage and alienate movable and 
immovable property; 
(c) to purchase or otherwise acquire or take over 
all or any of the assets, businesses, properties, 
privileges, contracts, rights, obligations and 
liabilities of any other company, firm or person 
in furtherance of any business engaged in by the 
corporation; 
(d) to enter into contracts or partnerships with 
any company, firm or person which in the opinion 
of the Corporation will facilitate the discharge 
of the said duties under this Act; 
(e) to establish and maintain subsidiaries for 
the discharge of such functions -as the 
Corporation may determine; and 
(f) to train managerial, technical and such other 
staf f for the purpose of the running of its 
operations and for the petroleum industry in 
general. 
in giving such wide powers, the NNPC is given a chance to 
grow and operate in a business setting. For instance, its 
power to create subsidiaries would mean that it would be an 
operating as well a holding company and consequently there 
would be a concentration of effort and personnel under the 
aegis of the parent company which would serve as a directing 
mind in the establishment of an integrated effort. The 
effect of this overall structure is to create an entity with 
a broad range of power to undertake the running of an 
i. ndustry which is clothed with certain commercial and 
business privileges in order to realise its power to 
represent the entrepreneurial policies and objectives of the 
government. It is perhaps with all these in mind that the 
Government sought to assign such powers including the 
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supervisory role to the NNPC. The supervisory role of the 
Corporation is carried out through the medium of its 
Petroleum Inspectorate Department. The NNPC Act in this 
regard states that, 
9 (1) "There shall be established a department 
to be known as the Petroleum Inspectorate which 
shall be an integral part of the Corporation. 
(2) The Minister may delegate to the chief of 
the Inspectorate such of the powers conferred 
upon him under the oil Pipelines Act, the 
Petroleum Act 1969 or any other enactment, but 
without prejudice to the generality of the 
foregoing responsibility for the following 
matters, that is, 
(a) issuing permits and licences for all 
activities connected with petroleum exploration 
and exploitation and the refining, storage, 
marketing, transportation and distribution 
thereof; and 
(b) acting as the agency for the enforcement of 
the provisions of the said Act and any relevant 
regulations made thereunder by the Minister; 
and notwithstanding the foregoing, any 
regulatory function conferred on the Director 
of Petroleum Resources pursuant to the said 
Act. 0123 
Generally, the NNPC operates as an entity in its own right 
as well as an arm of government. I shall expatiate on this 
point later. And as far as the discharge of these duties are 
concerned, it does carry them out in two ways: either (a) 
directly, by engaging in wholly owned petroleum operations 
or (b) indirectly through: 
(i) joint venture operations with foreign Oil Companies in 
which it has no shares ownership; 
(ii) wholly owned subsidiaries or subsidiaries in which it 
owns majority shares; and 
13 See Part II, Sections 1 to 2(a)(b) of the NNPC Act 1977. There is the need to add 
here too that the Act categorically sets out in Section 9(4) that "For the avoidance 
of doubt, the Inspectorate shall not exercise any commercial functions in respect of 
any activities of the Government of the Federation relating to the petroleum 
industry. " The said section emphasises the fact that the role of the Inspectorate 
Division is purely regulatory and nothing more. 
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(iii) minority share ownership in companies that perform 
services for oil exploration and producing companies. 14 
Having looked at the multifaceted duties and enormous powers 
of the Corporation, we now turn to examine its organisation 
and structure. ' 
3.4 THE ORGANISATION OF THE NNPC. 
Basically, two broad divisions make up the NNPC, viz. the 
commercial division and the Petroleum Inspectorate Division. 
The commercial section carries out the operational and 
commercial activities of the Corporation while the Petroleum 
Inspectorate Unit is a regulatory, enforcement and 
supervisory agency of the Government with regards to 
petroleum operations. 
The original set up of the NNPC remained unchanged between 
1977 and 1988. Between that period, the Corporation had the 
following set up: 
THE OPERATIONAL SECTOR (six Divisions) 
Exploration and Exploitation Division: It conducted, 
directed exploration and managed government interest in the 
foreign companies operating in Nigeria. 
Commercial Division: Sold all crude oil accruing to the NNPC 
and administered sales contracts. 
Project and Engineering Division: This undertook all major 
engineering and construction activities for all divisions of 
the NNPC, notably in oil and gas production, refineries and 
petrochemicals projects. 
14 For elaborate account on this see Holies, H. M., Nigerian Petroleum Law and Practice 
1987 at pp. 181-194. 
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Pipelines and Product Marketinq Division: It operated NNPC'B 
over 7,000 kilometres of pipelines for crude oil 
distribution and the depots up and down the country. 
Marine Transportation Division: It took charge of movements 
of NNPC's oil, products and cargo by sea. 
I 
Petrochemical Division: This was responsible for production 
of petrochemicals from oil, gas-and refined products. 
THE SERVICES' SECTOR (three Divisions) 
Personnel and Services Division: It provided administrative, 
personnel and ancillary support for the NNPC's activities. 
Finance and Accounts Division: it performed central 
accounting functions of the Corporation. 
Legal Division: It undertook all the legal services of the 
corporation. 
THE GENERAL MANAGEMENT SECTOR. 
Internal Audit Division: Responsible for auditing internal 
accounting duties of NNPC. 
Public Affairs and External Relations Division: In charge of 
matters of public relations in the Corporation. 
Economic and budget control Division: Concerned with 
planning and budgetary issues of the Corporation. 
THE PETROLEUM INSPECTORATE UNIT. 
it exercised statutory governmental control over operations 
in the oil industry through existing and new legislation. 
The Conservation Division under the Petroleum Inspectorate 
Unit was responsible for petroleum resource management. The 
Field Operations Division was responsible for matters 
dealing with exploration and exploitation. 
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In 1988, being mindful of the need for changes in its set up 
to reflect the realities of the situation, the NNPC 
underwent a structural reorganisation. Today, the NNPC has a 
new structure. It is a commercially managed integrated 
international oil company which) operates on the same basis 
as the private oil companies with a mission to profitably 
explore, developt produce, process and market crude and 
ref ined petroleum and their by-products and derivatives, at 
competitive prices, both at home and abroad. 15 This new 
posture of the Corporation, announced by President Babangida 
when he was promulgating the Commercialisation and 
Privatisation Decree 16 in March 1988, is a product of a 
general reorganisation plan of government parastatals in 
Nigeria, of which NNPC is the largest. 17 Under the said 
Decree, NNPC was one of the enterprises to be fully 
commercialised under the aegis of the Technical Committee on 
Privatisation and Commercialisation (TCPC). 
'Commercialisation' is defined in the Decree as "the 
reorganisation of enterprises wholly or partly owned by the 
Federal Military Government in which such commercialised 
enterprises shall operate as profit making commercial 
ventures and without subventions from the Federal Military 
Government. ""' Infact even before the promulgation of this 
15 Egwuenu, C. I., "Nigerian petroleum laws and regulations as they affect a 
commercialised NNPC, " NAPETCOR Vol. 10 No. 2 1989 pp. 8-11. 
16 The Privatisation and commercialisation Decree No. 25 of 1988. Laws of the Federation 
of Nigeria. 1988. 
17 south's survey of the top 400 firms in sub-Sahara Africa puts the turnover of the 
NNPC at an estimated $11,000 million and top of the list. With assets running into 
billions of Hairs. and employing over 17,000 people, the NNPC can be rightly described 
as the economic life-line of the country. See South, Narch 1987, pp. 65-80. 
IS Although it needs be stressed here that the issue of the commercialised public 
companies not receiving any subvention from Government Treasury does not apply in the 
case of NNPC and its subsidiaries. The Government still provides the capital budget 
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Decree, NNPC had started in 1987, a thorough reappraisal of 
the whole Corporation as a truly commercial and integrated 
oil company with a view to defining a long term mission for 
the Corporation and ensuring a better organisational 
structure that would enable it achieve its various goals and 
objectives. The Corporation's power to undertake such 
reappraisal exercise as well as establish subsidiaries 
derives from Sections 4(2) and 5(l)(e) of the NNPC Act 1977. 
The NNPC Act is now said to be under review to provide for 
the legal framework for a commercialised NNPC. For instance, 
the provisions relating to the Petroleum Inspectorate need 
to be repealed as the, Inspectorate is now a department of 
the ministry of Petroleum Resources and no more an integral 
part of the NNPC. I will return later to this last point 
again. 
3.5 THE NEW STRUCTURE OF THE NNPC 
Unlike its former centralised structure, the new structure 
of the Corporation now comprises a Corporate Head Office 
with three groups of functional Divisions and twelve 
subsidiary companies charged with the execution of the 
corporation's business. The reorganisation is designed to 
place the Corporation in a firm position to compete 
favourably in the international business environment, in 
line with its new commercial posture. In his comment in 
support of the present commercial and decentralised posture 
of the NNPC, the Group Managing Director of the NNPC, Adams 
remarked that 
of the Corporation whereas operating expenses are derived from its commercial 
activities. 
-A 
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"the objective of the reorganisation is to 
reduce rigid central control and allow 
subsidiaries the flexibility necessary to 
optimise their businesses and operate 
commercially in the best interest of the 
corporate body. "19 
The necessity for reorganisation was again stressed by the 
Minister of Petroleum Resources in a letter to the Chairman 
of TCPC and I quote: 
"I would like to emphasise that the primary 
objective of the reorganisation is to make the 
NNPC an integrated oil company similar to the 
major companies operating in the country. Very 
close cooperation between the Corporation 
Headquarters and the Subsidiaries is therefore 
necessary in order to achieve the mission of 
the Corporation. 1120 
Under the present dispensation, the NNPC will be adequately 
funded by the Government. Consequently, full commercial 
justification will be required for all the Corporation's 
investments. The Corporation will thus regularly make 
dividend payments to Government as returns for its 
investment in the Corporation. 
The three groups of functional Divisions under the Corporate 
Head office are; 
(1) Corporate Services Sector: which looks after Finance, 
Legal and Insurance, Administration and Personnel, 
Technology, and Corporate Planning and Development 
Divisions; 
(2) the Operations Sector: responsible for Exploration, 
Production, Gas,, Manufacturing, Petrochemicals and 
International Trading Divisions; and 
19 Adams, G. A., "Achieving results through integration, ": Group Hanaging Director's 1989 
Planning Letter. in NAPETCOR, Quarterly magazine of the NNPC Vol. 10 No. 1 1989 at p. 4. 
20 Quoted in Adam's 1989 Planning Letter, Ibid. 
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(3) the National Petroleum Investment Manaqement Services 
(NAPIMS).: which oversees the Federation's investment in 
exploration and production companies. It is responsible for 
supervising the Joint Venture activities of the Joint 
Venture partners; it markets the Federation's crudes and 
engages in direct exploration services in new oil fields 
relinquished or never before explored by foreign oil 
companies. 
The twelve subsidiaries have since become operational as 
strategic business units with financial autonomy and freedom 
to manage their businesses within the ambit of enabling laws 
and regulations. They include; 
1. Nigerian Petroleum Development Company Limited. 
2. Integrated Data services Limited. 
3. Nigerian gas Company Limited. 
4. Pipelines and Product Marketing Company Limited. 
5. Eleme Petrochemical Company Limited. 
6. Kaduna Refining and Petrochemical Company Limited. 
7. Warri Refining and Petrochemical Company Limited. 
8. Port-Harcourt Refining Company Limited. 
9. Nigerian Liquefied Natural Gas Limited. 
10. National Engineering and Technical Company Limited. 
11. Hyson (Nig. ) Limited. 
12. Calson Bermuda Limited. 
A brief summary of the equity holdings and activites of 
these subsidiaries are contained in Table 3.1 
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Table 3.1 
SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATE COMPANIES IN COMMERCIALISED NNPC. 
NAME % HOLDING TYPE OF ACTIVITY 
1. NIGERIAN PETROLEUM DEVE 100% Petroleum exploration 
LOPMENT COMPANY LTD. and production. 
2. INTEGRATED DATA SERVICES 100% Geological survey, 
LIMITED engineering and computer 
services. 
3. NIGERIA GAS COMPANY LTD 100% 
4. PIPELINE AND PRODUCT 
MARKETING COMPANY LTD. 
S. ELEME PETROCHEMICAL 
COMPANY LIMITED 
for export. 
6. KADUNA REFINING COMPANY 
LIMITED. 
7. WARRI REFINING COMPANY 
LIMITED. 
B. PORT-11ARCOURT REFINING 
LIMITED. 
9. NIGERIAN LNG LIMITED 
10. NETCO LIMITED. 
ll. HYSON LIMITED 
100% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
Gas transmission and 
local gas marketing. 
Petroleum distribution 
by pipelines. 
Manufacturing of 
petrochemical products 
Refining oil products. 
el 
it 
To liquefy gas and 
sell same by export 
100% Engineering consultancy 
and construction. 
100% Facilitates movement of 
oil out of refineries. 
12. CALSON BERMUDA LIMITED 100% Involved in marketing 
crude oil overseas. 
Source: Napetcor (NNPC) Second Quarter 1989. 
All the twelve subsidiaries are limited liability companies 
some wholly owned by NNPC while others are jointly owned 
between NNPC and foreign and local investors. 
The commercialisation of the NNPC have created divided 
opinion both within and outside the NNPC between those in 
0 
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f avour and those against it. The report of a Task Force on 
Commercialisation and Privatisation of NNPC conducted in 
1989 noted that majority of the senior management staff and 
technocrats of the NNPC believe the current commercialised 
structure is in the best interest of the NNPC. The other 
group disagreed and said that the breaking up of the NNPC 
into subsidiaries or autonomous units is inimical to the 
overall objective of the Corporation and cannot serve the 
commercialisation programme. To buttress their argument, the 
latter group posited that having numerous subsidiaries would 
mean creating as many Boards of Directors as there are 
subsidiaries which again in ef f ect means increase in the 
level of non-technical and non-economic outside influences 
in the activities of the Organisation. In coming to that 
conclusion, they assume, as is of ten the case in Nigeria, 
that majority of the appointees to such boards would be top 
civil servants or politicians appointed by way of party 
patronages instead of appointing experts in oil activities 
in such positions. 21 However, since the bottom line of the 
commercialisation exercise as Adams had remarked, is to make 
profit, one hopes such practice will not apply, instead 
appointments to the Boards will be made on the basis of 
members having some knowledge or experience in petroleum 
matters. At present, one can say that the future of the NNPC 
and indeed that of the Nigerian oil industry largely depends 
on the success or otherwise of the subsidiaries under the 
21 Data from Interviewn at Lagos, 1989. 
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commercialised NNPC. 
3.6 THE PETROLEUM INSPECTORATE UNIT 
The role of the Petroleum Inspectorate Unit (PIU) in the 
Nigerian Oil industry has been variously described as that 
of a 'policeman', 'protector', 'watch-dog', 'guardian', etc, 
of the industry. The power of Government regulatory control 
on the industry is vested in the PIU. Under the new 
dispensation, the PIU is an independent arm of the NNPC and 
performs the regulatory functions which the former ministry 
of Petroleum Resources used to perform. 22 In this regard, 
Olisa commented that: 
"it is probably a better arrangement for the 
Inspectorate to be fully independent of the 
Corporation in the same manner as the 
regulatory and enforcement Ministries or 
government agencies of many oil producing 
countries are autonomous of their national oil 
companies, as Algeria, Canada, France and 
Norway. With such an arrangement the 
Inspectorate will not depend on the corporation 
for funding, staffing, general services and 
facilities for it to perform its statutory 
duties. The Inspectorate need not, and 
preferably should not, be a part of any 
Ministry. Rather it should be an enlarged 
entity by itself or as a part of the Petroleum 
or Energy Board reporting to the Minister of 
petroleum Resources. 1023 
The PIU was set up through the instrumentality of Section 
9(l) of the NNPC Act 1977, and its duties may be summarised 
22 The details of these functions are spelt out in a number of laws and regulations 
relating to the oil Industry, these include amongst others the Mineral oils Safety 
Act 2963, oil in Navigable Waters Act 1968, Petroleum Amendment Decree 1973, 
Associated Gas Re-Injection Decree 2979, etc. 
23 Olin&, M. M., Nigerian Petroleum Law and Practice. 1987 at p. 200. The view that the 
Inspectorate should be independent and removed an a department under NNPC was one of 
the earlier recommendations of the Justice Ayo Irikefe Tribunal of Inquiry met up to 
investigate a press allegation of missing C2.8 million NNPC funds in its account with 
the London Midland Bank in 2990. 
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as follows: 
(a) Overseeing all - the activities of all the companies 
licensed to engage in any oil activities in the country to 
ensure compliance with the laws and regulations to the oil 
industry. 
(b) Monitoring oil industry operations to ensure that 
national goals and policies in the oil sector are followed. 
(c) Keeping records of all the occurrences and activities in 
the oil industry. 24 
In effect, the PIU is the agent for the enforcement of all 
the laws and regulations relevant to the Nigerian Oil 
Industry. In overseeing the performance of all the companies 
involved in oil operations within Nigeria it ascertains that 
they carry out their operations according to "good oil 
industry practices"25 
The PIU also maintains a close watch on the activities of 
the Petroleum Training Institute,, Warri and the Petroleum 
Technology Development Fund which was set up mainly for the 
provision of funds for training of Nigerians in the 
Petroleum Industry. 
Furthermore, the PIU works with the Ministry of internal 
Affairs in considering expatriate quota applications. The 
rationale of the imposition of expatriate quotas in the 
Nigerian Petroleum industry is that by limiting the numbers 
24 Section 9(2) NMPC Act 2977. 
25 The phrase itself is often used an a term of art in many jurisdictions where oil 
operations take place, e. g. the U. S. and the U. K., but in no jurisdiction has it 
received a single authoritative definition. There are, however, operational codes of 
practice drawn up by, e. g. the American institute of Petroleum and the institute of 
Petroleum in the U. K., and a failure to follow these practices might well be used as 
evidence of & failure to follow "good oil industry practices and standards. ' 
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of non-Nigerian staff a higher level of training of 
Nigerians for the Industry will result. The PIU has been 
known to object to expatriate quota applications by 
companies when it is aware of qualified Nigerians who can do 
the jobs for which the expatriates are being brought in. 
it is evident from the foregoing that the task of the 
Inspectorate is immense. It is equally clear that, having 
regard to the dearth of competent indigenous manpower and 
petroleum technology capability in the Industry, the 
effective implementation of most of the duties of the 
Inspectorate is likely to lag behind public expectation. It 
has been criticised often from both within and outside' the 
oil industry as being 'passive' rather than 'participatory' 
in the performance of its duties. One commentator, Osuno, 
identified several problems of the Inspectorate. These 
include the problem of distrust by other law enforcement 
agencies, especially as to the scope of the agencies 
statutory powers, inadequate capacity to effectively monitor 
the entire oil industry in Nigeria and lack of public 
support, among others. He also blames this on the fact that 
the work of the Plu is severely hindered by a lack of 
coordination of the various Ministries or Departments whose 
functions overlap in the regulation of diverse aspects of 
the Nigerian Petroleum Industry. 26 It is against this 
background of lack of an overall coordination in the 
26 Osuno, B. A., "The role of the Petroleum Inspectorate Division of the NNPC an the 
guardian of the Nigerian Oil Industry. * A paper presented at the National Workshop on 
Petroleum Law, organised by the Department of Jurisprudence and International Law, 
raculty of Law, University of Lagoa 1984 at p. 6. 
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Industry that the new initiative towards the independent 
status for the Inspectorate as well as the commercialisation 
of the NNPC are welcome. It is hoped that in the long-run 
these initiatives will result in detailed and effective 
regulation of activities of all those involved in the 
operations of the Nigerian Petroleum Industry. 
3.7 LEGAL AND MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE OF THE NNPC 
The affairs of the NNPC are managed by a Board of Directors 
consisting of the Chairman who is also the Minister of 
petroleum, and the following members: 
(a) the Permanent Secretary, Federal Ministry of Finance, 
(b) the Permanent Secretary, Federal Ministry of Economic 
Development, 
(c) the Group Managing Director of NNPC and 
(d) three other persons appointed by the President "being 
persons who in the opinion of the President have, by reasons 
of any necessary ability, experience, specialised knowledge 
of the oil industry or their business or professional 
attainments, a special contribution to make to the work of 
the Corporation"27 Furthermore, under the present structure 
of the NNPC, each subsidiary has a representative on the 
Board of Directors. The Group Managing Director is the Chief 
Executive of the Corporation responsible for the execution 
of all policies of the Corporation and the day-to-day 
running of its activities. The Minister of Petroleum is the 
political controller of the Corporation. There is also a 
27 Section l(l)(2) NHPC Act 1977. 
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Secretary of the Corporation who is not a member of the 
Board. 28 
Under the now commercialised NNPC, the Group Managing 
Director heads the Holding Office of the Corporation and the 
three groups of functional Divisions are headed by Group 
Deputy Managing Directors. The subsidiaries also have their 
own Board of Directors and their Chief Executives. This is 
designed inter alia to promote maximum efficiency in 
operations by seeing to it that the subsidiaries are 
insulated from direct government interference to the same 
extent as any private company. 
The relationship between the Holding Office and the 
subsidiaries is defined by corporate policy, procedures and 
financial control. The subsidiaries present their budget 
proposals and programmes to the Holding Office for approval. 
The holding Office in turn passes on policy instructions to 
the subsidiaries f or execution and allocates resources for 
programme implementation. On a day-to-day basis, the 
subsidiaries are independent of the Holding Of f ice in the 
execution of their programmes. In their own turn, the 
subsidiaries make dividend payments to the Holding Company 
annually, who would in turn pay dividends to government as 
its sole shareholder. In essence, the NNPC is both an 
operating as well as a holding company responsible for 
deciding policies of its subsidiaries and directing the 
execution of government decisions and intentions. 
28 lbid Section 2(2). 
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Though NNPC is now an integrated international oil company 
which -has wide scope to operate on a commercial 
basis as 
private companies with a view to make profit, it operates as 
a commercial public corporation. unlike private oil 
companies, both the Holding Company and the Subsidiaries are 
funded by the government. In other words the Government is 
the sole or majority sharehoýder and the 'general management 
and control of the Corporation rest with the State. But 
because of their corporate status, the NNPC and its 
subsidiaries are accorded a legal status and expected to 
operate with the flexible and enterprising spirit of a 
private enterprise. Both Friedman and Ghai make the point 
that balancing the need for governmental control with that 
of the financial and managerial autonomy essential to 
realising the objective or goal of the Corporation is 
perhaps one of the most important yet elusive problems in 
the operation of a public corporation. 29 Commenting also on 
the nature of public corporations in general, Lord Denning 
said; 
"The significant difference in this corporation 
is that there are no shareholders to subscribe 
the capital or to have any voice in its 
affairs. The money which the corporation needs 
is not raised by the issue of shares but by 
borrowing; and its borrowing is not secured by 
debentures but is guaranteed by the 
Treasury ... It is, of course, a public authority 
and its purposes, no doubt, are public 
purposes, but it is not a government department 
nor do its powers fall within the province of 
government. A striking feature of the 
commercial public corporation is that it acts 
29 Friedman, W., " Forms and Functions of Public Enterprisess A comparative survey, * 
1969 Vol. 2 Current Legal Problems p. 79 at p. 94 and Y. P. Chai and A. Bohn (eds) 
Management of public enterprises through state holding corporations, International 
Centre for Public Enterprises in Developing countries, Ljubljana,. Vol 10 , 1990 
p. 127. 
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on its own behalf even though it is controlled 
by a government department. 1130 
Given thatt the position under the NNPC Act by which the 
Board of Directors of the Corporation and its subsidiaries 
are constituted deserve some special comment. This is 
because the NNPC Act is silent as regards what sort of 
qualifications, expertise or experience members who are 
appointed to the Board should possess. This applies both to 
members appointed to the Boards of NNPC, its subsidiaries 
and the joint venture companies. For example,, (as noted 
above) majority of the directors including the Minister are 
appointed either on the basis of their political background 
or official affiliation with some of the Ministries. The 
three non governmental members to be appointed by the 
President are equally appointed by reason of 'their business 
or professional experience, it is believed they would have 
special contribution to make to the work of the corporation' 
but not necessarily because of their knowledge or experience 
specially in the petroleum industry. Most of these Directors 
have civil service orientations and are ignorant of the 
petroleum management business and lack the competence to 
participate at board sessions. As a result, these Directors, 
owing to lack of any background of petroleum knowledge, and 
coupled with the pressure from their primary assignments, 
tend to depend largely on the advice of subordinates in 
their respective Ministries. The subordinates are themselves 
sometimes even more ignorant of the issues relating to 
petroleum development operations. In that way, the Board's 
30 Tamlin V. Hannaford 1950 1 X. B. p. 18. 
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decisional independence is jeopardised by the preponderance 
of official directors or 'party faithfuls' which makes it 
relatively easy for the MNOCs or any opposite party to 
influence important decisions affecting the corporation 
since those Directors do not fully understand what is going 
on. 31 This sort of Board, according to Handson, is incapable 
of ensuring energetic management or of interposing its 
authority between the Minister and the enterprise. 
intermediary decision functions may then be raised to 
ministerial level, which is too high, or reduced to 
management level which is too JOW. 32 By way of illustration, 
i have supplied a brief profile of the Members of the Board 
of Directors of the NNPC and one of the joint venture 
companies in Tables 3.2 and Table 3.3 below. This is 
representative of the composition of the membership of the 
other Boards in the industry. 
31 This information is got from an Interview Session in Lagos. 
32 See Hanson, A. H. # Public Enterprises and Economic Development, London, Routledge and 
kegan Paul. 1959 p. 404 and also Elias, T. O., "Public and Private Enterprises in 
Nigeria" in Friedman, W. (ed) Public and Private Enterprise in Mixed Economies, 
Columbia University Press. 1974 p. 88 
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TABLE 3.2 
PROFILE OF MEMBERS OF NNPC'S BOARD OF DIRECTORS, 1990. 
NAME. AREAS OF INTEREST. 
Professor J. Aminu Cardiologist, Educationist, 
(Minister) and Former Vice Chancellor. 
G. P. O. Chikelu Oil expert. 
Dr. T. M. John Oil expert. 
Daniel Akoh Geologist. 
Mrs. J. 0. Maduka Electrical and mechanical 
engineering consultant. 
Kanu Obioha Civil Engineer. 
Prof. S. Adesina Architect, University 
teacher. 
Dr. S. Kumo Lawyer, University teacher. 
Alhaji Y. Maigari Industrialist and 
educationist. 
S. I. Alete Accountant. 
U. K. Bello Dir. General, Administrator 
(Civil service). 
J. D. Edozien Dir. General, Administrator 
(Civil service). 
Alhaji M. Hayatudin Dir. General, Administrator 
(Civil Service). 
Alhaji Al-Hakim Dir. General, Administrator 
(Civil service). 
Alhaji A. Shueibu Dir. General, Administrator 
(Civil service). 
Chief M. O. Feyide Dir. General, Administrator 
(Civil service). 
Chief A. Onyeobi Dir. General, Administrator 
(Civil service). 
Dr. B. Briggs Economist, educationist. 
Notes: Under the new civil service structure in Nigeria, the 
post of Director General stands f or the former Permanent 
Secretary. 
Sources: Napector (NNPC) First Quarter, 1990 and Osso, 
N. (ed) Who's who in Nigeria, Newswatch Magazine publication, 
1990. 
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TABLE 3.3. 
_ 
PROFILE OF NIGERIAN DIRECTORS IN SHELL PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT 
COMPANY NIGERIA LIMITED, 1990. 
NAME AREAS OF INTEREST. 
Godw--in E. Omene Insurance Executive, 
Administrator. 
Chief E. A. 0. Shonekan Lawyer, Administrator and 
Industrialist. 
J. B. O. Kumola Economist, Management 
Consultant. 
N. A. Achebe Engineer, former University 
teacher. 
Dr. V. 0. Achimu Lawyer. 
(Secretary) 
Source: Osso, N. (ed), Who's who in Nigeria, Newswatc 
Magazine publication, 1990. 
in the light of the above, a comprehensive statutory 
prescription where only oil experts are appointed as 
directors will go a long way towards solving these problems. 
That is the situation in Venezuela and Iraq where the SoCs 
have full time Directors whose qualifications are prescribed 
in their constitutive statutes. For example, in Venezuela, 
the Board of Directors of its SOC consists of the Minister 
for Mines and Hydrocarbons and six recognised petroleum 
experts appointed by the National Executive. 33 While in 
Iraq, the Minister of Petroleum nominates the Board Members, 
and the Company's statute prescribes guide-lines as to the 
qualifications and experience of the persons whom the 
Minister may propose to the Council of Ministers. 34 
33 See Article 8. Statute of the corporation Venezuela Del Petroleo, Decree No. 260 1960 
34 See Article XIII Statute of Iraq National oil Company Law No. 123 1967. 
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3.8 THE NNPC AS PARTY TO PETROLEUM CONTRACTS. 
The NNPC is the agency through which the Nigerian Government 
negotiates *and enters into petroleum contracts with MNOCS. 
Such power to represent the government in contractual 
matters in respect of petroleum activities is derived from 
the NNPC Act. It stipulates that with effect from the day 
the Act comes into effect, 
"(a) all the rights, interests, obligations and 
liabilities of the Government existing 
immediately before the appointed day under any 
afore-mentioned contract or instrument,, or at 
law or in equity, shall by virtue of this 
Decree be assigned to and vested in the 
Corporation, and 
(b) any such contract or instrument as is 
mentioned in sub-paragraph (a) above, shall be 
of same force and effect against or in favour 
of the Corporation and shall be enforceable as 
fully and effectively as if instead of the 
Government, the Corporation had been named 
therein or had been a party thereto. "35 
To assist in the handling of such contracts and negotiating 
any in the future, the NNPC has at its disposal scores of 
lawyers in its Legal Division who handle all corporate legal 
issues and provide legal services to the various arms of the 
corporation. Also in this regard, the NNPC has a permanent 
Joint Venture Coordinating Committee in the NAPIMS (one of 
the three Divisions of the NNPC, which amongst other things, 
coordinates and manages the various petroleum contracts 
entered into between the Corporation and foreign oil 
companies. Most of these lawyers working for NNPC are quite 
knowledgeable in aspects of petroleum operations in general 
and also aware of the desired objective of the oil industry. 
35 Schedule 2 Section 8(3)(a)(b) NNPC Act 1977. 
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in the course of the author's f ield research, it was found 
that majority of these lawyers in addition to their legal 
training have undergone training in various renown Petroleum 
Institutes in the U. S., U. K., Canada, India and the former 
Soviet Union. For example, the General Manager, Legal 
Division of the NNPC in addition to possessing a 
postgraduate qualification in law, had worked for seven 
years with a Canadian Oil company before his appointment in 
Nigeria. 
In an interview conducted by the author with the General 
Manager, Legal Division36 he commented on several issues in 
response to questions put to him. When asked about the 
practice of making petroleum contracts in the Corporation 
and at what stage the legal Division is involved therein he 
stated that literally, the legal Division gets involved at 
all the stages, viz. from negotiation right through to the 
phase for contract of sale of the commodity. He averred that 
before any petroleum development agreement or any 
legislation in that regard is concluded, it is usual for the 
Board of Directors to seek for legal advice before or 
sometimes even at the negotiation table. Following the 
negotiation stage is the drafting stage. The drafting of the 
contracts is purely conducted by Nigerian legal 
practitioners in the Legal Division. The practice among the 
other parties to the contract (namely, the foreign oil 
companies) is to refer the draft copy of the contract to 
their legal counsel at their home offices abroad. It is 
36 Interview with Mr. H. M. Olisa, General Manager, Legal Division, and Legal Adviser to 
NHPC in Lagos in November 1989, conducted an part the author's fieldwork research. 
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after the draft contract is returned with or without 
comments and where there is any, such comments resolved that 
it becomes an executed contract. 
olisa further made the point that internationally accepted 
legal concepts of oil and gas and practices have great 
influence on Nigeria in terms of drafting petroleum 
agreements. For example, he cited such concepts such as 
'wild cat', 'undivided percentage interest', 'well head', 
'blow-out', 'spud' and 'gas lift' among others and said they 
are commonly applied by legal draftsmen in the Nigerian Oil 
industry through usage. 37 Many of these terms and concepts 
are said to have found their ways into the Nigerian Oil 
industry through foreign personnel and agreements prepared 
by foreign legal practitioners (draftsmen), particularly in 
the U. K. and U. S. A., countries which Nigeria had her pioneer 
oil dealings with and where the oil industry has had a long 
history of legal development through legislation, 
transactions and litigation. As a result, most of the 
petroleum contracts and consultancy agreements in use in the 
Nigerian oil Industry are of foreign origins although 
adapted somehow to suit the Nigerian Government's desired 
objectives. Generally speaking, it can be argued that this 
is not an adverse thing. Just as the oil industry have 
become international in scope and operations, so also have 
major contracts for petroleum operations become 
internationalised in the sense that they are contracts 
commonly in use in the International Petroleum Industry 
37 : [nterview informationg lbid, 
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adapted to suit domestic laws and circUMBtanceB. ThUB, it is 
against this background that my analysis of the Nigerian 
petroleum contracts in the succeeding chapters is to be 
understood. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
FORMS OF PETROLEUM CONTRACTS I: CONCESSION REGIMES AND JOINT 
VENTURES. 
4.1 INTRODUCTION: 
The early forms of petroleum development agreements in 
Nigeria were, firstly, the traditional concession system and 
afterward the participation or joint venture agreements. The 
concession agreements, as we will later see,, were in due 
course perceived as being unfavourable and against the 
desired interests of the country, and as a result were 
revised and ultimately discontinued. But the joint venture 
agreements which replaced them till today form the bulk of 
the petroleum development arrangements in Nigeria. The aim 
of this chapter is to highlight the basic features of these 
early contracts in order to appreciate their role and import 
in striking a balance between the conflicting interests of 
the Nigerian Government on one hand and those of the MNOCs 
operating in the country on the other. 
4.2 TRADITIONAL CONCESSION AGREEMENTS 
4.2.1 NATURE OF CONCESSIONS. 
modern forms of petroleum contracts as known today started 
with the traditional concession system or as one writer 
calls them - 'the first generation agreements. " The word 
concession has no clear legal connotation in many legal 
systems. In some countries the term is referred to as 
See Page, A, C,, *Trananational Hining contracts", in Horn, H, and C, H, Schmitthoff, 
The Trananational Law of International Commercial Transactions. Vol. 2 Studies in 
Transnational Economic Law. Kluwer 1982 pp223-238. He further describes the Joint 
venture agreements an second generation and the Production sharing and Risk Service 
contracts an third generation agreements respectively. 
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administrative contractS2 and in others, such as the Common 
Law jurisdictions, a concession may take the form of a 
grant, a licence or a lease or even sometimes all three. As 
a result, in the mineral resource industry today, 
'concession' is an all-embracing term, covering any 
agreement between the government and an investor (MNOC) for 
exploration and production of mineral resources. But this is 
far from its traditional meaning. 
A number of scholars have attempted definitions of 
concessions in the traditional sense. According to William 
and Meyers a concession is : 
"an agreement (usually from a host government) 
permitting a foreign petroleum company to 
prospect for and produce oil in the area 
subject to the agreement. The terms ordinarily 
include a time limitation and a provision for 
royalty to be paid to the government. '13 
Similarly, Lipton described it as: 
II.. a grant of a property right in minerals, 
usually for a very long period; 99 years was by 
no means unusual. The investor had an almost 
complete property right in the minerals in the 
ground, that is to say all the interest but the 
bare legal title. 014 
To yet another writer, Fischer, concession simply is 
91,. a synallagmatic act by which a state 
transfers the exercise of rights or functions 
proper to itself to a private person, state- 
owned enterprise or a consortium which, in 
turn, participates in the performance of public 
functions and thus gains a privileged position 
2 Under the French Civil Law system concession agreements are classified as 
administrative contracts - i. e. "Contracts administratifs. " For further details on 
this see Toriguian, S,, Legal Aspects of oil Concessions in the Middle East, 
Hamashaine Press Beirut, Lebanon. 1972 ppl8-24. 
3 See William, H. R. and Heyers, C. J., "Oil and Gas terms. " Matthew Bender and Co. New 
York, 1962 at p. 150. 
4 Lipton, C, J,, "Negotiation and drafting of Mining Development Agreements" An Inter- 
Regional workshop arranged by the U. N, Buenos Aires, Mining Journal Books Ltd. London 
1986 at p. 92. 
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vis-a-vis other private subjects within the 
jurisdiction of the state concerned. "5 
in the light of the above definitions, it may be discerned 
that the traditional concession agreement was a relatively 
simple document, the main provisions of which were an 
outright grant of the rights to exploit and market minerals 
recovered within the area of concession by a Sovereign in 
return f or which the concessionaire provided the necessary 
capital, know-how and bore the risk of exploration. The 
concession area was usually very large and if it -did not 
include the whole territory of the conceding state, it 
covered its largest part. Contrasted with today's standards, 
the duration too was long and usually ranged between 30 to 
99 years. 6 The principal financial feature of the old 
concession was the royalty payment. Judged by today's values 
also, these early royalty payments were modest in size, but 
as time went on and competition for concessions became 
keener, the amounts increased. In many cases the companies 
paid a nominal rent of say E150 for a whole concession, plus 
one or two bottles of rUM. 7 There was no royalty in the 
modern sense, that is, the concessions provided for a 
royalty calculated as a flat rate per ton of oil rather than 
as a percentage of the value of the sale price of 
production. On the average, the royalty was generally fixed 
5 Fischer, P., "Concessions. " in R. Bernhardt (ed), Encyclopedia of Public International 
Law, Vol-8 1985 At P-100- 1 
6A few examples of the vastness and duration of the traditional concessions merit a 
mention. (1) The concession to Standard oil Company of California in Iraq was made in 
1925. Its area covered the whole of Iraq excluding the province of Basra. The 
duration was for 75 years. (2) in the concession to Anglo-Persian oil Company in 
Qatar in 2935, the area extended to the whole country while the duration was for 77 
years. 
7 Asante, S. K. B. 0 "Restructuring Trananational mineral Agreements. " A. J. I. L. Vol. 73 
1979 p. 339. 
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at four shillings gold or three rupees per ton of crude oil. 
The value of four shillings gold at the time was equivalent 
to U. S. $1.65.8 In sum, under the traditional concession 
regime the foreign investor was assured and displayed all 
the incidents of ownership of the extracted minerals. 9 
The first effective petroleum concession that led to the 
first discovery of oil was that granted to Colonel Edwin 
Drake in July 1859 at Titusville, Pennsylvania, U. S. A. 10 The 
agreement, brief and superficial as it was, gave Drake the 
rights "to bore, dig, - mine, search and obtain oil and take 
all, remove and sell such,, for his own exclusive use and 
benefit,, for the term of 15 years, with the privilege of 
renewal for same term. "" At the turn of the century, about 
1901, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain granted similar 
arrangements to William Knox D'Arcy which became known as 
D'Arcy Concessions. 12 Nigeria's earliest concessionaire was 
a German Bitumen company in 1908. The discussion on 
concession agreement regimes in Nigeria will follow shortly. 
All the early concessions, like the modernised ones of 
today, represent an important source of law which serves to 
8 This information in owed to Cattan, H. The Evolution of Oil Concessions in the Middle 
East and North Africa. 1967 Oceana Publications, New York, pp. 5-25 and E. E. Smith and 
i. s. Dzienkowski, "A fifty-year perspective on world petroleum arrangements" Texas 
international Law journal, Vol 24 2989, pp. 28-19.. 
9 For fuller account on the fiscal regime of concessions in general see Cameron, P. D., 
"The Structure of Petroleum Agreements", in N. Beredjick and To Walde (ads), Petroleum 
investment Policies in Developing Countries. Graham & trotman London 1988, chapter3 
and Fritzsche and Stockmayerf Mining agreements in developing Countries - issues of 
Finance and taxation" 1978 2 Natural Resources Forum 220. 
20 see Blinn at al (ads), international Petroleum agreements, Euromoney Publications, 
1987 p. 40. 
21 Pennsylvania Rock Oil Company Va. Bowditch & E. L. Drake dated December, 30 1857, 
12 For an incisive account on the concession regimes in these countries see, Cattan, No, 
The evolution of oil concessions in the Middle East. London 1979 , and by the same author, The Law of Oil Concessions in the Middle East and North Africa. Oceana 
Publications New York 2967. See also X. Hoxsain, Law and policy in petroleum 
Development. Nichols Publications Co New York, 1979. 
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define the legal relationship between the host countries and 
the f oreign investors. But recently most countries with the 
exception of Abu Dhabi13 prefer to use the term covenant, 
licence, grant or lease in place of the word 'concession'. 
The objection to the term 'concession' may be connected with 
the fact that it suggests a one-sided relationship implying 
a unilateral grant by the state to the concessionaire, 
without expressing the rights and obligations of both 
parties to the agreement. it will be recollected that such 
was the case under the traditional concession agreements. As 
times changed and investors were made subject to income 
taxes as the host countries too became increasingly versed 
in the mining operations the use of the term concession was 
not only dropped but its terms were revised. The revised 
concessions, (as we will also notice below, in the case of 
Nigeria) are for shorter periods and envisage substantially 
increased benefits for the host country, usually in the form 
a increased revenue through a combination of royalties and 
taxation. In addition, they contain numerous sophisticated 
terms and conditions governing the mining operations, 
expenditures to be incurred and other developmental goals 
with the supervision and enforcement of these obligations by 
the host countries. As again intimated before, in this 
revised form the concession continues to be used in many 
countries (mostly using different terms) in combination with 
13 Abu Dhabi still uses the word concession in her petroleum development arrangements. 
see *Abu Dhabi concessions 1981" in Barrows, International trends and latest changes 
in oil and gas laws, concession and production sharing agreements worldwide, 1983 
institutions on International oil and Gas Law at A-1 and A-14. 
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some subsidiary petroleum legislations and also contracts as 
the legal regime applicable to petroleum activities. 
4.2.2 MERITS AND DEMERITS OF TRADITIONAL CONCESSIONS. 
On examination of the general features of the traditional 
concessions it is evident that there are certain merits and 
demerits that go with their application. We begin by 
highlighting the pros and cons of the system from the host 
country's or mineral owner's position. 
For the host country, the early concessions meant 
simplicity. As seen above, these agreements were 
characterised by their simplicity and similarity. The grant 
made to the concessionaire was usually an exclusive right to 
exploit the mineral resource with minimum administrative and 
supervisory requirements. This invariably meant too that 
there were few ceremonies such as negotiations or bargaining 
under such agreements. This is hardly surprising because a 
good many of these old concessions were granted either by 
traditional rulers or colonial administrations. 14 The 
investors, who at the time were comprised of the "majors", 
were assured that government would not interfere with what 
they termed "management prerogatives.,, 15 It was for the 
investors alone to determine how the minerals would be 
mined, at what rate; the extent to which they would be 
processed in the host country, if at all; where they would 
be sold, on what terms, conditions and prices, etc. Indeed, 
24 For example the first Nigerian concession agreement with Shell D'Arcy company in 1937 
was signed by the then Governor General of Nigeria on behalf of the colonial 
Government of Nigeria. 
15 Roland, B., "Choice of Law Provisions in concession and Related Contracts", H. L. R. 
1976 pp. 625-627. 
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the investors had complete discretion unhampered by any view 
that government had an interest or concern in these basic 
decisions. In fact, however, it could be argued that this 
was as a result of the law and the regulations of the host 
country not being sufficiently developed into a system to 
regulate the mining industry. It also goes without saying 
that at the time the host country lacked the wherewithal and 
knowledge of petroleum operations to be able to influence 
any decisions of the investors. Hence, in this regard, one 
author remarked that, 
"Concessions were the product of global 
environment in which seven or eight vertically 
integrated major international oil companies, 
operating in an oligopolistic world petroleum 
market, dominated the international petroleum 
industry. In negotiating with governments their 
bargaining power (often backed by their home 
countries) was as strong as that of the host 
governments was weak. Governments had no option 
but to g, 3: ant concession to the majors, on their 
terms. "-LO 
Furthermore, under concessions, the host country exercised 
little or no control, or participation in the activities of 
the industry. 
_Ynlike 
today, the role of the government then 
was passive. In turn, the investor provided all the capital 
not only for the mining project, but for the infrastructure 
as well. Having contributed all of the capital, the 
concessionaire expected to receive all of the profit. 
Probably, this explains why the host country received a 
proportionately smaller income as rent as it contributed 
nothing and bore no risk throughout the production stages. 
16 As per Hossain, K., Law and Policy in Petroleum Development. Nichols Publication, New 
York 1979. at p. 57. See also Smith and Wells, Negotiating Third World Hineral 
Agreements. Ballinger Publication, 1975, Chapter 1. 
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Again in this regard, one author adduced the following 
perspective on the concession system; 
"It is not the legal system per se which made 
for the terms of the early concessions, but the 
then prevailing general circumstances. In those 
days, concessions were granted by Sovereigns 
with sometimes little authority, often under 
foreign political dominance. Also, the 
countries concerned were backward, sometimes 
nomadic, and in no case possessed a legal 
framework liable to govern such things as 
petroleum operations. Therefore, in order to 
fill that void, concessions were not only 
tilted in favour of multinational oil 
corporations but also written in such a way 
that constituted self-sufficient charters for 
those areas of the world where there existed no 
infrastructure of any kind, nor any government 
control or capabilities of any sort. Hence, it 
is hardly surprising that the word "concession" 
became mentally associated with 
"underdevelopment" and "political dominance"; 
this explains, from a psychological stand- 
point, the hostility shown toward this type of 
agreements. 0117 
While the above may present a case for the benef its and 
drawbacks of concessions for the host country, this 
arrangement carried with it certain costs and benefits for 
the investor company as well. To the investor, the early 
concessions too meant simplicity and certainty. This is 
because during the old concession era, it may generally be 
assumed that the investors treated questions such as what 
terms or regulations,, and at what rate or prices should 
minerals be mined and disposed of as a matter of convenience 
rather than substance. Since these investors are usually 
incorporated in or controlled from, their home countries, 
which in most cases the home countries are the seats of the 
colonial governments of the host countries, there was 
17 Statement by El-Kosheri quoted from Blinn, X. et al international petroleum agreements, op. cit. at PP. 60-6i. 
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generally no cause for them to fear any regulatory measure 
or policy directives that would be against their 
interests. 18 
From this, it follows that in terms of management and by any 
financial yardstick, the investors enjoyed maximum freedom 
to proceed in the best way to gain the optimum returns with 
minimum constraints and interference. Further, this meant 
too that all the risks lay with the investor. This included 
risks such as dependence upon the investor's finance, 
technology and overall policy decisions affecting the 
industry. 
On the whole, it is apparent that the host governments were 
unfairly treated under these agreements. The principal 
disadvantage has been that it has given the host government 
less direct involvement and "say" in the management of 
petroleum operations, and less opportunity to enter into 
operations directly for such vital objectives as training of 
nationals and understanding of the international energy 
industry which is vital to government policy matters. 
Likewise the governments intake from oil proceeds under this 
agreement was meagre and inconsequential. The royalty system 
applicable then lacked the flexibility to accommodate rising 
or falling prices of oil of the present times through the 
medium of taxation. Many kinds of financial obligations 
which may generally be classified as taxation, 19 which are 
is For a detailed text see Walde, T., "Tranonational Investment in the Natural Resources 
Industries", 1979 11 Law and Pol. in Int'l-Bus. 703 and Schanze, "Mining Agreements in 
Developing Countries"11978 J, W, T. L, 240. 
29 They include such fiscal regimes as Petroleum Profit Tax, Posted Prices, Signature 
bonuses, Customs and Excise Duties, Harbour and Terminal dues, among others. 
147 
applied today by oil producing states in contractual 
agreements with MNOCs were not applicable under concession 
agreements. This view also finds support in the writings Of 
scholars such as ABante20 and Zakariya. 21 Asante for 
instance, posits that the new forms of agreement, like 
production sharing contracts,, are 'formally structured to 
dismantle the enclave status enjoyed by the transnational 
corporation in the concession and to reassert in unqualified 
terms the sovereignty of the hOBt state over its natural 
resources., 
22 At this point, we will turn and focus our 
attention on the concession regimes in Nigeria. 
4.2.3 NIGERIAN CONCESSIONS REGIMES. 
After unsuccessful attempts by the first Nigerian 
Concessionaire - the German Bitumen Company in 1908 to 
prospect for oil in the then British protectorate at Lagos, 
a consortium of Shell D'Arcy Petroleum Company and British 
petroleum Company (Shell-B. P. ) acquired the second oil 
concession from the British colonial government in 1937.23 
in the course of research by the author in this area, no 
detailed account was got about the terms of the first 
Nigerian concession agreement except the fact that the 
Bitumen Company carried out surveys and exploration 
unsuccessfully for oil until the outbreak of the World War I 
20 Asante, Restructuring Transnational Minerals Agreements op. cit. 
21 Zakariya, H. S., "New Directions in the Search for and Development of Petroleum 
Resources in the Developing countries" Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 1976 
vol. 9, pp. 554-576. 
22 Asante op. cit. at p. 359. 
23 'search for Oil', in Nigerian Trade Journal, Vol. 3 No. 3, July/September 1954, p, 13 
See also The Story of oil in Nigeria, Shell-BP Petroleum Development Company of 
Nigeria Ltd, Alperton, Wembly Middlesex, 1960, p. 5. 
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when it abandoned the search. However, the terms of the 
second concession granted to Shell-B. P. stated that it was 
for a period of thirty and forty years for on-shore and off- 
shore areas (with an option for renewal for another thirty 
and forty years),, covering the whole mainland of Nigeria, 
which comprised of 357,, 000 sq. ml (925,000 sq. kl. ). 24 The 
area of the concession was that large even though geological 
survey of the country at the time showed that the most 
favourable oil-yielding areas lay in the region of the 
southern Nigeria sedimentary basin. 25 The concession lasted 
until 1959 when the duration was reduced to twenty years and 
the area narrowed down to 40,000 sq. ml. (103,600 sq. kl. ) 
around the Niger Delta basin. These early efforts involved a 
lot of hardships which required great perseverance and 
expenditure. That was as a result of intensive activities in 
the search in areas with unfavourable physical conditions 
and a rather unsophisticated infrastructure. World War II 
also interrupted the search for five years but exploration 
resumed after the war until oil was found in commercial 
quantity in 1956. Following Shell-BP's success story in 
discovering oil, other MNOCs were attracted to prospect for 
oil in Nigeria. Up until 1960, Shell-B. P. had complete 
monopoly to select at their leisure any concession area they 
were granted to prospect for oil. Such monopolistic position 
which it enjoyed throughout these two decades with respect 
24 The concession Document of the Nigerian Government with Shell-BP 1937 cited in 
Schatzl, H. L. Petroleum in Nigeria. 1969 lbadan Univ. Press p. l. The concession was 
governed by the old Colonial Mineral Ordinances Act, No. 27, of 1914. 
25 See Reyment, R. A., Aspects of Geology of Nigeria, Ibadan Univ. Press, 1964 cited in 
L. H. Schatzl# Petroleum in Nigeria. op. cit. p. 3. 
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to oil concession agreements has afforded Shell-B. P. both 
now and in the future a position of dominance in the 
development of the Nigerian petroleum resources. For 
instance, at present, Shell Petroleum Development Company of 
Nigeria, as the company is known today produces about 56 per 
cent of the total oil production of the country. 
26 
The other oil companies were able to obtain concessions only 
after 1959 in those areas Shell-B. P. had earlier abandoned. 
By lst April, 1966, out of the entire concession areas in 
the country, Shell-BP had acquired nearly 19,000 sq. ml. and 
Gulf oil had only 6,, 855 sq. ml. Esso and SAFRAP possessed 
more than two-thirds of the areas with 59,, 000 and 25,000 
sq. ml. respectively. The concessions granted to these 
companies were at the time governed by the Minerals Oil 
ordinances No. 17,1914. The duration of the concession was 
for twenty years. And the fiscal terms comprised of payments 
of some yearly rent in respect of the whole duration plus 
royalties. With regard to the yearly rent, Paragraph 3(1) of 
the concession agreement granted to Shell-BP in 1949 
stipulates that; 
"The Licensee shall pay to the Accountant General of the 
Federation of Nigeria on behalf of the Governor General 
during the term hereby granted or any renewal thereof for 
each square mile or part thereof comprised in the said lands 
a certain yearly rent as follows: 
(a) in respect of each year of the said term the certain 
rent of five shillings; 
(b) in respect of each year of a renewal of the said term 
the certain rent of ten shillings. " 
While Paragraph 5 of the agreement ý7hich addressed the 
royalty payments states that; 
26 See Understanding the Nigerian oil Industry. An HNPC Publication 1988, at p. 25. 
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"The licensee shall pay to the Accountant General of the 
Federation of Nigeria on behalf of the Governor General 
within two months after the end of each year of the term 
hereby granted or any renewal thereof the royalties 
hereunder specified: 
(1) a royalty of four shillings a ton of 2,240 lbs. of all 
crude oil won and saved and casinghead petroleum spirit 
recovered by the licensee from the said lands within such 
year ascertained in the manner provided by Clause 6 
(measurement of petroleum obtained from the said lands. )" 
These early concessions granted to oil companies in Nigeria 
were -called 'Exploration Rights' under the Mineral Oil 
ordinances of 1914. In order to commence exploration, 
production or marketing activities, the oil companies needed 
to obtain such rights at first from the British colonial 
government and after independence from the Nigerian 
government. In a sense, they were the legal*prerequisite for 
the companies before any prospecting work began. The 
Minerals oil ordinance continued to operate even after the 
country's independence until in 1969 when it was repealed 
and replaced by the Petroleum Act 1969 and its subsidiary 
legislation the Petroleum (Drilling and Production) 
Regulations 1969.27 
The promulgation of this Act marked a watershed in the 
history of crude oil legislation in Nigeria. Its 
significance is that it,, among other things, provided for 
the first time that the entire ownership and control of all 
petroleum in the country is vested in the Federal Government 
of Nigeria. As alluded to earlier, it also revised all the 
terms and conditions under which pre-1969 concessions were 
granted and indeed repealed in whole the Mineral Oils 
27 Petroleum Act, 1969 No. 51 of 1969. 
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ordinances of 1914. The revised concession agreements are 
looked at in the next section. 
4.2.4 MODERNISM TYPES OF CONCESSIONS 
One of the fundamental changes introduced by the Petroleum 
Act 1969 is that as opposed to a single grant (Exploration 
right) as obtained under the traditional concession regime, 
it provides for three types of grants to regulate petroleum 
operations in the country. They include: 
(1) Oil exploration licence (OEL), 
(2) oil prospecting licence (OPL) and 
(3) Oil mining lease (OML). 
Next, we will briefly discuss the nature and content of 
these grants in turn. 
4.2.5 OIL EXPLORATION LICENCE. 
This licence is granted by the Minister of Petroleum under 
the powers conferred by Section 2(l)(a) of the Petroleum Act 
1969 only in respect of'areas which have never been explored 
before. It entitles the licensee to the non-exclusive right 
to carry out geological and geophysical search for petroleum 
within the area of the grant. The size of the area applied 
for must be compact and may not exceed 5,000 sq. ml. (12,950 
sq. kl). The duration of an OEL is for one year only, with a 
possible extension for another year. Any discovery of 
hydrocarbon or other minerals by the licensee must be 
reported to the Head of the Petroleum Inspectorate of NNPC 
and this may be accompanied by an application for either an 
oil prospecting licence or oil mining lease in respect of 
the same area or areas. And whenever the OEL expires, an oil 
company can apply to the Minister to convert it into an oil 
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prospecting licence or oil mining lease for the areas it 
finds to be promising. 
4.2.6 OIL PROSPECTING LICENCE 
As with the OEL, this licence is granted by the Minister of 
Petroleum on application by an oil company. An OPL grants to 
the licensee the exclusive right to search, drill, to 
extract samples, as well as to export the crude oil, and to 
refine it in Nigeria. The duration of an OPL is left at the 
discretion of the Minister but must not exceed 5 years 
including any periods of renewal in the case of land and 
territorial waters and 7 years for continental shelf areas. 
The maximum area prescribed for an OPL is 1,000 sq. ml. 
(2,590 sq. kl. ) 
As soon as the licensees undertake crude oil or gas 
production in the areas of grant, they are obliged to pay 
royalties and are also subject to pay taxation as governed 
by the Petroleum Profits Tax Act (PPT Act) 1959. The 
intention of the PPT Act 1959 was to "impose a tax upon the 
profits from the winning of petroleum in Nigeria, to provide 
for the assessment and collection thereof and for purposes 
connected therewith". 
28 The Act among other things, 
introduced the 50: 50 profit share between the Licensees and 
Nigeria. In other words, royalties were collected separately 
from the 50 per cent tax due to the Government. There are 
other rights, duties and obligations, of licensees under an 
OPL which are similar to those of an OML. For convenience 
and to avoid repetition, such rights, duties and obligations 
28 Preamble to the PPT Act 1959. since its enactment the PPT Act has been amended 
several times. currently, the percentage of the profit paid to Nigeria by the oil 
companies under the Act stands at 85 per cent. 
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are addressed in the succeeding section which deals with the 
OML. 
4.2.7 OIL MINING LEASE. 
juridically, a 'lease' denotes an agreement which gives rise 
to the relationship of landlord and tenant or lessor and 
lessee in respect of real or personal property respectively. 
Hence, as compared to a licence, a lease is of a more formal 
nature and rights conferred thereunder are greater and more 
enduring. For example, the terms of the lease would usually 
provide for the tenant or lessee to have exclusive 
possession of lands or tenements for a fixed or determinable 
period of time in return for some consideration to the 
landlord or lessor. 29 An OML granted under the Petroleum Act 
1969 not only has the foregoing contractual qualities but 
also does contain some provisions which relate to the 
lessee's operations. However, it is stated that unlike a 
normal lease, an OML granted under the Petroleum Act even 
though designated a 'lease' does not grant to the lessee a 
leasehold estate. 30 That means, it is more in the nature of 
a mineral lease which permits the lessee the use of the land 
to explore and dispose of any petroleum discovered within 
the leased area for a definite time upon the payment of 
royalty among other considerations, and does not involve an 
estate in land per se. 
The Petroleum Act 1969 also requires applicants for an OML 
to file their applications with the Minister of Petroleum. 
29 See Williams and Mayers op. cit. Para. 201, pp. 19-37. 
30 For a more incisive account on this see Olisa, H. H. Nigerian Petroleum Law and 
Practice, Fountain Books lbadan. 1987, at pp. 24-30. 
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The grant is made only to a holder of an OPL who has 
discovered oil in commercial quantities. A holder of an OML, 
in addition to having virtually all other rights of a 
licensee of an OPL, has 
"the exclusive right within the leased area to 
conduct exploration and prospecting operations 
and to win, get, work, store, carry away, 
transport, export or otherwise treat pe3tfoleum 
discovered in or under the leased area. ', 3 
Holders of the OML are also obliged as soon as production 
work commences to payment of rents, royalties as well as 
taxation in accordance with the Petroleum Profits Tax Act 
1959. The area involved in the grant of an OML must not 
exceed 1295 sq. km. And the maximum duration of an OML is 20 
years, but it may be renewed upon approval by the Minister. 
The ren6wal may either be for the entire area of grant or 
for part thereof. The Petroleum Act does not set out 
distinctions between the duration of a grant of the OML in 
respect of on-shore and off-shore areas as it is the case 
with the pre-1969 grants. It will be recalled that the 
position under the pre-1969 grants was such that, the 
duration of a grant in an on-shore area was for a term of 30 
years, while with respect to that for off-shore area, a term 
of 40 years was stipulated. It has been rightly observed 
that the reason for this difference in duration, is that 
there existed in the pre-1960s during the old concessions 
period less advanced state of technology for exploiting off- 
shore areas as compared to the higher technology available 
from the 1970s onwards for on-shore petroleum 
31 Paragraph 11 of schedule I to the Petroleum Act 1969. 
155 
exploitation. 32 in addition, the Petroleum Act does not 
permit of the renewals of the OML for 30 years and 40 years 
as they relate to on-shore and of f -shore areas as was the 
case under the pre-1969 grants. Instead, it is silent on the 
number of years to which a lessee would be entitled on 
renewal. 
4.2.8 RIGHTS, DUTIES AND OBLIGATIONS OF OPL AND OML HOLDERS. 
For purposes of carrying out their operations, holders of 
the OPL and OML are given certain ancillary rights, duties 
and obligations set out in the Petroleum Act 1969. These 
rights, duties and obligations conferred on the licensee and 
lessee are again subject to certain reservations and 
restrictions in the same manner any grantor of an interest 
in land mqy impose conditions on the use or alienation of 
the land. Some of these rights include, for example, surface 
rights (right to enter and remain in the licensed or leased 
area for purpose of operations permitted by the grantor) and 
water rights (right to take and make use of water f ound in 
the area). These rights, among others, are conferred on the 
holders of the licence or lease subject to the condition 
that the Government would not nationalise their assets and 
their entire investments in the venture without fair and 
adequate compensation. 
33 
Furthermore, holders of both OPL and OML are under 
obligations relating to the level and standard of work to be 
32 See Etikerentse, G., Nigerian Petroleum Law 1985, Macmillan Publishers, Chapter 2 at 
p. 35. 
33 on the issue of payment of compensation by host countries to KNOCs following a 
nationalisation move by the former see generally Higgins, R., "The taking of property 
by the State: Recent Licences, " Hague Academy Recueil des Cours 1982 Vol. 3,298. 
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performed within specified periods. Others relate to 
obligations to recruit and train Nigerian citizens in all 
phases of the industry, to conserve petroleum and to control 
pollution of land, water and air. Work obligations are 
designed to provide efficient operation within the entire 
area of the grant. And in relation to recruitment and 
training of nationals, the Petroleum Act prescribes for the 
lessee the percentages of skilled and unskilled Nigerian 
personnel which it must recruit and train as follows: 
The holder of an OML shall ensure that: 
11 (1) the number of citizens, of Nigeria employed by him in 
connection with the lease in managerial, professional and 
supervisory grades shall reach at least seventy-five per 
cent of the total number of persons employed by him in those 
grades, and 
(2) the number of citizens of Nigeria in any one such grade 
shall be not less than 60 per cent of the total and, 
(3) all skilled and gri-skilled and unskilled workers are 
citizens of Nigeria". 
It is pertinent to stress also that the Petroleum Act 
embodies for the first time conditions under which grants of 
both an OPL and OML can be assigned or revoked. If the 
holder of an OPL or OML desires to assign the licence or 
lease, it must take place subject to the approval of an 
application to that effect submitted to the Petroleum 
Minister. For the Minister's consent to be given, the 
proposed assignee must be of good reputation. If the 
assignee is a new entrant into the Nigerian Oil industry, it 
has to satisfy essentially the same conditions and 
requirements of a new applicant for a grant of petroleum 
34 Paragraph 37 of Schedule 1 to the Petroleum Act 1969. It is pertinent to note that 
the emphasis placed here by the Nigerian Government is rather on employment of many 
Nigerians in the oil industry than on transfer of technology which came into focus 
later on. 
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rights from the point of view of technical competence, 
financial capability and Government's policy on foreign 
investments. 35 Turning to the issue of revocation, the 
Petroleum Act is explicit on the conditions under which an 
OPL or OML can be revoked. There are two instances in which 
revocation of a grant, be it an OPL or OML can occur. 
(1) When the'licensee or lessee becomes controlled directly 
or indirectly by shareholders who are nationals of a country 
whose laws prohibit Nigerian citizens or companies from 
participating in such country's petroleum related businesses 
under conditions that are comparable to those applicable in 
Nigeria. 36 
(2) When a holder of a grant fails to conduct operations 
continuously and vigorously in a business-like manner and in 
accordance with good oil-field practice. 37 In this regard, 
the question has been asked whether the Nigerian Government 
or NNPC can revoke a lease on the ground that an operator or 
lessee has reduced its production or pace of activities 
because of its inability to dispose of its production due to 
either oil glut or reduced demand for oil in the world. In 
Etikerentse's opinion, which is also shared by the author, 
it would be wrong and inappropriate under this provision to 
invoke the powers of revocation if indeed the lessee's 
action or reduced activity is solely brought aboutl by 
35 For a survey of the law and Policy of the Nigerian Government on foreign investments 
in general, see Osunbor, O. A., "Laws and policy on the registration of technology 
transaction in Nigeria", 22 JWTL 1987 P. M. 
36 Paragraph 23(l) of Schedule I to the Petroleum Act 1969. 
37 Paragraph 24 (1) (4) schedulel to the Petroleum Act 1969. 
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dictates of market forces and not by any deliberate 
malevolent act. 
Finally, as regards which arbitration law will apply in the 
event of any dispute arising, Section 10 of the Petroleum 
Act stipulates that such disputes shall be settled in 
accordance with the Arbitration Law of any state in Nigeria 
mutually agreed to by the parties. Where the parties fail to 
reach such agreement the Arbitration Law of Lagos State 
shall be applied. The Petroleum Act does not stipulate 
specifically which law will be applicable for the 
construction of the terms and provisions of the OPLs and 
OMLs, but being the major legislation on oil mining 
operations in Nigeria, it goes without saying that the 
applicable law too will be Nigerian law. 
4.2.9 THE END OF THE CONCESSION ERA. 
The major impetus towards dismantling the concessions regime 
in Nigeria was largely motivated by the country's desire for 
participation in the development of its hydrocarbon 
resources with the foreign oil companies. It is clear from 
the above examination of the traditional and modernised 
concessions in Nigeria that, the role of the government 
under both was purely regulatory and non-participatory. 
This, as we again noticed was because the country lacked the 
financial, technical, manpower and marketing capabilities 
required for the exploitation of the resource. But following 
its membership of OPEC in 1971 and the formation of the NNOC 
in the same year, things began to change. Nigeria, along 
with other OPEC member countries, at the time,, sought to 
actively participate in and eventually exercise control over 
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their oil industries, including development, exploitation 
and marketing in order to make the best possible use of 
these resources. At its XVI Conference of January 1968, OPEC 
passed Resolution No. 90 which embodied a policy statement 
calling for modification in the concession system or 
arrangements between member states and oil companies. The 
policy statement, inter alia, mentioned that, 
"Where provision for governmental participation 
in the ownership of the concession holding 
company under any of the present contracts has 
not been made, the government may acquire a 
reasonable participation, on the grounds of the 
principle of changing circumstances. If suA 
provision has actually been made, but avoided 
by the operators concerned, the rate provided 
for shall serve as a minimum basis for the 
participation to be acquired. "3 
This principle was re-emphasised by the OPEC in 1971 when it 
resolved that member countries shall take immediate steps 
towards the effective implementation of the principle of 
participation in the existing oil concessions. infact, the 
resolution prescribed a guide-line for the level of 
participation. The guide-line was a minimum of 25 per cent 
participation by 1973 and a maximum of 51 per cent by 
1982.39 
In the same vein, this desire to change from the concessions 
type of agreement to participation and the need for 
increased control, had been re-emphasised and supported by 
the United Nations (U. N. ) when, through many resolutions, it 
accentuated the importance of permanent sovereignty as the 
38 See Adedeji, K., "State participation in the Nigerian Petroleum Industry", 11 JWTL 
1977 at p. 374. 
39 OPEC Resolution No. 192 of 1971. 
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right of peoples and nations to determine freely the use of 
their natural resources. 40 Legally, the significance of 
these resolutions is that they recognised and supported the 
aspirations of many LDCs to adopt legislation governing the 
allocation, use, disposal, development and distribution of 
their natural resources, this being an indisputable function 
of state sovereignty. 41 The question of permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources, which for the first time 
came up in 1950s, is inextricably linked with the history of 
colonialism and neo-colonialism. Historically and 
politically,, it was the' demand of the newly independent 
countries for economic self-determination once political 
independence had been achieved. It stemmed from the 
recognition of these countries that political independence 
was bound to remain meaningless if foreign control were to 
last in the economic sector, more so since for most LDCs 
their natural resources generally represented their only 
economic assets. Hence, it is no surprise that the issue of 
permanent sovereignty has become and continues to be a bone 
of contention between developed and LDCs in all 
international forums. Kemper has succinctly put it that, 
"the history of the concept permanent 
sovereignty can be seen as the history of the 
struggle between private foreign investment and 
the interests of the capital-exporting 
countries on the one side and the interests of 
the capital-importing countries and their 
40 They include, G. A. Res. 523 (VI) 1952,626 (VII) 1952,837 (IX) 1954 and 1803 (XVII) 
1968, the latter is called "Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural 
Resources. " This resolution is the last substantive resolution on the subject. 
41 Kemper, R. "The Concept of Permanent Sovereignty and its Impact on Hineral Contracts. " 
Legal and Institutional Arrangements in minerals Development. mining Journal Books 
1982 U. N. D. T. C. D. Cap. 4 at p. 30. See also S. Zorn, "Permanent Sovereignty over 
Natural Resources" Natural Resources Forum 1983 Vol. 7, No. 4, at pp. 321-328. 
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economi, q and development goals on the other 
side. "" 
Leaving these arguments and controversies aside, the fact 
has to be acknowledged that the changes called for in the UN 
Resolutions clearly have been realised, sometimes with a 
certain time lag, sometimes in anticipation, in relation to 
the forms of contractual agreements of LDCs. In pursuance of 
these resolutions,, LDCs including Nigeria,, have affirmed 
that ownership of their natural resources is vested in them 
and have sought increased control over, and benefits from, 
their exploitation. These countries felt confident in taking 
steps that reversed the then concession agreements to forms 
of joint ventures (either with majority or minority 
participation), and later on to production sharing and risk 
service contracts. To get to that stage, these countries, by 
and large, chose a path of either outright expropriation or 
renegotiation. Some countries, such as Mexico, Iraq and 
Libya embarked on expropriation of assets of the foreign oil 
companies operating in their oil industries, whereas Nigeria 
(as will be seen shortly) took a moderate principle of 
acquiring equity interest in the operating oil companies 
through a renegotiation process. Several factors may explain 
the preference of renegotiation by Nigeria. The willingness 
of the "majors" to renegotiate the early concessions may be 
attributable to their fear that Nigeria and other countries 
would take the same step as Mexico and Libya. other factors 
include, first, the formation of OPEC and its coordinate 
efforts to renegotiate the original concessions. Second, it 
42 Kemper, R., "The Concept of Permanent Sovereignty and its Impact on Hineral 
contracts. " op. cit. at p. 30. 
162 
became increasingly obvious that it was unfair to tie these 
countries' royalties and other benefits to prices of oil 
controlled by the MNOCs. 43 Finally, international political 
pressure (backed by the U. N. ) and nationalism also 
contributed to Nigeria and the other oil producing countries 
to complain about the unfair nature of the early 
concessions. 
Although several countries managed to renegotiate their 
concessions in 1950s and the 1960s, the major restructuring 
of the traditional concession arrangements occurred in the 
1970s. While OPEC was assisting in the collective 
negotiation of improvements in the financial terms of the 
concessions, individual countries were negotiating various 
piecemeal changes in the structure of the arrangements. In 
1971, the OPEC renegotiations resulted in an increase in the 
countries' share of income through additional income taxes 
and a new system for determining the posted price of oil 
other than that determined by the MNOCs. 44 
In the case of Nigeria, the final blow on MNOCs with regards 
the demise of concessions came in February 1972, through a 
Government Notice45 which assigned to the erstwhile NNOC all 
areas in the country not covered by existing licences or 
leases, and also of concession areas being held by MNOCs 
46 
which might be surrendered from time to time. The Notice 
43 This discussion draws on A. Danielsen, The Evolution of OPEC, op. cit. 1982, pp4-7. 
44 Swith, E. E. et al "World Petroleum Arrangements, " op. cit. pp. 30-33. 
45 official Gazzette No 9 Vol. 59 of February 2972, Government Notice No. 321. 
46 Paragraph 12 of Schedule I to the Petroleum Act, 1969 provides that ten years after 
the grant of an OHL, one half of the area of the lease shall be relinquished. it is 
silent on whether or not such relinquishement shall take place when no exploration 
work is undertaken in the area of grant. The provision applies to all leases granted 
under the repealed Mineral Oils ordinance and the Petroleum Act by virtue of 
163 
issued under the heading "Issue of Prospecting Licences" 
stated that: 
"All areas not covered by existing oil mining 
leases, oil prospecting licences or oil 
exploration licences have been vested by the 
Federal Military Government in the Nigerian 
National Oil Corporation. Concession areas 
surrendered from time to time under the laws 
regulating the exploitation of petroleum and 
gas deposits in Nigeria will be vested in the 
Nigerian National oil Corporation.,, 47 
The effect of the Notice is that since February 1972, no new 
OEL,, OPL and OML has been granted to any person whether 
corporate or individual, foreign or indigenous, covering any 
part of the areas reserved for the corporation. This meant 
that no more concessions were to be granted to any companies 
or organisations. The question arises, whether such Notice 
is equivalent to an enactment or a recognised form of 
conveyance to effect the vesting of the mineral oils and gas 
in place in the NNOC. In view of section 40(3) of the 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria which vests 
in the Government all natural resources within the lands 
under Nigerian jurisdiction, it would appear that the Notice 
could at best be regarded as statement of policy or 
Government decision whereby all uncommitted oil fields are 
treated as areas reserved for the exclusive exploitation by 
the state owned oil corporation. This is because, 
notwithstanding the Notice, all petroleum in place over 
which the Government has Jurisdiction vests throughout in 
the Federal Government by virtue of the provisions in the 
Paragraph 1 of Schedule 4 of the Petroleulm Act 1969, In my view, this provision is 
fraught with practical difficulties. 
47 ibid. at p-284. 
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Petroleum Act 1969,48 Exclusive Economic Zone Act 197849 and 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979.50 
However,, the NNOC was instead authorised to employ private 
companies as contractors or minority partners and that it 
has been doing up to now even though under a new name - the 
NNPC. The ef fect is that in Nigeria today, apart from the 
modernised concessions which are converted and operate as 
joint ventures, two other contractual forms exist within the 
oil industry. These are the production sharing and risk 
service contracts which are discussed in chapter five. 
it is worthwhile too to mentio n that the provisions under 
the Petroleum Act relating to the OEL, OPL and OML 1969 have 
neither been amended nor repealed, as such they are still in 
force. 51 Similarly, some of the licences granted under the 
pre 1969 concessions regime i. e. under the repealed Mineral 
oils ordinances of 1914 are still in force subject to the 
transitional and saving provisions of the Petroleum Act 1969 
which stipulates that: 
"Any licence or lease granted under an 
enactment repealed by this Act shall continue 
in force notwithstanding the repeal, but shall 
be subject to this Decree and to any 
regulations made thereunder except as regards 
the duration of the licence or lease, the rent 
and royalties payable in respect thereof and 
any term or condition as to which the Minister 
certifies that the justice of the case required 
that the term or condition in question shall 
48 section I of the Petroleum Act 1969. 
49 Section 1 of the Exclusive Economic Zone Act 1978. 
50 section 40(3) of the 1979 Constitution of Nigeria. 
51 interview information by the author with H. H. Olisa, NNPC Lagos. 
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conti ue to be effective notwithstanding this 
Act. 52 
In ef f ect, this means that some of the licences and leases 
granted to oil companies under both old and modernised 
concessions (pre 1969 and post 1969 grants), are still in 
operation. When Nigeria was renegotiating with these 
companies in relation to participation agreements, such 
original licences and leases served as the bases for such 
participation or joint ventures. It is reckoned that greater 
majority of the licences currently in force in Nigeria were 
granted under the Mineral Ordinances. Many of such licences 
granted for the initial 40 years term, have now had close to 
35 years duration. 53 Therefore, companies who conduct 
petroleum operations through joint ventures or participation 
agreements with the NNPC in the areas in respect of both 
pre-1969 and post-1969 grants are obliged to carry out most 
of the work obligations and comply with most of the 
regulations and requirements of holders of OPLs and OMLs. 
The nature of the operations of joint ventures or 
participation agreements will now be examined. 
4.3 PARTICIPATION AND JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENTS. 
As indicated earlier, participation agreements as a new form 
of petroleum development arrangement was a response to the 
need felt by Nigeria and other oil exporting countries in 
the late 1960s and 1970s to share in the ownership and 
control over operations in their oil industries. Given that 
complete control exercised by the early concessionaires was 
52 see Petroleum Act 1969 Schedule 4 Parargraph 1 (a). 
53 ror example the oil mining Lease agreement signed in June 1959 between Shell- 
B. P. Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria and Nigeria as well as similar 
agreements with other oil companies will continue to be in force until 1999. 
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based on their ownership of petroleum under traditional 
concessions, state participation was, thus, perceived by 
these countries as a corollary to state ownership of 
petroleum deposits. Again, as independent states, they saw 
it as incongruous that they should not have the right to 
participate in the exploration of a resource which falls 
within their sovereign jurisdictions. Infact, the first case 
of state participation in the international petroleum 
operations dates 
back to 1914. In that year, the British 
Government, carrying out the petroleum policy recommended by 
Winston Churchill, acquired a controlling share interest 
(about 56 per cent) in Anglo-Persian Oil Company (now 
British Petroleum'Company). 54 In the course of debate in the 
House of Commons in 1913, Churchill remarked: 
"Our ultimate policy is that the Admiralty 
should become the independent owner and 
producer of its own supplies of liquid 
fuel ... or at any rate,, the controller at the 
source of at least a proportion of the supply 
of national oil we require. 1155 
Similarlyr post World War II oil agreements in the Middle 
East envisaged an even more vigorous application of the 
principle. The majority of them provided for government 
equity participation in the form of either joint ventures or 
optional participation conditioned on the discovery of 
commercial petroleum deposits. The adoption by OPEC of 
Resolution 90 in 1968 which was pointed out earlier, added 
54 For detailed text of how Britain acquired majority shares in the British Petroleum 
company, see shivadran, B,, The Middle East oil and the Great Powers, 2nd Edition, 
1959 
55 Statement of Former Prime minister Winston Churchill to the British House of 
Coximmons, 17 July 1913, quoted in United States Federal Trade Commission, in The 
international Petroleum Cartel, Washington, D. C., 1958 at p. 348. 
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succour to these countries in their resolve towards 
participation agreements. 
Since then, state participation as a policy aimed at sharing 
ownership and control over exploitation of petroleum 
resources has been adopted by many countries. Thus, in many 
of the major oil producing countries today, aside from 
having ownership of the hydrocarbons wholly vested in the 
state, the state is also an operator as well as the 
regulating and administrative authority governing its 
relationship with MNOCs. In most cases, the state owned oil 
companies in these countries operate as instruments for 
achieving effective participation. 
The basic objectives of state participation can be 
summarised as follows: 
(a) satisfaction of the national aspiration of public 
participation as of right with the MNOCS in the ownership of 
petroleum rights and in decision making on important matters 
affecting the conduct of petroleum operations; 
(b) increased revenue to Government through profit sharing 
and sales of Government share of crude oil produced from 
joint operations; 
(c) acquisition of requisite technology, managerial and 
technical skill by the state owned oil company which 
participates in the operations; 
(d) supply of internal needs of petroleum and its products, 
and 
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(e) inside knowledge of the methods, techniques and patterns 
of petroleum operations necessary for an effective 
Government regulation of the industry. 56 
Given these general objectives, it is proposed to examine 
below the various forms of participation agreements in the 
Nigerian context. 
4.3.1 PARTICIPATION AGREEMENTS IN NIGERIA 
As we saw earlier in chapter two, under Paragraph 34(a) of 
the Petroleum Act 1969, provision is made authorising the 
Nigerian Government to participate in all licences or leases 
granted since 1969, to explore and develop oil with the 
applicant for such licence or lease. The Act empowered the 
Federal Government to achieve participation in the oil 
industry by negotiations rather than through unilateral 
action. The Act sets out that; 
"If he (the Minister) considers it to be in the 
public interest, he may impose on a licence or 
lease to which this Schedule applies special 
terms and conditions not inconsistent with this 
Act including terms and conditions as to: 
(a) participation by the Federal Military 
Government in the venture to which the licensee 
or lessee relates, on terms to be negotiated 
between the Minister and the applicant for the 
licence or lease...,, 57 
This is, for instance, in contrast with the position in 
Algeria where the Government enforced participation (i. e. 
through nationalisation) by transferring 51 per cent 
interest in assets, stocks and shares of the foreign oil 
56 The discussion in this area draws extensively on Khan, K. I. F. (ed), Petroleum 
Resources and Development: Economic, Legal and Policy Issues for Developing 
Countries, 1987 Belhaven Press, London, especially in chapter 12. 
57 Schedule 1, Paragraph 34(a) of the Petroleum Act 1969. 
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companies to the State oil Company - SONATRACH. 
58 The policy 
of participation through negotiation, is in my view more 
sensible compared to that through unilateral action because 
the former can generate a better atmosphere of mutual 
confidence between the parties than the latter. 
Therefore, in 1970, in consonance with provision of the 
Petroleum Act 1969, and also motivated by OPEC's Resolution 
No. 90 of 1968, the Nigerian Government announced its 
intention to participate in three branches of the petroleum 
industry, viz. exploration and mining, refining, and 
distribution and marketing. The detailed participation 
scheme received the necessary legislative approval in 
September 1971, with participation ratios ranging from 35 
per cent government interest in SAFRAP (a French subsidiary) 
and Shell-BP, to 51 per cent in Japan Petroleum Company. The 
ratio of participation at the early stages was flexible, it 
depended on the outcome of the negotiations with each oil 
company and whether or not the company involved is a holder 
of an existing OPL or OML. 
with effect from April 1973, Government participation at a 
level of 35 per cent was extended to other oil producing 
companies in the country,, viz. Gulf,, Mobil, Agip-Phillip 
Texaco and Pan Ocean. An additional 20 per cent interest was 
acquired with effect from April 1974, giving a total 
government participation of 55 per cent. This was followed 
by another acquisition of 5 per cent interest with effect 
from July, 1979, so that as from that date the NNPC, as a 
58 By virtue of Algerian ordinance No. 17 &1-23 of 12 April 1971. 
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transferee on behalf of the Government owns a participating 
interest of 60 per cent in the operations and assets of all 
oil producing companies in Nigeria, except those companies 
that are parties with NNPC to service contracts or 
production sharing contracts. 59 (See Tables on Government 
Joint Venture Participation interest below). 
The acquisition of interest just mentioned set the stage for 
government participation in the operations of oil companies 
in Nigeria. By acquiring such participating interests, 
Nigeria assumed the role of a partner in a joint venture 
and, among other things, had to contribute proportionately 
to the costs of carrying out the oil operations of each 
company, as well as collect its remunerations 
proportionately in kind, i. e., in crude oil. 
The subject matters of participation by NNPC in the 
operations and assets of each oil producing company are as 
f ollows: 
(a) the OPLs and OMLs held by the oil company, 
(b) the fixed and moveable assets of the company in Nigeria 
including development, production, transportation, 
distribution and export operations and associated assets as 
offices, housing and welfare facilities, and 
(c) the working capital applicable to the joint operations 
of the OPLs and OMLs. 
60 
59 All participation interests acquired by Government became vested in NNPC with effect 
from April, 1977. The discussion here draws mostly on Olisa op. cit., chapter 3 and 
Etikerentse op. cit., chapter 1 respectively. 
60 See Article 1 of Participation Agreements between NNPC anf ELF Nigeria Ltd 1985, NNPC 
and Gulf oil Company Nigeria Ltd 1984, NNPC and Shell Petroleum Development Company 
of Nigeria Ltd, 1984 and NNPC and the rest of the oil companies operating in Nigeria. 
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It is pertinent to emphasise here that NNPC does not own 
shares or stock in any of the MNOCs with which it has joint 
venture operations agreements. In other words, NNPC only has 
a non-equity participation agreement with these companies. 
This point is further discussed below. 
Negotiations with the oil companies in respect of the 
acquisition of'the participation interests was said to be by 
no means an easy task. In some cases, it took as long as two 
years for the NNOC and later on NNPC of f icials and the oil 
companies to reach an agreement. Compensation to the 
companies for the Government's acquired interests were at 
first settled on the basis of the updated book value of 
their assets. That is to say, on the normal commercial basis 
calculated by valuing the future earning value of the assets 
notwithstanding the depreciation and qualifying capital 
allowances they had previously claimed on such assets. But 
the companies later on gave up this formula for an assurance 
of oil supplies and an oil 'buy back' system. 61 For example, 
in the 1974 agreement for the 55 per cent participation 
interest provided that in that year the companies would have 
the right to buy back at agreed prices, half of the NNOC's 
participation crude and the first option to buy another one 
quarter. The remainder was to be sold in the world oil 
market by the NNOC. The practice of making available a 
proportion of oil to the companies to sell on behalf of the 
Nigerian Government finally ceased in 1978. From that year, 
61 The information in this area is owed to an interview session with H-H. Olisa, NNPC 
office Lagos. 
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NNPC began to market Nigeria's participation crude directly 
to buyers. 
4.3.2 NATURE OF PARTICIPATION AGREEMENTS IN NIGERIA. 
The major concern here is to examine the main features of 
the Nigerian approach to joint venture agreements, which 
consists of a partnership between NNPC and the MNOCs for the 
exploitation of petroleum resources. As indicated 
previously, this type of agreement represents a practical 
compromise which has emerged in the post World War II era to 
meet two basic needs, that of the host state to acquire 
ownership and exert greater control over its petroleum 
resources, and that of the MNOCs to act as operators as well 
as to secure their own crude supply. 
The term 'joint venture' here is used in a broad sense to 
denote a variety of forms of cooperation. Its intended 
meaning is broad enough to accommodate all situations in 
which the host state and the MNOCs undertake such joint 
participation in any phase of the oil industry. Therefore, 
it is not limited to joint ventures in the technical sense 
of joint ownership and control. 
62 
in Nigeria, there are two separate but related agreements 
which constitute joint participation in petroleum 
operations: the equity share participation and the. non- 
equity participation agreements. 
4.3.3 [A] THE EQUITY SHARE PARTICIPATION AGREEMENT 
62 For instance, in the case of Chishon L7. Gil!! er 
the term 'Joint venture' was Z[Tef-ined ai `e 7t 
81 F. 2d 120 at p. 124 (4th Cir 1936) 
lationship created when two or more 
persons combine in a Joint business enterprise for their mutual benefit with the 
understanding that they are to share in the profits or losses and that each is to 
have a voice in its management, " Thusl for our present purposes any joint business 
operation in which either the host state or the HNOC owns between 5 and 90 per cent 
participating interest is classified as joint ventures. 
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in Nigerian publications and usage it is commonly called 
'participation agreement' and refers to the one in which the 
government is a shareholder in the joint venture company, 
and is entitled to dividends to the extent of its equity 
share interest in that company. This arrangement requires 
the formation of a separate legal entity in the form of a 
joint stock company by a MNOC and the Nigerian Government or 
its agency. The company so created is usually completely 
neutral of the parents, drawing equally or as may be agreed 
on from their resources, both human and material. Management 
board representation is based on parties' participation 
interests. Management is usually independent of direct 
influence by the partners who intervene only through 
representing their several interests at the Board level. The 
joint company usually has its own completely distinct image 
and outlook. 
Most companies that fall within such classification of 
participation agreement in Nigeria, are the 'oil service 
companies' in which by virtue of the Nigerian Enterprises 
Promotion Act (NEP Act) 1977, the NNPC owns 36 per cent 
equity shares in each company while the Nigerian employees 
of such companies own 4 per cent of the share capital. The 
NEP Act also known as the 'Indigenisation Act' was enacted 
for the purpose of transferring proprietary interests in 
business organisations from foreign control to Nigerians. 
The Act classified all business enterprises in the private 
sector into three groups,, each requiring a different 
percentage of Nigerian- participation, namely 100,60 and 40 
per cent respectively. The oil service companies are among 
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those businesses listed in Schedule 3 to the Act, in which 
Nigerians must have at least 40 per cent share ownership. 
There are as many as 55 oil service companies operating in 
Nigeria, of which about 13 are 100 per cent Nigerian owned 
firms. Examples of such oil service companies in which NNPC 
has 36 per cent share ownership and the remaining 4 per cent 
equity shares to make up the mandatory 40 per cent Nigerian 
participation is held by the employees of the companies 
include; Baroid of Nigeria Ltd, Baroid Drilling and Chemical 
Products Nigeria Ltd, Dresser Nigeria Ltd, Baker Nigeria 
Ltd, Keydrill Nigeria Ltd and Forex Company of Nigeria Ltd, 
to name but a few. These companies engage in all sorts of 
repairs and servicing jobs in the oil industry which range 
from construction works, electrical services, drilling, 
refining, surveying, data processing, tank building, driving 
services, etc. 
63 See Table 4.1 below. 
Further,, by virtue of the same Act, the NNPC has equity 
share ownership of 60 per cent each in National Oil and 
Chemical Marketing Company Limited (Shell owns 40 per cent) 
and African Petroleum Limited. The African Petroleum Limited 
was initially 60 per cent equity owned by B. P. Company 
Limited and the NNPC owned the remaining 40 per cent. But 
following the nationalisation of B. P's interests in 1977 
because of its involvement in the shipment of Nigerian oil 
to south Africa (which was against the Nigerian Government 
policy), Nigeria acquired all the 60 per cent owned by BP. 
64 
63 Interview data NNPC Lagos. 
64 See Acquisition of Assets (British Petroleum Company Limited) Act 1977. No. 20, Laws of 
the Federation of Nigeria. 
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As a result, currently the African Petroleum Company is 100 
per cent owned by Nigeria, viz. 60 per cent owned by NNPC 
and 40 per cent by Nigerian private investors. Both 
companies (National oil Chemical and Marketing Company and 
African Petroleum Company) are engaged in the business of 
marketing petroleum products. It is worthy of note that oil 
companies engaged in exploration and production operations 
are not mentioned in any of the provisions of the NEP Act 
1977 in relation to equity holdings. There is a 'blanket 
provision' in Schedule 3 to the Act which states that "all 
other enterprises not included in Schedules 1 and 2 not 
being public sector enterprises are exempt from the 
provisions of the Act". As a result,, the Government or its 
agency the NNPC owns no equity share but has only non-equity 
participation agreement with the oil exploration and 
production companies. 
Mention must also be made of the most recent equity joint 
venture participation agreement between NNPC and 
Shell/Agip/Elf for purpose of gas liquefaction which led to 
the formation of a company called the Nigerian Liquefied 
Natural Gas Limited (NLNG). The company was incorporated in 
February 1990 as one of the new subsidiaries of the 
commercialised NNPCI with their respective shares being NNPC 
- 60 per cent, Shell - 20 per cent, Agip - 10 per cent and 
Elf - 10 per cent. Other subsidiaries in which NNPC has 
equity holdings are Hyson Ltd, Calson Bermuda Ltd and 
National Engineering and Technical Company Ltd (NETCO). 
Again see Table 4.1 below. 
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Generally speaking, the nature of the operations of these 
equity participation agreements are the same as those under 
non-equity participation agreements in that in both cases, 
NNPC acts an the non-operating partner except that it has a 
say in the management through its board representatives who 
see to it that Government's policies are duly carried out. 
Thus, one can say that the basic difference between the two 
lies in the f act that on the one side, the government has 
equity share holdings and on the other, it has only a 
participatory right to a share in the ownership and conduct 
of petroleum operations in accordance with its participating 
interest. Another point of difference lies in the fact that 
under the equity participation agreement a new corporate 
body is formed, whereas as it will be seen later, it is not 
usually the case under a non-equity participation 
arrangement. One writer simply differentiates the two by 
describing them as "Corporate Joint -Ventures" to represent 
the equity participation agreement and "Unincorporated Joint 
Ventures" for non-equity participation agreements. 65 The 
main provisions of both types of agreements will be 
addressed below after the next section on non-equity 
participation agreements. 
65 Herzfeld, E. O., Joint Ventures, Jordans & Sons. 1983, p. 8. Similarly, Zakariya 
differentiates between the two kinds of joint ventures by calling the equity joint 
venture- "the American model" and the non-equity joint venture- "the Italian model". 
For details an this, see Zakariya, H. S., "Sovereignty, state participation and the 
need to restructure the existing petroleum concession regime", Alberta Law Review, 
vol. X p. 232. 
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Table 4.1. 
NNPC EQUITY PARTICIPATION STATUS 
Name of company Business Nature Acquired Equity 
Schlumberger Ltd Well survey 40 
Forex Ltd Drilling 36 
Baroid Ltd Mud Chemicals services 36 
Dreeser Ltd. Engineering Services 36 
Solus SchallLtd Driving Services 36 
Baker Ltd Equipment Marketing 35 
NLNG Ltd Gas liquefaction and sale 60 
NETCO Ltd Engineering consultancy 60 
HYSON Ltd Refinery services 60 
CALSON BERMUDA Oil marketing 51 
Source: NNPC Office, Lagos, 1989. 
4.3.4 [B) NON-EQUITY PARTICIPATION AGREEMENT. 
Under this form of arrangement, also commonly referred to in 
Nigeria as 'joint operating agreement' (JOA), the government 
participates in the ownership and authorised operations and 
shares in kind in the crude oil and other products. That is 
to say that the Government does not own shares or stocks in 
the joint venture operator company and is not entitled to 
dividends from the company. There are many kinds of these 
arrangements. The most common of which is the formation of a 
working association between a MNOC and a host government or 
its agency without the creation of a new and separate 
company. Both'parties agree to hold jointly all rights and 
interests under the joint venture agreement and meet 
expenses in proportion to their participation interests. 
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Furthermore, one of the parties, i. e. the MNOC, usually is 
designated the operator. 66 
This type of joint venture was first used by Algeria in 1968 
when the state oil company - SONATRACH entered into an 
association with Getty Petroleum Company for the exploration 
and production of hydrocarbons. The said agreement described 
the association as "not a legal entity, partnership or a 
corporation but only the juxtaposition of participation and 
interest according to a peýcentage fixed at 51 per cent for 
SONATRACH and 49 per cent for Getty.,, 67 The management 
structure consisted of an Executive Council of four 
representatives of SONATRACH and three of Getty and 
operation is carried out by SONATRACH, with Getty to furnish 
technical assistance and qualified personnel, the cost to be 
borne by the association. " Juridically speaking, this kind 
of arrangement does not constitute either a partnership or a 
typical joint venture agreement. The usual elements of a 
typical joint venture, some of. which are lacking under this 
arrangement are, (1) a common interest in the object of the 
undertaking; (2) an equal right to direct and govern the 
conduct of each other with respect thereto; (3) sharing of 
production; (4) shares in the losses, if any and (5) a close 
and even fiduciary relationship between the parties. 
69 
66 The writings on this aspect are vast. See generally, Herzfeld, E. O., Joint Ventures, 
Jordans Bristol, 1983; H. P. G. Taylor, T. P. Winsor and S. H. Tyne, The Joint Operating 
Agreement: oil and Gas Law. Longman, 1989 and P. D. Cameron, "The Structure of 
Petroleum Agreements", in T. Walde and N. Beredjick (eds), Petroleum Investment 
policies in Developing countries op. cit. 
67 The agreement was governed by the Sahara Petroleum Code 1958. For a full text, see, 
OPEC Selected Documents 1968 pp 253-288 quoted in Barrows, G. H., Wordwide Concession 
Contracts and Petroleum legislation, Pennwell Publishing, Oklahoma, 1983 at p. 263. 
68 ibid Article 18, Title 22. 
69 Cameron, P. D., op. cit pp 42-46. 
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In Nigeria, this form of arrangement exists between NNPC and 
(1) Shell (2) Mobil (3) Gulf (4) Agip (5) Elf (6) Texaco and 
Chevron and (7) Pan Ocean Company. (See Table 4.2 which 
gives the percentage of NNPC's Non Equity Participation 
Interests in MNOCs operating in Nigeria). 
Table 4.2 
NNPC's NON-EQUITY PARTICIPATION INTERESTS IN MNOCS OPERATING 
IN NIGERIA. 
COMPANY % PARTICIPATION DATE ACQUIRED NUMBER OF OMLS/OPLS 
SHELL/BP 35 1.4.1973 58 
55 1.4.1974 58 
60 1.4-1979 58 
so 1.8.1979 58 
60 1.7.1990 58 
GULF 35 1.4.1973 10 
55 1.4.1974 16 
60 1.7-1979 16 
TEXACO 55 1.5-1975 6 
60 1.7.1979 6 
MOBIL 35 1.4.1973 4 
55 1.4.1974 4 
60 1.7-1979 4 
ELF 35 1.4.1971 4 
55 1.4-1974 4 
60 1.7.1979 4 
AGIP/PHILLIPS 3.3 1.4-1971 4 
55 1.4.1974 4 
60 1.4.1979 4 
PAN OCEAN 55 1.1-1978 1 
60 1.7.1979 1 
Source: NNPC Office, Lagos. 
From Table 4.2, it is clear that the NNPC through its non- 
equity participation interests is a party to all JOAs in 
Nigeria. Each JOA embraces all the OMLs jointly owned by 
NNPC and the other parties to the agreements. For example, 
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the joint development of the OPLs/OMLs jointly held by NNPC 
and Shell Company Limited is governed by one single 
operating agreement irrespective of the fact that the blocks 
under the licences and leases are variously located on-shore 
and of f -shore. By design, all the terms of the operating 
agreements in Nigeria are uniform in substance, and as 
mentioned earlier are also similar to the terms of equity 
participation agreements. For instance, certain typical 
provisions common to both agreements which will be addressed 
in the next section include: 
(1) appointment of an operator to carry out joint operations 
for the benefit of the parties; 
(2) the rights, duties and obligations of the parties; 
(3) contribution of funds to finance joint operations and 
the sharing of production from the joint operations; 
(4) establishing of management board or operating committee 
of the joint operation, and 
(5) fiscal measures. 70 
4.3.5 MAIN FEATURES OF JOINT PARTICIPATING AGREEMENTS IN 
NIGERIA. 
What will concern us here is to look at the major features 
of the general theme running through the terms of the two 
kinds of participating agreements in Nigeria, regardless of 
the percentage of participation. While the specific terms 
and conditions of the agreements may vary somewhat from one 
another, the objectives of the parties are basically the 
same; i. e. Nigeria wants to participate in and take charge 
70 These provisions are based on the contents of the various Participation Agreements 
between NNPC and each of the HNOCs operating in Nigeria. 
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of the exploitation of her hydrocarbons for the benef it of 
the country, while the MNOCs want to act as the operators in 
the ventures and ensure a steady supply of oil. The 
discussion is based principally on the terms of some of the 
Participation Agreements as well as practices and principles 
established since April, 1971, for the conduct of joint 
petroleum development operations in Nigeria. Some of the 
information in respect of the latter were obtained through 
the means of interviews conducted when the author was on 
field research. 
4.3.6 CONTRIBUTIONS TOWARDS COSTS OF OPERATIONS. 
So far as contributions towards the costs of the joint 
operations are concerned, both types of agreements provide 
that the exploration, development and production costs are 
to be put up by parties,, according to their participating 
interest percentages. In the case of equity participation 
agreements such contributions are to be made through cash 
calls mainly based on work programmes and budgets presented 
by the foreign partner and approved by the NNPC. But with 
regards to the non-equity participation agreements, the 
foreign partner provides the initial capital for the 
operations at his own risk. If no commercial discovery is 
made, the foreign partner is not reimbursed for his 
expenses. But if exploration does result in pommercial 
discovery, the NNPC will reimburse the foreign partner for 
its share of the exploration expenses in accordance with its 
percentage of participating interest. 
Furthermore, funds contributed by NNPC and the MNOCs for 
joint operations are also expended for the payment of all 
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salaries and fringe benefits of the personnel of the joint 
operating ventures, viz. staff housing schemes, pensions, 
gratuities, and several other benefits and services. 
4.3.7 THE OPERATOR. 
Under both kinds of participation agreements, there are 
provisions for one of the parties (mostly the foreign 
partner) to be designated as "operator" for the conduct, 
management and control of the joint operations. But in the 
NNLG joint operating agreement the term "technical leader" 
was used instead of the word "operator", even though they 
both perform similar services. 71 The operator is obliged to 
conduct the operations in a prudent manner, in accordance 
with good oil-field practice and in compliance with 
applicable laws and regulations. In this sense, such rules 
and regulations refers to the provisions of the Petroleum 
Act 1969 regarding OPLs, OMLs as well as those of the PPT 
Act 1971. Further, the operator may conduct some operations 
by itself or through its agents or contractors but the 
operator generally remains responsible for the operations 
carried out either by itself or on its behalf. The reason 
behind having the foreign partner as operator is because it 
has the necessary technical expertise. 
in discharging its responsibilities, the operator is subject 
to the overall supervision and direction of the operating or 
management committee consisting of duly nominated 
representatives of the parties. The NNPC does not interfere 
in the internal management of the operator except for the 
71 see Final draft of the Joint Participation Agreement between NNPC and Shell/Agip/Elf 
in respect of the establishment of the NNPC subsidiary - the Nigerian Liquefied 
Natural Gas company Ltd, clause 12, dated 20/4/1989 at p. 23. 
f 
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purpose of monitoring compliance by the operator with the 
agreements and government policies. Hence, the operator is 
obliged to give NNPC at the latter's own risk and expense 
free access to all field operations and installations for 
the purpose of inspecting and observing all operations and 
ensuring that the operations are being conducted in 
accordance with the agreement. Similarly, NNPC has a right 
of access to the records and information obtained from the 
operators. 72 
Given the extended scope of joint venture expenditure 
indicated above, the operator receives no remuneration for 
its duties as operator. 73 However, the costs of services 
rendered by the parent company of the operator in connection 
with the joint operations are chargeable as expenses to 
joint account. 
4.3.8 RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE OPERATOR. 
The rights and duties of the operator can be summed up as 
follows: the operator, 
(1) has the right and obligation to conduct operations in a 
safe, technically sound and financially prudent manner; 
(2) has free hand to conduct operations up to a limit, 
beyond which it must seek the approval of NNPC; 
other specific responsibilities of the operator include: 
(1) preparation and implementation of work programme and 
budgets; 
(2) provision of reports and information to NNPC; 
72 much of the information in this paragraph is owed to Olisaj op, cit, pp85-89, 
73 See Article 5(l) of the NNPC/Elf Participation Agreement 1985. p. B. 
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(3) provision of all technical and advisory services, 
74 
required for the efficient performance of operations. 
The operator can be replaced by another if it defaults in 
its duties or obligations or becomes bankrupt or insolvent 
and fails to commence to rectify the default within 30 days 
after written notice f rom other co-ventures or the NNPC as 
the case may be specifying the def ault and requiring the 
operator to remedy the default. 
75 If NNPC is the only other 
party to the joint operating agreement, it will assume the 
duties of and become the operator. On the other hand, if 
NNPC is unable or unwilling to become the new operator, a 
new operator will be appointed by NNPC. 
4.3.9 MANAGEMENT OR OPERATING COMMITTEE. 
The operating Committee or Management Board as it is 
variously called are formed by the parties to the 
participating agreements for the purpose of providing 
overall supervision and direction of all matters pertaining 
to the joint venture operations. In all the participation 
agreements, the NNPC representatives are in the majority by 
virtue of its majority participation interests. For 
instance, under the NNPC/Gulf Participation Agreement signed 
in 1984, the management board consists of 6 government 
representatives and 4 from Gulf. Similarly, under the NNPC 
and Shell/Agip/Elf Participation Agreement, it is stated 
that "Any holder of shares in the JVC shall be entitled to 
nominate 1 Director for every 10 per cent of issued share 
74 Interview information. 
75 See Clause 35(l)(2) of the NNPC and Shell/Agip/Elf Agreement, op. cit. 
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capital of the JVC held by it". 76 Accordingly, upon 
incorporation, the NNPC with 60 per cent equity holding, 
nominated 6 Directors, Shell with 20 per cent equity holding 
had 2 Directors with Agip and Elf having 1 Director each by 
virtue of each having 10 per cent equity interest. Although 
the operator has the right and obligation to conduct 
operations freely, the Committee or Board exercises general 
supervisory role over such operations. For instance, it 
exercises such supervisory role as to: 
(1) the approval or disapproval of budgets and authorising 
of expenditure and work programmes in which the total cost 
is beyond the limits of the operator's authority; 
(2) approval of contracts which involve more than N200,000 
(Naira=Nigerian currency); 
(3) disposition of items of the assets or working capital of 
the joint venture, and 
(4) sale or disposition of vital information to third 
parties. 77 
Under such circumstance, it would have been a good 
opportunity for NNPC with its majority on the Board of 
Directors to influence decisions and their implementation in 
the ventures to the country's advantage, but it is not so. 
The reason is because as stated in chapter four most of the 
Nigerian representatives on the Board are not knowledgeable 
in petroleum matters and hence they end up as "sleeping 
76 Ibid clause 4(2)(1). 
77 Interview information. 
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partners" or "sit warmers" when it comes to discussions on 
matters of crucial importance in the industry. 
4.3.10 DURATION. 
Since one of the subject matters of participation interests 
acquired from the foreign oil companies by NNPC includes the 
OMLs. the duration of some of these joint venture agreements 
are the same as those of the OMLs, viz. 20 years. The only 
exception is in the case of the NNPC and Shell/Agip/Elf 
(NNLG project) Participation Agreement, where its duration 
is for a period of 25 years. All these, no doubt, are 
shorter than under the traditional concession regime. 
The non-equity participation agreements state categorically 
that the OMLs and all other provisions of the 1969 Petroleum 
Act relating to the existing agreements shall continue to 
have full force and effect,, save only as modified by the 
terms of these agreements. But strangely enough, it took 7 
years after these agreements were supposed to have been 
concluded, before they were finally executed with all the 
NNPC co-venturers. it was uncovered by the Justice Irikefe 
Tribunal of Inquiry set up in 1979 to investigate a media 
allegation of loss of N2.8 billion from the accounts of 
NNPC,, that none of the co- venturers of NNPC had formally 
executed any participation agreement with the NNPC. 
78 In 
effect, this means that there was no formal execution of the 
participation agreements with these companies for all those 
years, so that if any of them had been in breach of the 
agreements there would have been no basis to hold it 
78 For full text, see, Justice Ayo Irikefe's Crude oil Sales T4ibunal Report 1980. 
Federal Government Press, Lagos. 
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responsible. The absence of formal execution of these 
Agreements notwithstanding, a study carried out on the 
working relationship of the NNPC and its co-venturers over 
those years revealed that the relationship was generally 
good. 79 As even conceded in the Report of the Irikefe panel, 
"Despite the fact that these documents have not been 
formally completed, the production and sharing of crude oil 
won have not been hindered or frustrated". 80 
4.3.11 TAXATION, FEES AND ROYALTIES MEASURES. 
All the copies of participation agreements are silent on 
what rates of taxation, fees or royalties are payable by the 
co-venturers to the Government. Since also included as 
subject matters of the participation agreements are the OPLs 
and OMLs, it goes without saying that the provisions 
relating to these licences and leases in the Petroleum Act 
1969 which pertain to fiscal measures will apply to these 
agreements. That means that both NNPC and the co-venturers 
in the course of their joint operations are liable to 
payments of royalties, taxation and other chargeable fees as 
prescribed for holders of the OPLs and OMLs. In the same 
vein, the provisions of the Petroleum Act 1969 which apply 
to holders of both OPLs and OMLs will govern those aspects 
which the Participation Agreements are silent on such as, 
recruitment and training of nationals, assignment, 
revocation and relinquishment of areas of grant. 
79 See Etikerentse op. cit. pp. 13-15. 
so Paragraph 32, p. 16, of the Crude oil sales Report, op. cit. 
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Finally, on the question which law will govern the joint 
venture operations, all the Participation Agreements state 
unequivocally that the Agreements "shall be construed, 
interpreted and governed in accordance with and by the laws 
of Nigeria. 81 But the position is different with regards to 
which Arbitration Law shall govern disputes arising between 
co-venturers. All the Participation Agreements with the 
exception of the most recent i. e. between NNPC and 
Shell/Agip/Elf (NNLG Ltd) state that the Arbitration Laws of 
Nigeria shall apply. Under the NNPC and Shell/Agip/Elf 
Agreement, the position is as follows: 
"The Government of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria having ratified the Convention on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes between 
States and Nationals of other States, the 
parties hereto shall submit all disputes 
arising out of this Agreement to Arbitration 
before the International Centre for Settlement 
of Investment Disputes between States and 
Nationals of other states (ICSID), subject to 
the jurisdiction and the arbitration proced ef es 
of the said convention and rules of ICSID. " 
one possible explanation that can be proffered for such 
marked difference in terms of Arbitration Law between this 
Agreement and others before it may be because, Nigeria just 
recently ratified the ICSID Convention, hence the reason why 
the past agreements are not subject to ICSID is obvious. 
81 This provision was clearly demonstrated in the case of Shell-BP Petroleum 
Development Company V Federal Board of Inland Revenue 
(F. B. I. R. )2F. R. C. R. 1976 39, in which a dispute between the parties over the 
interpretation of the term "petroleum operations" for the purpose of assessment of 
the income tax of the plaintiff company was referred to the Federal High Court of 
Nigeria for settlement. 
82 Clause 40(l) of the NNPC and Shell/Agip/Elf (NNLG Ltd) Participation Agreement at 
p. 45. 
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4.4 GENERAL ASSESSMENT. 
At the outset of this Chapter, we examined the old-style 
concession regime in Nigeria where MNOCs were granted rights 
over huge areas, for long periods, without any specific 
obligations relating to work or expenditure in return for 
modest rents to the country. No doubt, in recent years this 
kind of agreement will be seen as old-fashioned. The 
granting of exploitation rights to an oil foreign investor 
company is now seen in a more business-like context. The 
foreign companies or MNOCs recognise that a host country 
will no longer be prepared to grant rights over its 
hydrocarbon except in return for specific work and 
expenditure obligations which can be quantified, assessed 
and monitored at each stage in the life of the project. The 
reason behind it all is that the host countries have become 
increasingly aware of the benefits to be obtained from the 
exploitation of their hydrocarbon resources and want to 
maximise the financial return to themselves for enhancement 
of their economic growth and development. This quest by host 
countries for the achievement of greater benefits from the 
exploitation of their petroleum resources had two 
consequences. Firstly, it has led through legislation, 
negotiation and renegotiation to the modification of the 
traditional concessions as an instrument for governing 
relations between MNOCs and the host countries. The revised 
concession agreements, as we saw in the case of Nigeria, 
were for shorter periods, smaller areas and with increased 
revenue returns for the host countries, usually in the form 
of a combination of royalties and taxation. 
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Secondly, it led to further transition from the revised 
concession agreements to a new type of petroleum development 
agreement with provision for equity or non-equity 
participation by the host country in the exploitation of the 
resources. Participation agreements in either corporate or 
unincorporated joint ventures are now established features 
of contractual arrangements through which host countries 
seek to exercise greater control over the exploitation of 
their hydrocarbon resources. It has again been observed that 
another reason for their popularity and use amongst host 
countries is due to the fact that they are seen as a medium 
to attract outside assistance in the form of large risk 
capital, technological and management expertise,, which are 
necessary for the development of petroleum resources. 
83 On 
the other hand, to the MNOCs, state participation helps 
diffuse nationalist feelings against foreign domination of 
the economy by showing the presence of nationals of the host 
countries in the joint operations. Thus, it has been rightly 
observed that,, participation agreements and related 
agreements have proved readily. adaptable mechanisms for 
accommodating the aims of host countries, whilst reducing 
the economic and political risks involved in mineral 
explorations and development. 
84 
In assessing these developments, three points may be made. 
First, although participation agreements are perceived by 
83 Zakariya, H. S., "Now directions in the search for and development of petroleum 
resources in the developing countries. " Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law. 
Summer 1976 Vol. 9 p. 556 
84 See Walde, T., "Revision of transnational investment agreements: Contracts 
flexibility in natural resources development 10 lawyer of the Americas, 1978, p, 265 
and also Page op. cit at p. 228. 
191 
host countries as vehicles for exerting control over the 
exploitation of their hydrocarbons, the reality of the 
situation is that participation or equity ownership does not 
mean control for these countries. In practice, it only helps 
to boost the political image of the host government, for the 
real control remains with the MNOCs, because the country 
lacks the technical know-how and management skills to 
effectively project government's interest. Despite the 
majority equity position of the host country in the joint 
venture, the effective powers are in the hands of the MNOCs. 
Because as operators they are in charge of exploration, 
maintenance programmes, supplies of equipments, the 
employment of expertise and all operational matters. For 
instance, as we noticed in the case of Nigeria, even though 
the NNPC has a built-in majority on all the boards of the 
joint venture companies, the fact that all proposals emanate 
from the operator leaves no doubt that the latter's 
representatives may have a fore-knowledge of such proposals 
and readily approve of them. Since the Nigerian 
representatives do not have the same fore-knowledge because 
of their distance from the operational management of the 
joint venture plus their lack of knowledge in oil matters, 
the likelihood is that they will go on to approve it without 
full grasp of its implications. 
in addition, by leaving all technical and economic matters 
including evaluation, programming, etc, to the operators, it 
builds no foundation for NNPC to acquire skills for 
operations. In a sense, with the agreements limiting 
Nigeria's involvement in managerial tasks to the exclusion 
192 
of operational matters, attainment of independent 
operational capacity is being frustrated. As one commentator 
remarked in respect of a similar subject, "... that unless 
the host country has the skill and expertise, the control is 
rather political". 
85 
Secondly, the notion that by concluding joint participation 
agreements a host country will enhance its revenue earning 
position merits some comment. This hypothesis is founded on 
the premise that under participation agreements, the 
government could receive, in addition to tax and royalties, 
dividends proportionate to its interest in the venture. For 
example, if the government has 60 per cent equity interest 
in the operations it takes an equivalent dividend while at 
the same time receiving the normal tax plus any dues payable 
under its fiscal laws. However, it has been argued by 
ogunlami in his work on the 'Nigerian Petroleum Profits 
Taxation' that this may not be always true because, for 
instance, a 50 percent dividend may not bring more revenue 
than a 50 per cent tax. This, he maintains is so because, 
all costs and expenses including interests on loans, debts 
and investment funds are deducted before dividends are paid 
but not before tax. 86 As a result, a Government having 
contributed its share of investment and other necessary 
payments can suffer a proportionate loss in the event of the 
joint venture company not making any profit at the end. This 
85 Hankabady, S., "Oil Contracts in the Middle East. " The International Contract Law and 
Finance Review, April 1980 Vol-1, No. 2, at p. 119. 
86 See Ogunlami, G. K. N., An Analysis of Nigerian Petroleum Profits Taxation, An 
unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, 1989, Centre for Petroleum and Mineral Law Studies. 
University of Dundee. 
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contrasts with any contractual arrangement such as the risk 
service contracts which involves no financial commitment on 
the part of the host country and under which the financial 
return is calculated solely on the basis of taxes, royalties 
and other payments. But, however, in my opinion, if the 
joint venture is making profits, it is in the government's 
best interest to actively participate rather than being a 
watcher and waiting for the operator to make returns at the 
end of the year. Doing so will be tantamount to turning the 
hand of the clock back to the old concession regime and all 
its inequities. 
Finally, even though the terms of the participation or joint 
venture agreements were, at the beginning, more favourable 
to the host countries compared with the traditional 
concession regime, they have not remained static. Because of 
the changed circumstances and the improved bargaining 
position of some host countries (notably OPEC producers), 
many countries have been able to negotiate new and better 
terms of agreements, as well as adjust disparities as they 
arise under the earlier agreements. It is in the light of 
this too that Nigeria negotiated new kinds of petroleum 
development contracts, viz. production sharing and risk 
service contracts which are the subject matters for our 
discussion in the ensuing chapter. 
I 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
FORMS OF PETROLEUM CONTRACTS II: PRODUCTION SHARING 
CONTRACTS AND RISK SERVICE CONTRACTS. 
5.1 INTRODUCTION: 
In the preceding chapter, we analysed the early forms of 
petroleum agreements Nigeria had with M. N. O. Cs. Aside from 
those early forms of agreements viz., concession regimes and 
the joint venture agreements, Nigeria also engages in other 
contractual arrangements for the exploitation of its 
hydrocarbons called production sharing contract (P. S. C. ). and 
risk service contract (R. S. C. ). It is now proposed to devote 
this chapter to a detailed analysis of these contracts vis- 
a-vis the Nigerian oil industry. Their merits and demerits 
are examined and comparisons between them and the early 
petroleum agreements in such important aspects as transfer 
of technology, training of nationals and remunerations, 
inte. r alia, are included in the treatise. The chapter aims 
to highlight the possible reasons why Nigeria resorted to 
these contractual arrangements. We first begin with 
Production sharing contract. 
5.2 PRODUCTION SHARING CONTRACT. 
William and Meyers define the term Production sharing 
contract as; 
"A contract for the development of mineral 
resources under which the contractors costs are 
recoverable each year out of the production but 
there is a maximum amount of the production 
which can be applied to this cost recovery in 
any one year. This share of oil produced is 
referred to as "cost oil". The balance of the 
oil is regarded as "profit oil" and is divided 
in the net profit royalty ratio- for instance, 
55% to the government. After the contractor has 
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recovered its investment, the amount of "cost 
oil" will drop to cover operating expenses only 
and the "profit oil" increases by a 
corresponding amount.... "l 
This type of contract originated in Indonesia in 1960s when 
it was first used in the agricultural sector, ' and then the 
oil industry. Since then, it has become very popular in the 
oil industry the world over. under this agreement, the MNOC 
acts as a contractor and risk bearing investor, but the 
ultimate responsibility for control and management of the 
enterprise, in principle at least, is in the hands of the 
host country's national oil company. Other features of this 
contract include, the contractor is engaged in oil 
exploration and production on the understanding that it has 
no title to the oil deposit; and continuation of the 
contract depends upon oil being discovered in commercial 
quantities, otherwise the contractor bears all the risks. 
But if oil is discovered in commercial quantity, the 
contractor recoups itself for its investment and cost of 
operations out of crude oil after deducting royalties and 
tax. 2 Thereafter, profits are shared on pro rata basis 
between the two parties. 
one other distinguishing feature of psc is that the 
government receives a revenue from the beginning of 
production through its share of the "profit oil ". 
Furthermore, ownership of any petroleum discovered remains 
vested in the state or the national oil company, and the 
William, H. R. and Meyers, C. J., Oil and gas law, Matthew Bender and company, New 
York, 1962 p. 686. 
2 Barrows, G. H., World Petroleum Arrangements, New York. 1980 P. 7. 
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contractor does not acquire title to its share of the oil 
until the oil reaches the point of export. 
The production sharing arrangement typically f rees the host 
state f rom contributing to the direct costs of operations. 
This arrangement also allows- the state to participate in 
control of oil operations through an operating or management 
committee, although day-to-day management is undoubtedly the 
responsibility of the contractor. 
The merit of such an agreement include, firstly, it reduces 
the incidence of tax evasion by a MNOC through manipulation 
of prices, since each party receives its entitlement in oil 
rather than in cash, thereby reducing conflicts. 
Yet another merit of this contract is that it frees the host 
country from directly bearing the costs of the initial 
operations since all are borne by the MNOC, thereby allowing 
the country's resources to be channelled into other pressing 
engagements. But as soon as commercial discovery is made, 
the government could come in and receive its share whether 
the MNOC has made profit or not. Because of that it is said 
to provide the government with much balance of payments than 
would other agreements. 
On the MNOC's (contractor) side, PSC ensures quick recovery 
of costs as well as assured supply of petrol even to its 
customers. Unlike a joint venture under which the MNOC has 
to continue bearing costs over the life span of the 
contract, by entering into PSC, it may recover all its 
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expenses within the f irst three years provided production 
and markets are available. 
it must be borne in mind also that this agreement is not 
without drawbacks. Thus, for instance, because a MNOC has to 
recover the cost of exploration and production from its 
share of the "cost oil" the host country will be concerned 
with these expenses which the company has to recover. This 
includes the cost of exploration, equipment and other 
services related to the project chargeable and recoverable 
from cost oil. Thus, a MNOC could af ford to be wasteful or 
engage in transfer pricing as a means of enhancing its 
returns since it knows that all costs and expenses incurred 
by it are reimburseable. As a result of this, some countries 
such as Libya do not allow exploration costs as 
recoverable. 3 
It is also likely for a contractor af ter realising that it 
is more beneficial or profitable to concentrate on producing 
one oil f ield to slow down the pace of exploration of new 
areas covered by the contract, the benefits flowing to the 
host country from such unwarranted slow pace of exploration 
would be to the eventual detriment of the host country. 
In ef fect, it is proper to say that the PSCs were "devised 
to avoid the Political opprobrium which in the oil producing 
countries has become associated with concessions", 
4 in that 
it represents an effort to divorce foreign capital with 
3 see Barrows op. cit. p. 55 for Libyan Production sharing contract provisions on fiscal 
regimes. 
4 Adedejij K,, "State participation in the Nigerian petroleum industry", 11 JWTL 1977 
p. 170. 
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f oreign ownership. They are also described by one author as 
involving a credit from abroad to be repaid from the results 
of production or from the improved quality of production. 5 
5.2.1 BACKGROUND OF NIGERIAN PRODUCTION SHARING CONTRACT. 
In Nigeria, as in most developing oil exporting countries . 
the PSC is essentially a form of commercial transaction for 
the development of petroleum -resources of the state which, 
as a sovereign owner of vital depletable resources, seeks to 
exercise its sovereign rights in the development of the 
resources by foreign enterprise. Hence, on March 25,1973, 
the Nigerian government through the agency of NNPC signed 
the f irst and only PSC with Ashland America oil Company. 
Under the contract, Ashland is to provide all the technical 
and financial requirements until oil is discovered in 
commercial quantity. 6 But in case no oil is found, the 
company bears all the risks. In other words, NNPC bears no 
responsibility whatsoever for an unsuccessful exploration 
and cannot reimburse or contribute to any failure. But 
Ashland can, with written consent of NNPC sell or otherwise 
dispose of any part of its rights and interests to others. 
Further, Ashland has an interest in any oil discovered and 
all data obtained must be turned over to NNPC. The company 
is in charge of management and operations, in accordance 
with "efficient and workmanlike standards" and to avoid 
5 Fabrikant, R., "Production sharing contract in the Indonesian petroleum industry", 16 
Harvard International law Journal, 1975 p. 37 
6 in Nigerian oil Industry, oil is said to be discovered in commercial quantity when 
the Petroleum Inspectorate is satisfied that the oil well struck is capable of 
producing at least 10,000 barrels of crude oil per day. 
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waste and water or land pollution. It also prepares the work 
programme and annual budgets which must be approved by NNPC. 
NNPC and Ashland professional staff work jointly in 
petroleum operations. While NNPC is to help procure the 
visas, work permits, right of way and easement which may be 
required by Ashland, in turn, Ashland is to provide all the 
machinery and equipment needed for the operations, such 
equipment will pass to NNPC upon arrival in Nigeria. This is 
said to be one advantage PSC has over JVC. 
5.2.2 DURATION OF THE CONTRACT. 
The contract's duration is for an initial term of 20 years 
effective from 1979 and is renewable for a period of five 
years with the consent of NNPC. Ashland may terminate the 
contract at any time upon three months prior notice in 
writing to that effect but if termination takes place before 
Ashland spends the prescribed minimum expenditure, it will 
pay to NNPC the unspent portion of minimum expenditure. If 
crude oil is not discovered in commercial quantities in the 
contract area within five years from the effective date of 
the contract, the contract terminates automatically. 7 
5.2.3 RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE PARTIES 
Under the contract, Ashland is to provide all the risk 
investment required for approved work programme, purchase or 
lease of equipment, purchase of materials and supplies, 
technical requirements and remuneration of its personnel 
engaged in the operations. And the provision which purports 
7 clause 2(c) of the Ashland/NHPC contract. 
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to give Ashland the right to dispose of its interests under 
the contract appears to be extremely wide in scope. It 
stipulates that "the contractor (Ashland) is given the right 
to sell, assign, transfer, convey or otherwise dispose of 
any part of its rights and interests" subject only to the 
prior written consent of NNPC, which consent shall not be 
unreasonably withheld. 8 Under such a provision Ashland can 
rightly maintain that it has the right subject only to 
NNPC's consent, to assign its contractual right to carry on 
petroleum operations for or on behalf of NNPC. Since as we 
saw earlier, the only restriction imposed on the right of 
Ashland to dispose any of its rights or interests is the 
grant of NNPC's consent or the withholding of such consent. 
The concept of unreasonableness in my view is perhaps 
insufficient to protect the interest of NNPC in the light of 
the wide powers given to Ashland to dispose of any of its 
interests under the contract. It is better for NNPC if the 
right of Ashland is unassignable but Ashland could retain 
the right to engage sub-contractors for specified 
operations. 
NNPC on its part is allowed to contribute professional staff 
to participate in the petroleum operations and is required 
to assist the contractor in obtaining necessary local funds, 
visas and work permits for its expatriate staff and in 
acquisition of surface rights. The cost incurred by NNPC in 
rendering such assistance is reimburseable to NNPC. The 
contract also assures the contractor that it will not be 
ibid. Clause 5 (e). 
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discriminated against in any way and will be treated as well 
as other oil companies operating in Nigeria. NNPC is 
required to also furnish Ashland with all geological, 
geophysical, drilling well, production and other information 
which are in the possession of NNPC relating to the contract 
area. This is worthwhile in order to assist Ashland smoothly 
undertake its contractual obligations. 
5.2.4 CONTRACTOR'S REMUNERATION. 
The contract defines the term "operating costs" as 
expenditures made and obligations incurred in carrying out 
petroleum operations, excluding the signature bonus9 
payable... "10 Perhaps the term is defined as it is because 
all allowable costs under the contract are recoverable from 
production if and when obtained. 
Ashland pays rents, royalties, production bonuses these 
together with operating costs including interest costs on 
borrowed funds, are recoverable out of cost oil put at 50% 
of total oil produced in the f irst year. Any short f all is 
carried over to succeeding years. "Cost oil" here means 
available crude oil the contractor is entitled to receive 
and retain to permit recovery of rents, royalties, operating 
9 This is a one-off payment by a HNOC to the host country on signing of a contract for 
petroleum exploration. since it is usually paid even before exploration has started, 
it affects the net value of the project, especially if the KNOC uses a high discount 
rate as in higher risk areas. It is of value to the host country as a source of 
foreign exchange and helps to defray the administrative costs associated with running 
a petroleum industry. 
10 Ibid Clause 1 (111) (o). 
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costs and interest on moneys borrowed for petroleum 
operations. 11 
in addition, Ashland is allowed to include 2% of the 
operating costs. Af ter deducting cost oil, the remainder is 
allocated to Ashland and applied towards Petroleum Prof its 
Tax. If the net realised price of the tax oil is 
insufficient to pay for the Petroleum Profits Tax, the 
balance is paid by NNPC and Ashland in the proportion of 65% 
to 35% respectively. However, if the available crude oil 
exceeds 50,000 barrels per day the balance is paid 70% by 
NNPC and 30% by Ashland. Similarly, the balance of available 
crude oil after deducting cost oil and tax oil, is shared by 
NNPC and Ashland in the proportion of 65% and 35%, but if 
daily production exceeds 50,000 barrels, NNPC's share is 70% 
while Ashland's is 30%. 12 
Each party under the contract, has the right to take in kind 
and dispose available crude oil allocated to it. Thus 
Ashland takes in kind cost oil and its share of remaining 
available crude oil so long as it finances the operations 
and conducts the same in accordance with approved work 
programme and pays the applicable rents, royalties and 
petroleum profits tax. 
There is one school of thought which holds the opinion that 
Ashland is not liable to pay Petroleum Prof its Tax on its 
allocated share of available crude oil but is liable to pay 
11 The discussion on this subject is terse, for details on how the cost oil is recovered 
and how the remaining fiscal obligations are carried out, see Olisa, H, H,, Nigerian 
Petroleum Law and Practice, Fountain Books Limited Ibadan. 1987 pp. 123-124. 
12 Olisa op. cit. p. 126. 
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income tax under the Companies Income Tax Act 1979. The 
reason is that since Ashland conducts petroleum operations 
not on its own behalf but on behalf of NNPC, such operations 
are not within the ambit of the Petroleum Profits Tax Act 
1959.13 Another school of thought is of the view that, in 
I 
practice, the Petroleum Profits Tax is paid jointly by NNPC 
and Ashland in the proportion of 65% to 35% and that it will 
amount to double taxation if Ashland is also liable to 
additional tax under the Companies Income Tax Act 1979. 
However, for no stated reason, the latter school of thought 
is applied by the Federal inland Revenue Department. 14 
The contract f urther stipulates that Ashland can market all 
or part of NNPC's share of the available crude oil if NNPC 
so notifies it in writing. NNPC may give Ashland the power 
to bind it in any crude oil sales agreement entered into by 
Ashland for sale of NNPC's share of available crude oil. For 
the sale of, NNPC's share of the oil, Ashland receives a 
commission of one and one half percent of the sales price 
f. o. b. at the point of export for the first 100,000 barrels 
per day sold. For sales of volumes exceeding 100,000 barrels 
per day, the additional volumes attract a commission of 1% 
of the sales price f. o. b. at the point of export-15 Ashland 
is required to instruct all purchases of crude oil sold for 
the account of NNPC to make all payments due under the 
23 This information is owed to Ogunlami, G. K. N., An Analysis of Nigerian Petroleum 
Profits Taxation, unpublished Ph. D. Thesis 1986, Centre for Petroleum and Mineral Law 
Studies, university of Dundee, Scotland, p. 143. 
14 The Federal Inland Revenue Department is one section of the Nigerian Federal Board of 
Inland Revenue charged with the responsibility of imposing tax upon profits got from 
petroleum operations in Nigeria. 
15 olisa. op. cit. p. 228. 
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contract, less the contractor's commission to an account in 
any, bank designated by NNPC. 
At the end of each calendar year Ashland furnishes auditors 
appointed by WNPC with all necessary information and gives 
them access to all books and records pertaining to crude oil 
sales made by the contractor of NNPC's share of available 
crude oil during the year. 
5.2.5 TITLE TO EQUIPMENT 
All equipment purchased by Ashland for the performance of 
the contract are the property of NNPC but Ashland is 
entitled to recover the landed costs. Ashland has the right 
to use the equipment purchased but the right ceases upon the 
termination or expiration of the contract. Ashland is 
allowed to export leased equipment subject to the provisions 
of the equipment lease. 
5.2.6 EMPLOYMENT, TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY AND TRAINING OF 
NATIONALS. 
Like most contractual agreements between NNPC and MNOCs, the 
PSC with Ashland contains provisions on employment, training 
and transfer of oil technology to local personnel. Infact by 
law as well as by policy guide-lines, 
16 the employment of 
expatriate technicians is permitted by Nigerian government 
only until such time as domestic personnel can be adequately 
trained for those jobs or offices. Such training is regarded 
16 This refers to the combined effects of the Petroleum Decree 1969 as amended and the 
Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Acts 1972-77. 
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as an essential component of the process of acquiring and 
absorbing oil technology. The contract provides that Ashland 
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All the costs and expenses of training of Nigerian personnel 
under the agreement are included in the production costs or 
development costs and are recoverable out of the cost oil on 
commencement of commercial production. 
There is no doubt under the contract that Ashland is to 
prepare and implement plans for the technical training and 
education of nationals for all job classifications in 
accordance with the Petroleum Decree 1969. It is noted that 
the exact type and level of training to be given to 
nationals are not contained in the contract; such provision 
are contained in the Petroleum Decree 1969. Take for 
instance, it provides for minimal Nigerian representation of 
50%-70% for skilled workers and 100% for unskilled workers. 
5.2.7 OTHER PROVISIONS. 
The rest part of the contract deals with relinquishement and 
exclusion of areas, work programmes and settlement of 
disputes provisions. 
17 Clauses 26-29 of the Petroleum Decree 1969. 
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Finally, on the question of applicable law, the contract is 
governed by the laws of Nigeria and any disputes arising 
will be determined in accordance with Nigerian legal system. 
However, it is noticed that the contract is silent on both 
1stabilisation' and 'renegotiation' clauses. The import of 
stabilisation clauses is essentially to give the MNOC a 
status of continuity consistent with the reasonable 
satisfaction of commercial expectations. Their aim is to 
insulate the relationship from changes in the contents of 
the law of the host state. On the other hand, renegotiation 
clauses allow the terms of the contract to be adjusted in 
case of any change of circumstance affecting substantially 
and adversely the interests of the parties under the 
contract. As regards these two clauses, experience shows 
that when incorporated in contracts the parties tend to rely 
more on them in order to define the concepts of force 
majeure, hardship and filling of gaps (as well as the 
consequences attached to such clause) than on ordinary rules 
of law. This is understandable since these concepts do not 
have the same connotation in all legal systems. But one 
would have expected that, at least from Nigeria's point of 
view, a clause on renegotiation will be included in the 
contract so that the country can rely on it whenever she 
wants to alter the terms of the contract in the future. 
Because as it stands, the country has no basis on which she 
can easily renegotiate the contract except through the long 
process of passing a legislation or starting the process all 
over again, which in my opinion is much cumbersome. 
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5.3. A GENERAL ASSESSMENT OF THE CONTRACT. 
The production sharing agreement in Nigeria broadly f ollows 
the Indonesian model between Pertamina, its state agency and 
such MNOCs as Independent American Oil Company, Agip, etc. 
However, there are few differences between the two, some of 
which are; firstly, whereas in Nigeria title to oil passes 
to the contractor at well-head, in Indonesia it only passes 
when it reaches an export point. In other words, Pertamina 
owns the oil produced until it reaches the export stage 
before the contractor assumes title. Although this is said 
to be of little significance. The only significance of 
postponing the transfer of title from the well-head to the 
point of export is that it reassures that the complete 
ownership of hydrocarbons is vested in Nigeria. 
18 This 
distinction tends to be artificial in functional terms and 
is, at least, only a technical device for conforming to the 
external trappings of national sovereignty over natural 
resources. 
Secondly, ' whereas in Nigeria management is vested in 
Ashland, the Indonesian agreement reserved this for 
Pertamina. This enables Indonesian government to issue 
directives to the contractors and monitor their activities 
to see that they acted in the best interest of the country. 
However, while performing its- responsibilities, Pertamina 
must confirm with the contractors. Furthermore, it exercises 
this power sparingly so as not to come into confrontation 
is Fabricant, R., oil Discovery and Technical Change in Southeast Asia- Legal Aspects of 
PsCs in the Indonesian Petroleum Industry. Institute of Southeast Asia Studies. 
Singapore, 1973 p, 137 
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with the contractors, or provide them with an excuse to cut 
down operations or even drive away other potential 
investors. Besides,, Pertamina is not technically competent 
enough to dictate or impose its opinion on the contractors. 
Nevertheless, the provision has the advantage of assuring 
the nation that their oil sector is in their hands, and the 
hope of them ultimately taking total control as a result of 
the active role they have been playing. 
Thirdly, in the case of Indonesia, until 1974 when the 
contracts were renegotiated allowing contractors maximum 
cost oil equivalent to expenses incurred,, it used to be 
limited to 40%, whereas in Nigeria it is now 50% as modified 
retroactively from 1977, thereby making the Nigerian cost 
oil one of the highest among oil producing countries engaged 
in production sharing arrangements. 
19 
other dif f erences exist and will be pointed out as we go 
along,, but it needs be stressed at this juncture that the 
Nigerian PSC can be described as less ambitious and one of 
the most liberal if compared with other PSCs elsewhere. We 
will come back to this point shortly. 
However, on the plus side, the arrangement whereby Ashland 
bears all the initial technical and financial responsibility 
for exploration and drilling is good enough,, because the 
government loses nothing at that stage. This makes it more 
attractive than a joint venture under which the government 
19 The only other country with high cost oil allocation as Nigeria is Peru. For details, 
see Oil Money, Special Report No. 59. New York 1983. 
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may suffer losses from unsuccessful exploration. The PSC 
does away with that, and such funds may be utilised on other 
projects. 
Another interesting provision in the contract is that 
putting NNPC in an intermediary position between Ashland and 
government agencies . namely NNPC is to obtain visas, work 
permits and easements rights which may be required by 
Ashland while the latter concentrates on oil production. 
This provision is interesting in view of the bureaucratic 
procedures and obstacles one has to follow in order to 
obtain these things. Hence, Ashland was wise enough to throw 
the burden onto NNPC, knowing fully well that being a state 
agency NNPC will f ind it easier to deal with other state 
agencies. Commenting in relation to a similar role played by 
Pertamina in Indonesia, Fabrikant remarked that; 
" The prospect of having a government agency 
negotiating on their behalf with Indonesian 
of f icialdom, Pertamina,, it was thought could 
deal more effectively than the contractors with 
government agencies, enabling the contractors 
to concentrate on the principal task of finding 
oil. Pertamina has thus far concentrated mainly 
on providing liaison with government agencies 
and the companies, and generally expediting 
petroleum operations by reducing the likelihood 
of a contractor entangl in the considerable 
government bureaucracy. "ýg 
* 
With regards to control , we earlier on mentioned that the 
Nigerian agreement departs from the Indonesian model in 
entrusting management and operational control exclusively to 
Ashland. It is feared that will make it hard to achieve the 
much sought control over natural resources and transfer of 
20 Fabrikant 1975 op. cit. p. 40 
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I technology through "on the job" training very difficult 
notwithstanding the proviso that Ashland is to work closely 
with NNPC officials. It would have been better if the 
agreement had provided for a transfer or proportionate 
sharing of management and operational positions as soon as 
commercial production begins. That would have provided a 
watch-dog on Ashland's activities in the areas of production 
and marketing, and would also afford NNPC officials an 
"excellent opportunity for learning the operational 
techniques and skills of the petroleum companyl a process 
which will ultimately strengthen NNPC's supervisory 
functions and consequently its control". 
21 
As regards to the fiscal regimes, if the Ashland/NNPC 
agreement is - evaluated on that basis, it could be argued 
that the f iscal and production arrangements does not give 
Nigeria enough financial returns compared to PSCs in 
countries like Indonesia, Malaysia and Libya. A general 
remark that a particular PSC gives or does not give a 
government enough financial returns is more meaningful if 
such statement is made in the context of a comparison 
between two or more PSCs. Thus the following summary of 
relevant arrangements in Indonesia, Malaysia and Libya is 
illustrative of the variations found in fiscal and oil 
sharing agreements in these countries and Nigeria. 
22 
21 Asante, S., " Restructuring Trananational Mineral Agreements", 73 A. J. I. L. 1979 
p. 366. 
22 The conclusion reached in relation to Nigeria is also informed by the Report of 
justice Ayo Xrikefe Tribunal of Inquiry into crude oil Sales 1980 which we shall 
refer to shortly. 
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INDONESIA 
(i) "In the recent' form of production sharing 
contracts, allowable costs are recoverable from 
available production without volume 
restriction * (ii) Balance of available crude oil is shared 
65.99% to 34.0% in favour of the state owned 
company; 
(iii) The contractor pays 45% tax on income and 
a 20% dividend tax; 
(iv) The net effect of sharing with the state 
owned company is 85 to 15 sharing of the net 
proceeds of production. However, the state 
owned company is responsible for management of 
the operation, but the contractor bears the 
risks and repares and executes the work 
programmete 2T 
MALAYSIA 
(i)"A maximum of 20% of total crude oil 
production is set aside f or cost recovery and 
within this limit all recognized costs are 
recoverable on an expensing basis, no 
depreciation or amortization rules being 
applicable; 
(ii) 10% of total crude oil production- is 
reserved for the state-owned company for 
purposes of royalty payments; 
(iii) Profit oil is shared 70% to 30% in favour 
of the state-owned company; 
(iv) The contractor pays income tax at the rate 
of 45%; 
(v) The contractor is obliged to make a cash 
payment of 70% of any increase of crude oil 
value per barrel above the base price for the 
year concerned". 24 
LIBYA 
(i) "No part of production is set aside for cost recovery; 
instead, the contractor receives 19% or 15% of production in 
off-shore and onshore agreements respectively; 
(ii) After a commercial discovery is made, the state owned 
company advances pro rata to its oil share (81% or 85%) part 
23 Blinn, K. W., & et al. International Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation 
Agreements; Legal Economic and policy Aspects. Euromoney Publications, 1987 p. 78 
24 oil Money , Special Report No. 59. New York. 1983 p. 188. 
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of the development expenditure, to be repaid by the 
contractor partly or wholly with interest as soon as certain 
production target has been achieved; 
(iii) The contractor is exempted from taxes on income"-25 
For analytical convenience, a summary is provided below of 
similar arrangements under the NNPC/Ashland PSC. 
NIGERIA 
(I) Up to 50% of available production is set 
aside as "cost oil" for reimbursement of 
contractor's allowable costs; 
(ii) 55% of the balance of available production 
after deducting cost oil is allocated as "tax 
oil" for the payment of Petroleum Profits Tax, 
but if the proceeds of tax oil are insufficient 
to pay such tax, the state-owned entity and the 
contractor provide the additional amount in the 
same ratio as they share profit oil i. e. 65: 35% 
if the available crude oil exceeds 50,000 
barrels per day. 
(iii) The remaining available production after 
deducting cost oil and tax oil -(profit oil) is 
shared in the proportion of 65% for the state- 
owned entity and 35% for the contractor but if 
production exceeds 50,000 barrels per day, the 
proportion is 70: 30%; 
(iv) The contractor is entitled to 2% of 
operating costs as "over head"; 
(v) The contractor is responsible for marketing 
cost oil, tax oil, its own share of profit oil 
and all the state-owned entity ILý the entity 
does not elect to lift its share. t 
An examination of these provisions reveals the following 
points regarding the Nigerian agreement: 
(i) The percentage of production set aside for cost recovery 
under the contract is one of the highest seen. 
(ii) The arrangement by which NNPC pays Petroleum Profits 
Tax on behalf of Ashland is unusual, and it makes this PSC 
25 Ibid p. 197. 
26 Ashland/NNPC PSC. Clause 6. 
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the one with the highest tax rate. 
(iii) The setting aside of a percentage of production 
towards the payment of tax is also a departure from the 
normal practice. Generally,, PSCs are subject to corporate 
income tax, other than in Libya where no tax is payable and 
in Nigeria, which as we have already seen imposes Petroleum 
Profit tax of 85%. 
Indeed the foregoing are all pointers to the f act that the 
contract is more advantageous to Ashland than to the NNPC, 
notwithstanding the fact that the bulk of the proceeds of 
sale go to the Nigerian Federal Board of Inland Revenue. 
This was also the conclusion reached by the Tribunal of 
inquiry which was set up to investigate an alleged loss of 
E1.8 (N2.8) billion from the accounts of NNPC with the 
Midland Bank in London between 1978-79. The Tribunal found 
no sum missing. Nevertheless, it was highly critical of the 
clause on the sharing of oil between NNPC and Ashland which 
it described as "too lop-sided in favour of Ashland". It was 
of the view that after the operating company (Ashland) took 
its 50% for the amortization of its investment and operating 
expenses, payment of royalties (as well as the additional 2% 
of the actual operating costs as overhead charges) and after 
setting aside the 55% for the payment of rents, petroleum 
profits tax etc,, the balance left was hardly anything to 
warrant the application of any ratio whether 35%/65% or 
30%/70%. 
Because of this, the Tribunal stated further' that the PSC 
"certainly has no benefits whatsoever to the NNPC as it 
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stands today" and added that "Ashland has taken the NNPC and 
this country for a good ride in the implementation of this 
contract". Hence it concluded that "the NNPC can therefore 
ill-afford to continue this contract a day longer". 27 
Furthermore, the right given to Ashland to prepare budgets 
and programmes with the NNPC approving it, renders the 
country vulnerable to foreign interests because this could 
be used by the contractor as a license to be extravagant 
with the government ultimately bearing the burden. The 
tribunal of inquiry too commented on this. It observed that, 
"The truth is that NNPC pays 100% of all 
expenditures incurred by Ashland which is a 
company incorporated in Nigeria for the 
purposes of executing the contract between NNPC 
and Ashland Oil incorporated of USA. They are 
agents of NNPC but the NNPC contrary to what 
should be expected from a prudent investor, 
blindly pays f or all types q expenses put up 
by Ashland without question". 
T18 
This means that if NNPC wants to be in a position in which 
it can question or competently assess the expenses put up by 
Ashland it must take part too in preparing such budgets. 
Similarly, there is no stringent restriction in the contract 
as to how the company disposes the cost oil to either 
affiliates or independent customers, in a way that could 
adversely affect the government's interest. For instance, if 
it is sold at an artificial price that may raise the 
recoverable costs. Such a loophole is blocked under the 
27 The Report of Tribunal of Enquiry into Crude oil Sales 1980. Federal Government 
Press, Apapa. Lagoa. p. 6. This in my view defeats the whole purpose and advantage of 
Psc in allocating risk capital to the MNOC. 
28 Ibid at p. 27- 
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Indonesian PSCs by two devices: firstly, it is provided 
that, in the event of Pertamina being able to secure a 
higher price , than the contractor for cost oil, the 
contractor must either match the price obtainable by 
Pertamina or permit Pertamina to sell the oil on its behalf. 
Secondly, the government prohibits contractors f rom giving 
discounts or commission to their affiliates. Although the 
efficacy of this provision depends very much on Pertamina's 
marketing and ability to identify affiliate transactions, it 
guarantees Pertamina the right to check and supervise the 
companies activities. No such right, exists, under the 
Nigerian agreement, instead, more authority is even granted 
to Ashland to sell the cost oil as well as the tax oil 
besides its own share. The only limitation is that'it should 
be at prices fixed by the NNPC which are periodically fixed 
for various categories of Nigerian crude. But with the 
incapacity of NNPC to market all its crude oil, it may not 
be totally wrong to suggest that the operating companies 
play important role in determining prices fixed by NNPC, it 
may find itself in a difficult situation of disposing all 
its crude. 
one advantage that may accrue to Ashland under this 
arrangement is that, it may earn what is usually termed 
windfall profits when there is a dramatic increase in prices 
as it did happen in 1973,1979/80 following the Iranian 
revolution and even fairly recently at the start of the Gulf 
Crisis sparked off by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. This may 
come from its sale of its participants share of the crude 
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af ter recovering all its expenses but continue to receive 
that share in the life span of the agreement; thereby 
earning huge profits for little investment. As Dam too 
observed, 
"Production sharing agreements have been 
popular with the oil companies. The companies 
control their own share of the crude oil and 
barring any election by the state oil company 
to take its share in kind, they can control the 
destination of the state oil companies share 
Most importantly, companies have been able, ýn-the 
share of their crude oil to enjoy the 
whole 
, 
oJq the price increase in the world 
market * 
A device for avoiding this, is to provide for an increase of 
the government share whenever prices rise to such an extent 
as to enable the company earn beyond a specified percentage 
of profits, say 40- 50%. A similar measure was adopted by 
Angola in 1979 by the inclusion of a "price cap" clause 
which retains for the state any excess profits that may 
arise when an increase in crude oil prices exceeds the rate 
of increase in company costs. 
Finally, in view of all these, the Tribunal recommended that 
the NNPC/Ashland PSC should be reviewed immediately and the 
terms made equitable. The government accepted the 
recommendation. But as the Nigerian PSC requires high level 
supervision, and, is not as profitable as expected, there 
was little incentive to renegotiate the contract in such a 
way that would prove acceptable to both parties. This is 
moreso when one considers the lack of managerial and 
29 Dam, K. W., " The pricing of Northsea Gas in Britain", 13 Journal of Law and 
Economics, 2970, at p. 28 quoted by Hossain, K., in Law and Policy In Petroleum 
Development. Nichols Publication New York 1979 at p. 157. 
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technical skills and the urgent need for revenue and foreign 
exchange by Nigeria. The government therefore failed to 
negotiate any more PSC. Perhaps,, the f act that there was 
only one PSC might have strengthened the government's stance 
in this regard. 
However, subsequent enquiries since have indicated that the 
Tribunal had not obtained the full facts, and had therefore 
been too harsh and categoric in its conclusion. It is 
thought that the Tribunal was probably led to believe that 
55% of the total production was assigned to tax oil, with 
only 5% being subject to the production Split. 30 If that was 
the case, then it is right NNPC had no business pursuing the 
contract a day longer. Again, others strongly opine that the 
split between the two parties was 27.5% and also Nigeria 
through the Federal Board of Inland Revenue receives at 
least 60% of the total crude oil production. 31 The 
difficulty has been blamed on the looseness of the drafting 
of the contract, which differs considerably from the 
detailed PSCs now found in a number of countries as 
Indonesia, Libya, Egypt, Peru and others. Thus, the 
Tribunal's conclusion, and the strong belief that Ashland is 
getting wind fall profits has meant that to date this 
remains the only contract of its kind in Nigeria. More on 
the overall assessment of PSCs is supplied at the end of 
this chapter. 
30 This information is owed to Omorogbe, Y., " Legal framework for petroleum production 
in Nigeria. " 5 JENR No. 4 1987. p. 283. 
31 Olisa op. cit. p. 128 and Omorogbe, op, cit. p. 285. 
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5.4 RISK SERVICE CONTRACT. 
Another highly significant addition to new forms of 
petroleum agreements between MNOCs and NNPC is the Risk 
Service Contract (R. S. C. ). This form of petroleum contract 
is also called "operation or work contract". 32 The RSC is 
indeed a variant of the PSC except that the durations 
covered are shorter, and the operator or contractor has no 
title to oil produced as exists under a production sharing 
arrangement. 
Normally, "a RSC is an agreement concluded between a state 
oil corporation acting for the state and a MNOC for the 
op eration of specific aspect of petroleum exploitation by 
the latter. The state oil corporation holds title to the 
exploitation rights and concession. No right in any 
petroleum discovered accrues to the oil company which does 
however undertake exploration development and production at 
its own risk". 33 Under such an agreement, the oil producing 
country or its national company hires the services of the 
MNOC with the latter assuming the legal status of a 
contractor. The contractor is obligated to carry out the 
exploration, development and production operations and the 
host government may take over and control production 
operations from the date of commencement of production. In 
case of commercial discovery, the MNOC is reimbursed for its 
costs and investments and paid for its services. Thus, the 
legal consequences of this type of agreement is that the 
32 Blinn op. cit. p-82 
33 Adedeji op. cit. p. 270. 
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MNOC is granted no mineral rights and that the oil produced 
belongs in its entirety to the government or its oil 
company. 
ideally, RSC is based on the premise that an oil producing 
state needs three essential services from a MNOC- technical, 
financial and commercial. In other words, it needs oil 
technology and technical expertise for the development and 
production of its petroleum resources. And this also means a 
lot of capital is needed to finance the project. It also 
needs the services of the foreign company to market the 
crude oil produced since not many countries have that 
facility or have properly developed it. But, with the 
vertical integration and world-wide operations of MNOCs, 
they control the oil industry including its market. Hence, 
the need to employ them,, so that in the process the oil 
producing state can acquire the technology as well as gain 
access to overseas markets. 
The earliest RSCs in the petroleum industry were those 
between the French State Agency (ERAP) , with the National 
Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) in 1966, and the Iraq National 
oil Company (INOC) in 1968. Several models of the service 
contracts now exist in the OPEC states. The common 
denominator of these contracts is that, the host state is 
regarded as the owner of the natural resources even after 
discovery; the MNOC as intimated before being only a 
contractor and not a title holder. Although in the 
arrangement which ERAP had with Iran and Iraq, it had right 
to purchase up to 35/40% of the oil produced at world market 
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prices and to sell the remainder in international market at 
2% commission (which was tax free) and the realised proceeds 
f rom. the sales was to be used by Iran for the purchase of 
petroleum exploration equipment, products and services from 
France. 34 In 1971, Peru through its state oil agency 
(PETROPERU) also signed a RSC with Occidental Petroleum 
Corporation, a US owned oil enterprise. According to 
advocates of the Peruvian PSC, the salient advantages of the 
contract are as follows: 
1 "The state does not risk or invest capital in 
the operation, and the area is entirely the 
responsibility of the contractor. 
2. The petroleum and the reserves remain at 
all-times the property of Peru, a situation 
that is not affected by the payment in kind the 
contractor receives if he is successful. 
3. The state is associated with the success 
from the first day on which it occurs. 
4. The agreement is simple, clear and 
straightforward to administer, and thus reduces 
supervisoKy and administrative mechanisms to a 
minimum""O 
The main characteristic feature of the RSC which 
distinguishes it from the concession system, joint venture 
and PSC is that the. MNOC provides the technical services and 
risk capital for petroleum operations in return for 
remuneration in cash or kind. This way, it is in effect akin 
to a management contract. Other features of the contract 
include; the host state oil company is the sole holder or 
owner of the area under agreement. All petroleum deposits 
and oil/gas produced are the property of the host state oil 
34 Hossain op. cit. P. 165. 
35 Cardenas, T., New characteristics of the juridical framework of the exploitation of 
natural resources in the Latin American context (Paper prepared for the United 
Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations. ) New York 1975 p. 341 
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company at well head. The MNOC, either directly or through a 
subsidiary, acts as general contractor for the host state 
oil company and as such carries out, in the name of the 
latter, all operations necessary for the exploration and 
development of the oil deposits. Thus, the contractor is not 
a concession holder or partner,, but merely a hired agent. 
The MNOC is solely responsible for providing all the 
necessary funds at his own risk. This explains why the 
emphasis is placed on that risk feature in the labelling of 
the contract. Unless oil is found in commercial quantities, 
the MNOC will not be reimbursed for the expenses it has 
incurred in its unsuccessful search for oil. However, if oil 
is found,, the cost incurred will be debited to the host 
state oil company's account. The duration of the contract 
does not exceed 5 years (unlike the 20 years in PSC) and 
relates only to a single block or specific contract area -a 
PSC normally relates to more than one contract area. 
5.4.1 NON-RISK SERVICE CONTRACT. 
There exists too what is often called "pure service 
contracts" to distinguish them from the usual service 
contracts which imply the notion of risk taking by the MNOC. 
Under this kind of agreement which are not so widely 
applied, the MNOC is paid af lat fee generally related to 
production for its services. In other words the government 
or state oil company bears all the exploration risk itself, 
in ef f ect hiring the MNOC as a contractor to the state oil 
company. Such contracts have, thus far, only been negotiated 
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by countries with excellent geological prospects such As 
Saudi Arabia and Venezuela. 
in theory, such approach would substantially reduce the 
return which the government would need to offer to the MNOC, 
as compared to the case in which the MNOC bore the 
exploration risk. In Saudi Arabia for example, the MNOCs 
that make up ARAMC036 consortium receive their reimburseable 
costs plus a fee of less than 20 cents per barrel for 
providing a full range of exploration development and 
production services to the Saudi Arabia State Oil Company 
(PETROMIN)37 under a non- risk service contract. Another 
example may be found in Abu Dhabi where the off-shore field 
of Zakum, is operated by the French Company TOTAL for a fee, 
coupled with the right to buy back part of the production. 
None of these agreements entails any element of exploration 
risk. 
5.4.2 BACKGROUND OF NIGERIAN RISK SERVICE CONTRACT. 
I 
The RSCs currently operating in Nigeria were designed as 
improvements on the PSCs. It would appear as one writer 
rightly observed, that the government had sought to 
introduce the RSC as an improvement on the existing 
petroleum development agreements in the country. 
38 Because 
in 1979, the government entered into eleven service 
contracts with ELF, AGIP, AFRICA and NIGUS petroleum 
36 This stands for -Arabian American oil company which is a wholly American owned 
company. 
37 For a complete account on this see Blinn op. cit. pp. 97-98. 
38 Omorogbe op. cit. p. 289. 
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companies, although only that with AGIP has been 
operational , while with the others oil has not yet been 
discovered. It is on the NNPC/AGIP service contract that our 
discussion will be focussed here. No doubt, the general 
provisions of the rest of the RSCs apply mutatis mutandis to 
the NNPC/AGIP contract with some differences in their 
specifics only. 
5.4.3 DURATION OF THE CONTRACT. 
The contract between NNPC and AGIP (AFRICA) Ltd was formally 
entered into on September 24,1979 in Lagos. The initial 
exploration period is three years and is renewable upon at 
least three months notice given in writing before the end of 
the initial period. The maximum duration of the exploration 
period is five years. If during the exploration period the 
contractor discovers petroleum, a further term of one year 
is granted to the contractor, if requested in writing at 
least thirty days before the end of the initial exploration 
period. It is likely that the purpose of the one year 
extension is to enable the contractor to complete appraisal, 
drilling and determine the commercial potential of the 
discovery. The contract further spells out clearly that; 
"If a commercial field is discovered in any 
portion of the contract area, contractor shall 
promptly commence and diligently carry out 
development and commercial production from such 
portion. But if contractor shall not have made 
a commercial discovery in any part of the 
contract area during the explorat'on period, 
this contract shall terminate"-R (emphasis 
mine) 
39 Clause 3 (5) of the NNPC/AGIP service contract. 
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5.4.4 RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE PARTIES. 
The contract states that Agip must commence work within 
three months from the effective date and continue to perform 
the specified exploration work for a specified minimum 
amount. Drilling of the first exploration well should 
commence within twelve months from the effective date. And a 
detailed report of the work done must be made available to 
INNPC at the end of the exploration period or any renewal 
thereof. 
Furthermore, AGIP must carry out the operations diligently 
and in a workmanlike manner in accordance with good oil 
field practice and is subject to all applicable laws, orders 
and regulations. 40 When required by NNPC, AGIP must furnish 
NNPC with any and all information, data, studies and 
interpretations concerning petroleum operations under the 
contract. AGIP is also under obligation to engage Nigerians 
to the maximum extent possible in all operations. 41 
It is the duty of AGIP to prepare exploration work programme 
and budget for each financial year, that is, from January I 
to December 31 of each year. The annual exploration 
programme and budget must be submitted to NNPC on or before 
August 31 each year. Thereafter the parties meet not later 
than November 15 of each year to approve or revise the 
40 Ibid Clause 4 (1) (q). 
42 This point In expatiated upon later on under the sub-title Employment, transfer of 
technology and training of nationals. 
225 
programme. Usually the parties agree on the programme and 
budget with mutually agreed amendments. 42 
Under the contract, NNPC retains title and ownership of all 
data obtained from the operations conducted by AGIP 
including all geophysical, geological and engineering data, 
well logs and evaluations,, status reports and all other or 
information obtained in the performance of the contract. 
NNPC is obligated to furnish AGIP with all geological 
drilling, well production data or information in its 
possession relating to the contract area. NNPC has right of 
access to the contract area to witness all petroleum 
operations carried out in the contract area and AGIP is 
required to provide necessary facilities or such access, so 
long as the operations are not unduly interfered with. Also, 
it is the duty of NNPC to assist in every possible way in 
the dealings of AGIP with government authorities and to 
ensure that the latter carries out the operations in 
accordance with Nigerian laws and regulations including 
those applicable to foreign currency payments. 
5.4.5 CONTRACTOR'S REMUNERATION 
By and large, all exploration and development costs incurred 
by AGIP from the effective date of the contract up to the 
establishment of the first commercial production are 
consolidated and charged to the applicable field for the 
purpose of reimbursement to AGIP. This is effected according 
42 Clause 7 (3) of the NHPC/AGIP contract. 
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to a mutually agreed formula and payments are made in cash 
or in lieu of cash. The contract stipulates that; 
"All reimburseable expenditures incurred in the 
contract area other than production costs, 
shall be reimbursed in quarterly instalments 
during the repayment period in accordance with 
the agreed formula: 
Rq = EC +DC +ld 
4T 
Where Rq = Quarterly repayment instalment. 
EC = Total exploration costs. 
DC = Total development costs. 
Id = Product of the outstanding balance 
of development costs and one-fourth of the 
annual interest rate as of the last working day 
of the applicable quarter. 
T= Repayment in years ". 43 
It goes further to state that, "All costs and 
expenses properly made in accordance with the 
provisions of this contract shall be reimbursed 
as follows: 
(a) NNPC shall reimburse contractor for all 
costs of exploration. 
(b) NNPC shall reimburse contractor for all 
development costs properly incurred by 
contractor and interest shall be payable 
thereon at LIBOR rate per quarter. 
(c) Production costs properly incurred by 
contractor shall be fully reimbursed in 
Nigerian currency within 30 days of the dýLte of 
receipt of the relevant invoice by NNPC"*"" 
It is evident from above that NNPC must reimburse AGIP from 
the proceeds of commercial field discovered by it for 
exploration, development and production costs in accordance 
with the formula. in addition to the reimburseable costs, 
AGIP is entitled to quarterly remuneration in accordance 
with a prescribed formula that takes into account such 
factors as volume of production per quarter and the'market 
43 Ibid clause 21 (9) (a) 
44 Ibid clause 21 (8). 
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price of crude oil produced. 45 Generally, the order of 
payments under the contract include; (a) royalty, (b) 
Petroleum Profits Tax,, (c) Reimbursement, (d) Remuneration 
and (e) Production costs. That means all customs duties and 
dues levied on imports and services of the contractor in 
performing all operations under the contract are 
reimburseable. And the Petroleum Prof it Tax plus royalties 
levied on production of crude oil are borne by NNPC. AGIP 
only bears tax levied on its remuneration pursuant to the 
Nigerian Companies Income Tax Act, 1979 and these are not 
reimburseable. 46 The Petroleum Profits Tax rate under the 
NNPC/AGIP service contract is 67.75% for the first five 
years and 85%47 thereafter. The rate of the royalty is 
20%. 48 And as far as the repayment period is concern, it is 
stated as quarterly. 
AGIP is also given the right to take crude oil produced from 
the contract area equivalent in value to the total payments 
due to it from NNPC for reimbursement and remuneration for 
the relevant quarter. 49 The crude oil taken by AGIP will be 
in lieu of cash payments to it. Such payment to the 
contractor will be in accordance with the "market value" for 
the relevant quarter. 50 Thereafter, all the remaining crude 
45 'Market Price' here refers to the weighed average realised price obtained by NNPC in US dollars for crude oil produced from the contract Area in that quarter in respect 
of each quality of crude oil In export market to third parties. 
46 This Taxation Act applies to All companies operating in Nigeria both 10CAl And 
subsidiaries of foreign COMPAnies. 
47 OliAA Op. Cit. p. 126. 
48 Ibid p. 66. 
49 NMPC/AGIP Risk service contract CIAUZe 12 (3). 
50 Ibid Clause 11 (22). 
228 
oil produced from the contract area except the quantity that 
AGIP is permitted to take under the contract belongs to 
NNPC. 
5.4.6 TITLE TO PETROLEUM AND EQUIPMENTS. 
The contract spells out that NNPC is the sole and 
unconditional owner of all petroleum, rare gases and any 
other hydrocarbons whatsoever produced in consequences of 
the services carried out by AGIP. In addition. all the lands 
acquired by AGIP for the purposes of operations, and all 
equipments used in such operations, as well as structure 
permanently fixed to the property other than fixed assets 
acquired for temporary use are the property of NNPC and must 
be transferred to it at the termination of the contract. The 
contract gives to NNPC first option to purchase all 
materials, equipment or machinery, other than fixed assets 
which are the property of NNPC, purchased by AGIP provided 
such costs have not been refunded to AGIP. Before the 
purchase takes place, AGIP is obliged to give to NNPC a 
written notice to exercise the option and NNPC has 60 days 
within which to exercise the option. The price of the 
materials and equipment is to be negotiated by NNPC and 
AGIP. 51 
5.4.7 ACCOUNTING PROCEDURE UNDER THE CONTRACT. 
The contract also carries detailed provisions for the 
rendering of accounts of the operations conducted by AGIP. 
51 Ibid Clause 12 (4). 
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It requires AGIP to prepare quarterly statements of the 
accounts, assets and liabilities analysing in full detail 
all the accounts and expenses actually incurred during any 
given quarter. Distinct statements are to be made concerning 
exploration expenditure as well as development expenditure 
when applicable, with respect to each contract area. 
Stressing on this need for use of an effective audit system 
on the part of AGIP, the contract provides that, 
"contractor shall establish an effective 
internal audit system in accordance with good 
financial Panagement practice in the oil 
industry"-5 
AGIP must also provide all explanations and justifications 
for any items of expenditure included in such statement. 
NNPC has a period of sixty days f rom the receipt of the 
statements to examine and approve them in whole or in part. 
The two sides will meet, upon notice in writing by NNPC to 
AGIP, to resolve any disagreement concerning any part of the 
statement if any, not approved by NNPC. 
Inspite of the approval by NNPC of quarterly statements,, 
NNPC has the right upon written notice to AGIP to submit at 
any time within two years from the end of the financial year 
in which a quarterly statement of accounts is prepared, the 
quarterly statements to a competent auditor selected by 
NNPC. And the expenditures in the quarterly statements 
approved by NNPC shall be regarded as appropriately 
incurred. 
52 Ibid Clause 16 (2). 
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If NNPC takes over the production operations AGIP is given 
the right under the contract to appoint a competent firm of 
auditors to audit the production accounts kept by NNPC. 
Within three months from the end of the audit, AGIP shall 
inform NNPC of the results of such audit. The cost of AGIP's 
audit will be borne by AGIP. 
5.4.8 EMPLOYMENT, TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY AND TRAINING OF 
NATIONALS. 
Provisions for the employment and training of Nigerians who 
will later take over the operations of the oil industry are 
also contained in the NNPC/AGIP contract. AGIP is under 
obligations similar to those of Ashland under the PSC 
regarding the training and employment of local personnel in 
petroleum operations. For example, one of the Clauses on 
"Nigerianisation" of the oil industry in the contract 
requires AGIP to 
"make use of Nigerian nationals to the maximum 
extent in all aspects of its operations. only 
in cases where specialised technical personnel 
are required and not available from among 
Nigerians, may the contractor with agreement of 
NNPC hire non-Nigerians whose level of 
remuneration shall be approved by NNPC. 
Provided always that the employment of non- 
Nigerians shall be subject to the condition 
that the contractor undertakes to train 
Nigerians in corresponding specialisation to 
replace such in the shortest 
possible time"_5 
in addition,, AGIP is required within six months after the 
effective date of its operations to submit to NNPC a 
detailed recruitment and training programme in accordance 
53 Ibid Clause 8 (9). 
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with the Petroleum Decree 1969. The contract is, however, 
silent on the quality of training and the numbers of 
nationals to be trained. This means AGIP wijl conduct the 
training programmes in accordance with the Petroleum Decree 
which provides for minimal Nigerian representation of 50-70% 
for skilled workers and 100% for. unskilled workers. 
5.4.9 INSURANCE POLICY. 
It is pertinent to note that the NNPC/AGIP contract contains 
detailed provisions on insurance policies -to cover all 
damages or losses to the operations. The contract provides 
that AGIP shall take out and maintain throughout the period 
of its engagement, all insurance policies with limits of 
liability not less than those required by Nigerian laws. 
54- 
in other words, AGIP must maintain, for instance, automobile 
liability and machinery insurance if aircraft and vessels 
are used in the operations.. Furthermore,, AGIP must maintain 
comprehensive general liability and property damage 
insurance and insurance covers for assets and materials 
which, by virtue of the contract, will become the property 
of NNPC. Each policy is to contain a provision for waiver of 
subrogation in favour of NNPC. The limit of insurance for 
each risk covered by any policy is required by the contract 
to be 'adequate' and each policy should be based on 
international petroleum practice. 
54 This in effect means that insurance coverages of the oil operations are to be taken 
out with insurance companies registered and operating in Higeria. 
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In addition, all insurance premiums are to be regarded as 
exploration costs or development costs, whichever is 
applicable. Policies covering materials and assets located 
in Nigeria shall be taken out and maintained with a 
reputable Nigeria insurance company except those policies 
that AGIP cannot obtain adequate coverage in Nigeria which 
shall be maintained with a foreign insurance company through 
the Nigerian Reinsurance Corporation. If AGIP engages sub- 
contractors, its obligation to maintain the insurances set 
out in the contract remains unchanged. Whenever NNPC takes 
over any production operations, it must take out and 
maintain adequate insurance policy to cover all assets taken 
over from AGIP and the premiums for such policy will be 
regarded as production costs. 
5.5 ASSESSMENT OF THE CONTRACT. 
To begin with, one may express the view that the RSC seems 
to be the most progressive of all the contractual forms 
currently in operation in Nigeria. As compared to the 
traditional concessions, PSC or joint ventures, RSC makes it 
possible for the state to receive a higher financial return. 
This type of contract seems to have been signed thus far 
only in areas of the world where oil companies have 
considered the exploration risk to be relatively small or 
the potential discoveries to be high, such as Iran, Nigeria, 
Saudi Arabia and Brazil, so as to provide a large protected 
supply and increased revenue. It will be recalled that one 
of the criticisms levelled against the PSC in Nigeria by the 
Tribunal on Crude Oil Sales was that it had not been an 
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efficient revenue or foreign exchange earner for the 
country. 
The short duration of the contract might be another 
explanation why Nigeria opted for the RSC. The f ive years 
duration (unlike certain pre 1969 old oil concessions 
granted for forty years as well as PSC made for twenty 
years) enables NNPC to resume its ownership interests of the 
contracted areas free of encumbrances in a much shorter 
period. This is, of course, where the contract is completed 
and handed 'over to NNPC at the end of the exploration 
period. Fresh arrangements can therefore be made by NNPC in 
respect of such completed areas after a much shorter time 
frame than would apply to areas covered by joint venture and 
PSC arrangements. Further, if no recoverable commercial 
reserve was discovered within that period the contract would 
automatically be determined and no further flow therefrom. 
Another good aspect of the RSC is that it is limited to just 
one prospecting block at a time. This will restrict a MNOC's 
activities to just a single block thereby encouraging it to 
explore the area quickly particularly if it f aces shortage 
of supply from other sources. In the same vein, the fact 
that the contract is limited to only one block prevents AGIP 
and indeed any MNOC from choosing and concentrating on 
select areas for reasons such as wanting to stay in the host 
country and maintain a long steady supply. 
on the issue of taxes, again,, AGIP is treated dif f erently 
f rom, that of Ashland under PSC. AGIP's status as a mere 
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contractor is thereby underscored, under the contract. While 
custom duties and other duties as a result of its activities 
are regarded as reimburseable taxes may not under any 
circumstances be reimbursed. The tax paid by the contractor 
is that due on its remuneration under the Company Income Tax 
Act. As stated earlier the Petroleum Prof its Tax and all 
royalties due on Petroleum in the contract area are paid by 
NNPC. 
it needs be mentioned too that the RSC imposes a lot of 
restraints on AGIP. For example, it lays down the standards 
of work to be maintained by AGIP and provides that it may be 
removed if it fails to maintain such standards. AGIP is only 
entitled to reimbursement of approved expenditures as 
specified in the contract from the proceeds of production if 
attained. Also, it must submit to NNPC for approval annual 
work programmes and budgets as well as their amendments. Its 
expenditure must not exceed the approved budget amount. Any 
contract exceeding a specified amount must be approved by 
NNPC. It must also submit to NNPC periodic reports and 
furnish a variety of information and data. And its records 
and accounts are so many that NNPC can be said to possess a 
greater degree of control of operations than it has entered 
before. There is little wonder that this contract is the 
most favoured of all by NNPC at present. 
Worthy of mention too are the provisions on insurance 
policies contained in the service contract. No doubt, 
activities of the oil industry involve huge capital 
investments. Such investments are with respect to equipment, 
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materials as well as the costs associated with pollution 
control. Inspite of the strict observance of safety rules 
and good oil field practice, accidents occur in near ly all 
phases of the industry- ranging from seismic operations, 
drilling to production. These accidents result in loss of or 
damage to property, bodily injury and even death to field 
personnel engaged in petroleum exploration and exploitation. 
it is therefore necessary and important that such huge 
investments be protected against loss and the risks to men 
and materials insured against. At NNPC's insistence, all 
insurance coverages of joint venture activities as well as 
the RSC are taken out with the National Insurance 
corporation of Nigeria (NICON)- a federal government wholly- 
owned corporation. 55 A study on insurance coverages in oil 
operations in Nigeria shows that before January 1976 the 
MNOCs insured the joint ventureship operations with 
insurance companies other than NICON. By January 1976, the 
NNOC (NNPC's predecessor) came out with a directive or 
statement which stated that NNOC had decided that "its 
interests in the assets and operations of all our venture 
partners in the oil industry should be insured with 
NICON"*56 NNPC as successors to NNOC has since 1977 gone 
along with the same policy. 
Though the directive is f or the insurance only of NNPC's 
interests with NICON, the other parties to the contracts, 
namely MNOCs including AGIP are said to have found it 
55 Etikerentse, G,. Nigerian Petroleum, Law Macmillan, 1985 p. 171. 
56 Ibid at p. 172. 
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convenient too to insure the entire 100% interests of their 
ventures with NICON. But because of the enormity of the size 
of risks (pecuniary) involved, NICON, in turn reinsures 
certain aspects of these risks with foreign insurance 
companies. 
Even inspite of the widespread accolade the RSC received and 
hopes raised for a complete control and 100% benefits to 
Nigeria, it may still not have fulfilled that goal. By 
leaving management and operations solely in the hands of the 
MNOCs (contractors), it amounts to an implied investor 
ownership of mineral resources reminiscent of the old 
concession regime which it wants to avoid. Some countries, 
such as Bolivia and Venezuela, have sought to participate in 
the management of their state-owned oil enterprises by 
setting up control committees to supervise various aspects 
of their operations and of their service contracts. A study 
of these contracts, however, indicates that the transfer of 
control from MNOCs to host governments is assured not so 
much by recourse to sophisticated contractual forms and 
institutional arrangements as by effective supervision of 
the operations. The study also observed, and rightly too, 
that "where the supervisory authority lacks the requisite 
technical, financial, and managerial skills, such 
supervision tends to be ineffectual and government control 
becomes largely illusory"-57 Thus, the meaningful way out 
for NNPC is to in tensify efforts and see that the Clauses on 
"Nigerianisation" and transfer of technology is effectively 
57 Cardenes, op. cit. at p. 448. 
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carried out so that once commercial production commences, 
WNPC may take over production operations in the shortest 
possible time. 
In summation, one could say that the two contractual forms - 
namely PSC and RSC, are akin to a management contract, 
particularly in marking the divorce between ownership and 
management. Indeed, the two can be seen as operating a 
management contract phenomenon, i. e. an arrangement whereby 
two parties, one a foreign firm is made responsible to 
manage and undertake certain technical, educative, executive 
functions in another firm (a local firm) with or without 
being an equity holder therein in return for a fee or share 
in the product"*58 
of the two,, it is the RSC which operates in precisely the 
same form as a management contract. As in the case of 
management contract, a RSC covers all phases of a petroleum 
venture i. e. exploration through production to marketing. 
When it comes to management aspects the contractor has the 
sole responsibility for execution of the operations like in 
a typical management contract. Similarly, the contractor 
under both contracts are to provide all the funds for and 
assume all the risks of the petroleum operations at the 
initial stages. After making a discovery and having 
appraised its potential the contractor is free in declaring 
a discovery commercially exploitable or not. If not 
58 Sharma, D. D., Swedish Firms and Management Contracts. Uppsala. 1983 p. 6 For an 
exhaustive survey on management contracts in general, see Brooke, M. Z., Xnternational 
Management. A review of strategies and operations. Hutchinson, 1986 especially 
chapter 4 and YoPoGhai and T. C. Chorry, Management contracts and public enterprises in 
developing countries, A paper prepared for public enterprises in developing 
countries, Uppsalag 1986. 
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considered commercially viable, the area concerned is 
returned to the host state. Also paramount is the issue of 
remuneration under both contracts. Just as in a management 
contract phenomenon,, a RSC is a simple contract of work 
wherein the contractor is paid a flat fee for his services. 
However, the basic difference between RSC and management 
contract on the one hand and the other various kinds of 
petroleum contracts on the other lies in division of the 
crude oil produced. For example, the concession regime 
basically gives all the production to the MNOCs in return 
for modest royalty fees, and the PSC divides production 
between the host state and the MNOCs after allowing a 
portion for cost recovery. - But the RSC and management 
contract give non of the production to the MNOC but pays it 
for its risk production. These fiscal obligations are indeed 
the fundamental differences between the various kinds of 
petroleum arrangements. 
As a whole, one would discover that the general trend in the 
Nigerian Petroleum contracts and indeed among other OPEC 
states has been toward the increasing assertion of national 
control over the petroleum industry. Thus, from the early 
seventies to the present, one notices many common elements 
permeating through the existing patterns of the contracts. 
in all of them, the sovereign rights of Nigeria to its 
natural resources are recognised and respected. The role of 
NNPC as regulator and controller of the operations is 
clearly stated as i. 4 the aim of maximising income for the 
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country and its people through the different' taxation 
systems. 
Asante rightly observed that the idea of ownership among the 
oil producing developing countries evokes the sense of 
political gratification associated with the attainment of 
political independence. 59 But just as sovereignty is now 
acknowledged to be meaningless without economic power, so 
ownership has little significance in economic terms unless 
translated into effective control and concrete financial 
benefits reinforced by sound managerial and technical 
skills. There is no substitute for technological know-how 
and the acquisition of basic skills eýssential to management 
and operations of the enterprises formerly owned by MNOCs. 
Thus one may say that what is really important is not the 
sort of contract a government enters into with the MNOCs 
that matters., but the contents of it. As Zakariya too 
commented, 
"It is evident that engaging the services of a 
foreign oil company is not wrong per se or 
derogatory of the principle of state 
sovereignty over natural resources. It is the 
mode and conditions of such cooperation that 
call for bpi areful scrutiny and painstaking appraisal"- 0 
All types of contracts whether be it called service contract 
or management contract may be structured so as to yield 
equivalent benefits for oil producing countries. To this 
end, the knowledge and skills of the government 
59 Asante op. cit. p. 369. 
60 Zakariya, H. S., "Sovereignty, State participation and the need to restructure the 
existing petroleum concession regime, " Alberta Law Review. Vol. X, 1972 at p. 230. 
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representatives on the management board of the host oil 
companies is crucial for purposes of striking better 
contract deals. 
Finally, unless the Nigerian government policy on joint 
operations is structured in order to effectively deal with 
the basic problems which I perceive as 
(i) lack of oil technological know-how; 
(ii) lack of management expertise, given that most 
representatives on the management boards of the oil 
companies are not skilled or knowledgeable in the f ield of 
petroleum operations,, the NNPC will continue to remain a 
dormant or sleeping partner. Majority ownership of itself, 
will not give the effective control and active participation 
needed for integration of the petroleum industry into the 
Nigerian economy. 61 The issue of transfer of petroleum 
technology and training of nationals in the Nigerian oil 
industry,, which the author perceives as crucial for the 
acquisition of management and other such vital skills, is 
addressed in the succeeding chapter. 
61 The celebrated case of ANACONDA V OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT CORPORATION I. L. H. 
1975, Vol. 14, p. 2237, in very illustrative in this regard and thus worthy of mention. 
Briefly, the facts of the case are in relation to Anaconda's control over mining 
operations in Chile where the Chilean Government had acquired 51 per cent majority 
equity ownership in the venture. The question at stake before the Tribunal was 
whether Anaconda still retained control over the mining enterprises in Chile. After a 
review of both the operational and management structures of the enterprise, the 
tribunal concluded that, 
"on the evidence it Is clear that from the end of 1969 to 1971, 
Anaconda retained de-facto control in the sense that the operations 
continued to be carried out in the same way as before, by the same 
personnel, with a handful of exceptions as before, through 
substantially the same practical chain of command as before and 
pursuant to the same plans as before. " 
For these reasons, the tribunal held that effective control of the enterprise was in the 
hands of Anaconda despite the fact that it had minority equity ownership. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
TRANSFER OF PETROLEUM TECHNOLOGY IN NIGERIA. 
6.1 INTRODUCTION: 
As noted in chapters four and five, apart from the 
traditional concession agreements, most of the petroleum 
development contracts between the NNPC and the MNOCs contain 
provisions on transfer of technology. Also contained in 
these contracts are provisions for exchanging data and 
information., reversion of equipment on termination of the 
contract, and use of local goods and services, all of which 
can be said are aimed at effecting such transfer. Hence, the 
task of this chapter is to assess the extent to which the 
Nigerian oil industry possesses a technological capability 
with respect to petroleum operations. The questions 
addressed here are whether or not the MNOCs have transferred 
petroleum technology to Nigeria, and whether Nigeria should 
rely exclusively on them for effecting the transfer, or 
should of its own make efforts, devise programmes and create 
arrangements which will compel such transfer. The relevance 
of these questions lies in the fact that, despite more than 
three decades of engaging in the business of oil production, 
Nigeria has yet not acquired real ef f ective or as Steward 
and James call it "dynamic"' petroleum technology. Acquiring 
such technological capability will no doubt lead to further 
I See Stewart, F. and J. James (eds), The economics of new technology in developing 
countries, London, Frances Printer, 1982. By "Dynamic technology" they mean a sort of 
technology which tends to give the owner the capacity for innovation and invention. on the 
other hand, they call the type of technology which is precluded from innovations or 
inventions "Static technology% Also Lall chooses to distinguish the two kinds of 
technology by referring to static technology as the "know-how" and dynamic technology as 
including both the "know-how and "know-why". Lall, S., "Exports of Technology to Newly- 
Industrialising countries: An Overview", World Development, Vol. 12, Nos. 516,1984 at 
p. 475. 
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increase in the country's bargaining power vis-a-vis the 
MNOCs and lessen her depence on the latter. 
6.2 AISSESSMENT OF NIGERIA'S TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITY IN 
PETROLEUM OPERATIONS. 
6.2.1 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY: 
r 
In evaluating a country's technological capability in 
relation to its oil industry and its ability to run it, one 
needs, as Farrel posits, to disaggregate the industry into 
its component functions and technologies and then assess the 
extent to which nationals are capable of carrying out the 
varied complex functions. 2 Clearly, several problems can 
result from our attempting to do just that in the instant 
case. For example, there is the issue of whether the complex 
of skills or technologies identified is unique to the 
industry. A problem may be solved in different ways. Lack of 
a particular technology may not mean that it cannot be 
substituted with another one which is possessed. 
Furthermore, evaluating a technological capability on the 
basis of nationals operating in a particular industry may be 
misleading. There may be nationals with relevant skills 
resident in the country but outside of the industry, or even 
resident abroad and not willing to return. As a result, this 
procedure could not be used uncomplemented. Thus bearing 
this in mind, different research methods have been used. The 
approach adopted is comprised of four different methods with 
2 Farrel, T. H. A., "A tale of two issues, Nationalisation, the transfer of technology 
and the petroleum Multinationals in Trinidad and Tobago. " 28 Social and Economic Studies, 
2979, p. 247. 
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each method helping to correct the shortcomings in the 
other. 
The first facet of the method applied was to undertake 
library research into the operations of the oil industry in 
general with a view to identify those skills or technologies 
relevant to its crucial functioning. For example, there is 
no doubt that in an oil refining company, legal affairs and 
public relations are not crucial functions as compared to 
the operation of the refining plants. The second facet of 
the method was to take the case study (Nigerian Oil 
Industry), and disaggregate it into its component parts with 
the aid of the NNPC's organisational charts and some data 
about the MNOCs operating in the country. This facet also 
could not be relied upon on its own, uncomplemented. Aside 
from the two reasons advanced above, such an approach 
ignores the question of whether the existing structure is 
ideal or desirable, whether alternative technologies can be 
substituted in different areas or further still, whether the 
existing industry is efficient or, not. The third step 
involved taking and studying of what we will term as "ideal 
countries" with more advanced petroleum technology. These 
include oil exporting developing countries as Nigeria. The 
study of these countries' oil industries and skill profile 
did provide some extremely valuable clues as to what might 
be the model for Nigeria to emulate. A caveat needs to be 
entered here though. This does not imply that the countries 
chosen are ideal in the sense that their organisational set 
up is perfect. Indeed, they may themselves have areas of 
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inefficiency, weakness in certain aspects, etc, and 
emulating them might mean emulating error. It is simply that 
such countries are somehow along the path that Nigeria will 
have to travel and studying them provides us with valuable 
information about the journey that is ahead for Nigeria. 
Finally, the fourth approach used was to take the complex of 
functions identified under the first method, and then 
identify and interview experts in some of these areas, 
asking their advice and opinion with respect to analysing 
the skill situation of these areas via-a-vis the Nigerian 
oil industry. This is the most potent of all the methods. it 
might be wondered why reliance could not be placed on this 
method alone. Perhaps the reason might be because an expert 
or specialist working in one area of a company may not have 
any precise idea as to the industry as a whole. In the 
course of the research, this problem was confirmed. 
in the whole, interviewing people actually working in 
particular sectors of the oil Industry in course of the 
research (fieldwork) in Nigeria proved enlightening. 
6.2.2 RESEARCH ASSESSMENT 
From the information obtained through library research, as 
required by the first method, a listing of functions into 
which the oil industry can be disaggregated was determined. 
This listing forms the subject of Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. 
THE DISAGGREGATION OF THE OIL INDUSTRY INTO ITS SEVERAL 
BROAD FUNCTIONS. 
- Exploration and Development. 
- Production. 
- Refining. 
- Petrochemicals. 
- Transportation. 
- Marketing and Distribution. 
- Projects and Construction. 
- Research and Development (R & D). 
- information and Data Processing. 
- Tax. 
- General Administration (personnel). 
- Legal. 
- Economics and Planning. and 
- Public Relations. 
(it is pertinent to state here that many of these can be 
further disaggregated. But the enumeration here is purely 
illustrative. ) 
This method also provided much information on the sort of 
skill requirements necessary for running the industry 
independently by nationals. Based on such information, a 
breakdown of skills comprising the Nigerian oil industry was 
determined as follows; 
(a) The unskilled Nigerians working in different sectors of 
the industry, 
(b) The skilled Nigerians (professionals) in the industry, 
(c) The skilled expatriates on full-time employment in the 
industry. 
(d) The skilled expatriates on temporary work permits who 
are brought in for a brief spell to perform specialised 
tasks and then withdrawn. 
The complex of functions into which the industry was 
disaggregated and the listings of the skill requirements in 
relation to such functions, plus the specialised contractor 
f irms who perform a variety of functions in the industry 
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were studied and analysed in conjunction with the 
information f rom interviews. The skill def icit under each 
function was estimated by subtracting the skilled nationals 
plus the locally based contractors f rom the total personnel 
and organisations operating in the oil industry. we will 
return to this point shortly. 
Algeria, India and Mexico were chosen as the "ideal 
countries" we referred to earlier under the third method. 
These are the few developing countries which can boast of 
viable technological capabilities in some sectors of the oil 
industry. It is not possible to discuss in great detail all 
the experiences of these countries Pince this would require 
an extensive treatise well beyond the scope of this study. 
However, a brief account on the experiences in these three 
countries is provided below. 
ALGERIA 
Algeria is also one of the world's leading producers of oil. 
Besides oil, the country is also a great exporter of natural 
gas to the U. S. and Western Europe. Algeria's state-owned 
oil company. - Sonatrach was established in 1963. The country 
became a member of the OPEC in 1969. The Algerian Government 
gained full control of its hydrocarbon resources by 
nationalising 51 per cent of the shares of all the foreign 
oil companies operating in the country. 
Algeria abolished its old concessionary regime in 1971 and 
in that year Sonatrach started to be involved in exploration 
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and production activities. Sonatrach entered into several 
joint ventures with specialised service companies for the 
provision of services required in crude oil processing, 
refining and transportation. Of the nine foreign partners, 
six are from the U. S., two from Italy and one from France. 
The joint venture agreements are said to have played a major 
role in the transfer and development of petroleum technology 
in the Algerian oil industry. 3 This is particularly so 
because the joint venture partners are obligated to provide 
aýequate training to permit the replacement of foreign 
personnel by Algerians. In this connection, the proportion 
of foreign personnel in the different joint ventures varies, 
f or example, f rom less than 1 per cent in ALFLUID to more 
than II per cent in Aldia. 4ý It is worthy of note that in 
drilling activities Sonatrach holds 79 of the 124 onshore 
rigs in operation in the country and that they are fully 
operated by Algerian personnel. 
Training is an important element in strengthening the 
technological capacity of Sonatrach. The number of 
expatriates working in the Algerian oil industry has been 
decreasing since the early 1970s, at the end of 1980 they 
accounted for 3.14 per cent of the total personnel working 
in the industry. 5 Similar to the Nigerian situation, as we 
will later discover, this percentage was concentrated in top 
3 See OPEC, Basic Oil Information, 1983, particularly at the section on Algeria, 
pp. 24-37 and Aneze C., " The Transfer of Petroleum Technology to Algeria" (Science Policy 
Research Unit) University of Sussex. 1975 p. 14 (mimeographed). 
4 ibid. 
5 Energy supplies for Developing countries: Issues in Transfer and Development of 
Technology, U. N. Doc. TD/B/C. 6/31/Rev. 1,1980 at p. 44. 
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managerial and high level technical positions within the 
industry. The training is provided both 'on the job' and by 
specialised institutes in Algeria and abroad. the most 
important step concerning training has been to shift from a 
training system on an ad hoc basis to one carried out on a 
continuous basis. For this purpose, technical training is 
provided in the Algerian Petroleum Institute, the National 
Institute for Hydrocarbons and Chemistry and the National 
Institute for Productivity and Development. Management 
training exists too in Algeria. This is carried out in 
specialised institutes in Algiers, Oran and Hassi-Messaoud. 6 
commenting on Algeria, in this regard, a U. N. study held 
that, the country possesses a local technological capability 
in equipment supply and scientific support services of the 
oil industry. 7 This means Algeria has local capability from 
exploration to development phases which includes services 
such as drilling rigs, logging services, equipment supplies 
for oil fields and scientific services e. g. engineering, 
seismic, computer, sophisticated hydrocarbon equipments, 
pipelines, etc. 8 
However, in the case of refineries and LNG plants, Algeria 
has so f ar relied on turn-key contracts because it lacks 
adequate indigenous expertise in these areas. At any rate, 
6 See OPEC Bulletin Supplement, Vol. 28, No. 51 1987, p. 43. 
7 Energy supplies for Developing Countries; Issues in transfer and development of 
technology. U. N. C. T. A. D. 1980 hereinafter referred to as U. N. Doc TD/B/C. 6/31.1980 p. 37. 
See also Khan op-cit p. 14. 
8 U. N. Doc. TD/B/C. 6? 31,1980 Ibid. 
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it is stated that in doing so, Sonatrach is able to screen 
and select the process technology and evaluate the 
specifications presented by the owners of the technologies. 9 
on the whole, one can say that as f ar as the process of 
acquisition of oil technology by Algeria is concerned, the 
stress is laid mainly on the acquisition of operating and 
managerial capabilities. This is very appropriate because 
they constitute the basis for building an engineering and a 
research and development (R & D) capability for Algeria in 
the future. The next country to be discussed is Mexico. 
MEXICO 
Mexico and India have developed local technological 
capability in the fields of exploration, production and 
ref ining through their training schemes and R. '& ý D. units. 
Mexico was specially chosen as one of the ideal countries 
because it nationalised its oil industry in 1938, and has 
thus had decades of experience. in addition, it has a 
relatively well dev6loped petrochemical sector - which is a 
direction that the Nigerian oil industry is aiming to reach 
too. 
Pemex,, the country's state oil company was founded in 1938, 
the same year that the Mexican Government nationalised the 
oil industry. 10 Following the national is ation, Pemex faced 
almost universal hostility from the MNOCs and their home 
governments, which attempted to boycott and stif le it from 
9 ibid. 
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the cradle. Nevertheless, despite such hostility, Pemex 
survived and in its f irst three decades built an enviable 
record in the business of petroleum development. For 
example, the Mexican institute of Petroleum (IMP) on which 
Pemex relies for its oil technology is said to be one of the 
most technologically advanced in the Third World. Of the 136 
technological agreements concluded by Pemex in the 1970-1980 
period, only 40 per cent were signed with foreign firms, the 
rest were with the IMP. It is also reckoned that Mexico 
devotes about three times more resources to developing its 
own oil technology than to importing it. " 
In 1980, IMP had 2,900 employees of whom over half were 
professionals of different disciplines within the oil 
sector. in addition, it holds 90 patents registered, on 
refining and petrochemical processes, catalysts and chemical, 
products. In a few areas it has even succeeded in gaining a 
foothold in world market, as proved by the marketing of a 
patented technique, 'Demex', in a joint venture with 
universal Oil Products of the U. S. This technique was 
applied in two refineries in the U. S., one in Colombia and 
two in the Middle East. 12 
While IMP is nearly self suf f icient in ref ining and well 
advanced in petrochemical sector and in R&D, it is much 
10 Gaither, R., Expropriation in Mexico: The facts and the law, 1940, cited in E. 
Smith at al, "A fifty year perspective on World Petroleum Arrangements", Texas 
international Law Journal, 1989, p. 15. 
11 See Baker, G., Mexico's Petroleum Sectort Performance and Prospects , 1984 pp. 55-57 
cited in D. A. Kimbal, Jr, "Secondary and tertiary petroleum operations in Mexico: New 
foreign investment opportunities", 25 Texas International Law Journal, 1990 p. 425. See 
also Energy Supplies for Developing Countries, U. N. Doc. op. cit. pp. 46-47 
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weaker in drilling sector and generally in pipeline laying 
and transportation sector. IMP has concluded technology 
transfer agreements with foreign firms to obtain technology 
not available in the country. 13 
indeed, one can say that in spite of the early set back 
suffered by Mexico occasioned by the nationalisation, it has 
achieved two things. First, Mexico has demonstrated that a 
developing oil producing country could effectively reclaim 
the right to its oil and mineral resources from foreign 
control by the MNOCs. Secondly, the country proved that it 
can develop those resources independently. Although 
questions have been raised about Pemex's efficiency and its 
operational standards, no real doubts exist as to its 
ability to develop mexico's hydrocarbons without external 
aid. 
INDIA 
India is the next country among the Aeveloping countries 
which is as advanced as Mexico in oil technology. A country 
with a per capita income of about $100 per year, India seems 
like a country whose government cannot af ford the risk of 
exploring for oil on her own, yet thanks to her state oil 
entity, 14 she has very successfully carried out such 
exploration at great benefit to the country. To achieve such 
feat, the country laid great emphasis in the area, of R&D. 
For instance, it is stated that India's state-owned oil 
12 The discussion here draws significantly on Tanzer, H., 'Oil Exploration Strategies: 
Alternatives for the Third World'. in T, Turner et al (eds), oil and Class struggle, Zed 
Press, London, 1980, p. 92. 
13 ibid. 
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company, the Oil and Natural Gas Commission (ONGC) devotes 
about 2-3 per cent of its revenues to in-house research 
activities. Most of the research is conducted by the Indian 
institute of Petroleum Exploration, established in 1972 and 
staffed by 1,500 scientists and technicians. 15 For purpose of 
promoting further R&D. the country has two other research 
institutes, namely, the Institute for Reservoir Studies in 
Ahmedabad and the institute of Drilling Technology in 
Dehrahun. As a result of these efforts, India has built up a 
solid domestic technological capability in petroleum, 
especially the mastery of drilling and off-shore 
technologies. 26 
it is intriguing to note how India has acquired a 
technological capacity in off-shore exploration and 
production. Briefly, it started when the government awarded 
two PSCs to foreign oil companies and reserved one area f or 
the ONGC. Under the terms of the contract, the foreign 
contractors were to subcontract work as much as possible to 
an Indian firm for the engineering work and to a local 
manufacturer for the provision of the equipments, while the 
foreign contractors were to be fully responsible for the 
quality and delivery schedule of the entire work. At the 
same time, the ONGC was to develop local capability in the 
area in addition to the training that the foreign 
contractors will give to local employees. The result was 
14 India's state-owned oil company is called Oil and Natural Gas Commission (ONGC). 
15 See Energy supplies for Developing Countries, U. N. Doc, op. cit. p. 47. 
16 For an exhaustive survey on this see, Halhorta, "India's off-shore oil programme 
from policy to plans" and "on the development of indigenous capability for off-shore 
production systems", January, 1978 (mimeographed papers) cited in Energy Supplies for 
Developing countries, op. cit p. 47. 
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that the ONGC found a major of f -shore oil f ield (the Bombay 
High), while the two private companies, after some 
unsuccessful attempts ceased operations. To develop the oil 
field, the Indian Government bought what is called a "jack- 
up rig" which is a simple technology drilling equipment 
suited for shallow waters up to 250 feet. The rig was built 
in Japanr and the ONGC hired a U. S. off-shore drilling 
company to operate it and also to train Indian nationals to 
carry out work in the area independently in the future. In 
that way and also through training and R&D ef forts India 
was able to acquire local capability and mastery of of f- 
shore technologies which it even exports today to other 
countries. 27 The cost of buying the rig and the management 
and training fees were partly financed by loan from the 
world Bank and partly by the Government. 
In the main, these countries' experiences attest to the fact 
that commitment to a local technological capability plan and 
state effort by way of training as in Algeria and Mexico or 
using R. & D such as India, can yield results and diminish 
the dependency infinitely on foreign technology. 
Next, data on all work permits applied f or and granted in 
the oil industry for the year 1988 were obtained through the 
aid of interview and a study made of them. (See Table 7.2). 
This data broken down by company and by function, led to the 
determination of expatriates on temporary work permits who 
are brought on contracts to perform specialised tasks 
17 Platts Oilgram News l8th July 1981 p. 1, See also H. Tanzer, Oil exploration 
strategies, op. cit. p. 92. 
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Lists of contractors or specialised independent f irms 
operating in the industry were also obtained from the 
interview sources. This led to the identification of about 
32 firms who perform specialist functions in areas related 
to the oil industry This listing forms the subject of Table 
7.3. The classification of the firms is done into 'local' 
and 'foreign'. The list allows an assessment to be made of 
the role and significance of these firms in the industry. 
Table 6.1 : 
WORK PERMITS IN THE NIGERIAN OIL INDUSTRY, (Nov. 1988) 
gempany Number Requested Granted Refused 
l. NNPC 33 33 0 
2. ELF 27 26 0 
3. SHELL 57 50 7 
4. MOBIL 16 16 0 
5. GULF 24 24 0 
6. ASHLAND 30 15 15 
7. TEXACO/CHEVRON 17 17 0 
8. AGIP 14 14 0 
9. PHILLIPS 15 7 8 
10. PAN OCEAN 27 25 2 
ll. TENNECO 18 18 0 
Source: Xnterview data (Nov 1989) 
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Table 6.2: 
SPECIALISED PETROLEUM CONTRACTOR FIRMS IDENTIFIED IN THE 
NIGERIAN OIL INDUSTRY. ( Nov. 1988 
NA14ES FUNCTIONS ORIGIN. 
1. Schlumberger Well survey Foreign 
2. Flopetrol Well testing it 
3. Dowell Cementing service rr 
4. Forex Drilling it 
5. Baker Equipment marketing it 
6. Solus Schall Driving services Local. 
7. Dresser Nig. Ltd Mud chemicals It 
8. Baroid Equipment Engineering Foreign 
9. A. C. M. Ltd Repairs and Servicing Local 
10 D. C. P. Ltd Grinding and Marking ft 
11 Mitsui Pipeline construction Foreign 
12. Nissco Depot construction if 
13. Wigi Supply of pipelines 1j, 
14. Granges Hedlund Tank building 
15. C. M. P. Off-shore construction 
16. U. I. E. Workboat Charter 
17. Montubi Logging and perforating service 
18. Seismograph Service Well velocity 
19. U. G. C. Ltd Seismic Processing 
20. Safel Ltd Data Processing 
21. C. G. G. to, 
22. Gearheart Nig. Ltd. Wireline lodging. Local 
23. Brink Jones Gravity surveying 
24. Zenith Nigergroup Land surveying 
25. Geodetic 01 1 
26. Whipstock Nig Ltd Equipment service & rental. 
27. Melby Ltd Mud Engineering Foreign 
28. Marcoba Well services Ali, 
29. Venwell Int. Mud services 
30. Welex logging perforating. 
31. Marubeni A, 
32. Spibat Int. 
Source: Interview data ( Nov. 1989 ) 
Furthermore, data on the distribution of nationals as well 
as expatriates working in the NNPC and all the MNOCs 
operating in the industry in 1989 were obtained and 
studied. (See Tables 6.3,6.4 and 6.5 below). These staffers 
were classified into Management, professional and 
Secretarial cadres. Since these classifications cover the 
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senior staff and professionals in the industry it allows for 
assessment to be done of what skills are possessed by 
nationals which approximate what we described earlier on as 
either dynamic or static technology. 
Table 6.3. 
EMPLOYMENT STATISTICS IN OIL EXPLORATION COMPANIES AS AT 
DECEMBER 1989. 
Categories Nigerians Non-Nigerians 
Management 119 151 
Professional 1,065 255 
intermediate & Supervisory 1,994 45 
Clerical & Secretarial 1,414 - 
Skilled Labour 3,268 - 
Unskilled Labour 218 - 
others 190 - 
TOTAL 8,268 451 
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Table 6.. 4. 
EMPLOYMENT STATISTICS IN OIL SERVICE COMPANIES AS AT 
DECEMBER 1989 
Categories Nigerians Non-Nigerians 
Management 110 173 
Professional 394 282 
Intermediate & Supervisory 511 88 
Clerical & Secretarial 415 - 
Skilled Labour, 11797 - 
Unskilled Labour 2,357 - 
Others 442 - 
TOTAL 6,026 543 
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Table 6.5 
EMPLOYMENT STATISTICS IN MARKETING COMPANIES AS AT DECEMBER 
1989 
Categories Nigerians Non-Nigerians 
Management 203 15 
Professional 691 5 
Intermediate & Supervisory 1,249 
Clerical & Secretarial 1,493 
Skilled Labour 989 
Unskilled Labour 753 
others 74 
TOTAL 5,452 20 
Source: 1988-89 Annual Report on the Nigerian oil Industr 
An NNPC publication, Falomo Office Complex, Lagos. 
y 
6.3. RESEARCH FINDINGS: 
The research findings or results will take the form of 
judgements and comments on each of the areas listed in the 
disaggregated functions of the industry. At times, the 
assessment of the country's capability will be made in 
comparison with situations in the other countries (Algeria, 
India and Mexico) whose industries were studied. Perhaps, a 
useful starting point is to begin by commenting on the 
findings in respect of the exploration and production phases 
of the industry. 
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6.3.1 EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION PHASES. 
So far as the exploration and production phases are 
concerned, it is f ound that the Nigerian oil Industry has 
very little local capability therein. Out of the 10 MNOCs 
operating in the country, only SHELL, AGIP, MOBIL and GULF 
have wide range of skills relevant to this phase. It is 
pertinent to note that these four companies together are 
responsible for the production of 80 per cent of the 
country's crude oil. 18 But a considerable number of these 
skilled personnel are expatriates, who are almost at the 
intermediate and senior professional cadres. The other 
companies as well as NNPC are very weak in terms of both 
numbers and range of professional personnel in these phases. 
As a result these companies rely a great deal on specialised 
contractor firms for assistance. When compared with the 
Algerian or Mexican technological capability in these 
phases, Nigeria is not up their stages yet, both in terms of 
number of skilled personnel and experience. Nevertheless,, 
Nigeria has a nucleus of a capability. For example, some 
evidence is available of Nigeria's capability in the on- 
shore (land) exploration sector. An NNPC subsidiary,, the 
integrated Data Services Limited (I. D. S. L. ) has two seismic 
parties who complement the services of the foreign seismic 
crews in the country. These two seismic parties have been 
carrying on exploration with commendable achievements in 
28 ibid. 
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areas reserved for the exclusive exploration and 
exploitation by NNPC. 19 
However, the country seems weak in off-shore (marine) 
production. It was observed that the bulk of the work 
permits granted are in this area, and a wide range of skills 
are involved in this sector. NNPC, for instance, is heavily 
reliant on contractors to service this function. 
6.3.2 REFINING SECTOR. 
The fundamental objective of refinery development in Nigeria 
is to ref ine crude oil to meet local demand and to export 
the excess. Added to this, is the development of indigenous 
manpower to run all facets of refining operations, and hence 
augment overall development of the country. 20 To achieve 
this, four refineries have been constructed and are 
operating in the country. The breakdown of the installed 
capacity of these refineries by 1988 is depicted in Figure 
2. 
Figure 2 
Refinery No. 1234 
REFINERIES ELEME WARRI KADUNA PORTHARCOURT TOTAL 
CAPACITY 60,000 25,000 110,000 150,000 445,000 
B. P. D. 
CAPACITY 2,613 870 5,504 400 4,475 400 7,214 402 18,342 543 
MT/YR. 
Source: Xnterview Data. 
19 interview information held with Hanager, Corporate Legal Division NNPC. 1989. 
20 Progress of Public sector participation in the Nigerian oil industry. NNPC 
publication, 1986 p. 19 
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Thus, with a total ref ining capacity of the f our ref ineries 
at 445,000 barrels per day (b/p/d. ) the perennial fuel 
shortages in the country was reduced, and the level of 
f oreigp importation curtailed. The General Manager of Warri 
Refinery, while commenting on the current state of the four 
refineries remarked that "only 65 per cent of installed 
capacity of the refineries is utilised presently, while the 
projected product supply is hinged on the premise that the 
four refineries will operate well above 90 per cent". 21 This 
means that if the refineries operate in their full installed 
capacities there will be sufficient fuel to meet local 
demand as well as for export. 
in terms of ownership, all the four refineries are 100 per 
cent state owned. The refineries sector is fully 
Nigerianised except for occasions where the use of an 
expatriate technical back-up team is considered absolutely 
necessary. For example, 80 per cent of the staff of Eleme, 
Kaduna and Warri refineries are Nigerians and many of them 
have worked with the foreign consultants and contractors who 
designed and constructed the new Port Harcourt refinery 
which was commissioned on March 21,1989. Although the 
refineries sector is dominated by nationals, in terms of 
numbers and range of skills, our judgement is that a 
national capability exists only to the extent of carrying 
out the maintenance and operating functions in the plants. 
The Kaduna NNPC Refinery is a good case in point. In 1988, 
there were over 49 engineers in the plant, 50 plant 
21 interview information held with Dr. A. ola, The General Manager NNPC Refinery Warri 
in December, 1989 at Lagos. 
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superintendents and 44 assistant plant superintendents. Most 
of the engineers are nationals, but expatriates control the 
top positions. Majority of the plant superintendents are 
nationals. Specialised contracting firms are not very 
significant here in terms of day-to-day plant operation, but 
they are in cases where major plant construction exercises 
have to be carried out. In comparison, the local capability 
of Nigeria in this sector in relation to Mexico is weaker 
than in the latter. This is because in Mexico, in addition 
to the day-to-ýday operation of the plants by nationals, 
there exists local contractors who carry out major plant 
construction works. 22 
6.3.3 PETROCHEMICAL SECTOR 
As seen in chapter two, the idea to set up a petrochemical 
project in Nigeria was first conceived during the 1970-74 
National Development Plan period. The plan recognised its 
importance as a key project which will help transform the 
economy of the country and provide the much needed base for 
industrialisation. However, owing to financial and other 
constraints, the project did not take off until 1979. And a 
three-phased programme of completion was planned for it. The 
first and second phases have been completed while the third 
phase is in its early stages. It is scheduled to be 
completed by 1995. 
I! T- 
The Petrochemical project is also 100 per cent state owned. 
The feasibility studies,, construction assemblage and 
installation of sophisticated components necessary for the 
22 See U. N. Doc TD/B/C. 6/31 1980 op. cit. 
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project is done by foreign construction f irms with Nigerians 
as semi-skilled and unskilled workers. 23 No local capability 
exists in this new sector, although a nucleus can be said to 
exist. 
6.3.4 MARKETING AND DISTRIBUTION 
Until recently, the marketing and distribution of petroleum 
products was dominated by the MNOCs. 24 These marketing 
companies determined the volume of products to be imported 
into the country, and had their own network of depots and 
retail outlets in certain parts of the - country. Local 
participation. in this sector was passive until the coming 
into force of the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Act 1977. 
By this Act, the government through its agency, NNPC, 
acquired equity shares in the following oil marketing 
companies; 
(1) ESSO - 100% and it was renamed UNI-PETROL. 
(2) SHELL -60% and it was renamed National Oil. 
(3) B. P. -100% and renamed AFRICAN PETROLEUM (A. P. ). 
The remaining oil marketing companies too complied with the 
Indigenisation Decree whereby 40 per cent equity shares were 
sold to nationals. Thus in this way, local capability began 
to build up. But this quickly developed when the government 
in 1984 introduced what is known as "the independent 
marketers scheme" whereby enterprising nationals are 
23 Momodu, K. H., "Transfer of Technology in the Petroleum Industry; The Nigerian 
Experience. " 22 JWT 1988 p. 54. 
24 The marketing of petroleum products in Nigeria first started in 1907 through SOCONY 
vAcuuH oil company which marketed kerosine. This later expanded in the mid seventies to 
include the seven major marketing companies viz; -HOBIL, A. P., TOTAL, TEXACO, AGIP and UNI- 
PETROL. 
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encouraged to participate actively in petroleum products 
distribution. 25 This implies that local staff with real 
knowledge and skills in this area are available in both 
domestic and international marketing. (See Table 6.6 above 
in support of this assertion. ) This is unlike the case with 
mexico, which has capability with respect to domestic 
marketing but not in international marketing. 
6.3.5 RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT. (R. & D) 
Generally, present local ef fort and capability in this area 
is very poor. There has been talk about the Petroleum 
Training Institute in Warri to be up-graded to the status of 
a degree awarding institute f or purposes of research but 
nothing has been done to realise this. 26 Also, the NNPC has a 
R. & D. Unit, but owing to lack of proper research 
facilities, it cannot conduct research in a big scale. The 
most convenient approach had been to refer problems to the 
foreign technical partners where the research is conducted 
in the latter's home countries. This is because the R. & D. 
centres of the MNOCs are mostly situated at their 
headquarters. Unlike Nigeria, Mexico and India are far ahead 
in this area. For instance, as mentioned earlier, India 
through Research projects is able to support the activities 
of the exploration, petrochemical, refinery pipeline and 
product marketing divisions of its oil industry. 27 
25 interview information held with H. H. Olisa, a top official of the NNPC Joint 
Venture Department. Lagos. November 1989. 
26 ibid. 
27 Petroleum Economist (London) October 1980. p. 453. 
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6.3.6 INFORMATION AND DATA PROCESSING. 
Information and data processing is important in any transfer 
of technology package. It may take various forms, such as 
records, maps, analyses, field or research data. Exchange of 
information between parties in the oil industry can prove a 
useful means whereby the skills and knowledge of one party 
can be imparted on the other. The mere collection of 
information is one thing, and the capability to analyse or 
process such information is another. Without both, 
information collection is but a passive learning process. 
Nigeria's national capability in this area is vast. There 
are clauses in most petroleum contracts between the MNOCs 
and NNPC which emphasise on exchange of information between 
the two. Similarly, through the country's membership of OPEC 
Nigeria gets a great deal of information from deliberations 
of the Organisation on all issues of common interest to 
memberstates. Although NNPC is allowed access to information 
of the foreign partners (MNOCs) as well as from OPEC but 
such information is of little value if there is no means, 
namely through R&D capability to analyse and process same. 
6.3.7 LOCAL CAPABILITY AREAS. 
So far, our findings have been in areas, (except in 
marketing and distribution) where Nigeria has little, or no 
technological capability. Next, we will focus on areas where 
adequate local capability exists. 
Applying the same data and information based on the methods 
outlined above, the following areas were adjudged to be 
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areas where some basic capabilities seem to exist. These 
include; 
(1) General administration, 
(2) Transportation, 
(3 ) Taxation Unit, 
(4) Legal Department, 
(5) Economics and Planning and 
(6) Public Relations. 
What this means is that, in these areas, there exist 
nationals with adequate skills and knowledge (tools of the 
trade) who run them or perform the functions required with 
little or no foreign dependence. It is interesting to 
observe that most of the skills involved in these areas are 
those we earlier referred to as 'static' technology. Whereas 
the skills involved in those areas where there is little or 
no local capability come under what we called 'dynamic 
technology'. 
Thus, what emerges from the foregoing is that there is an 
uneven development of the skills of nationals in *the 
industry. And as Farrell correctly argues about a similar 
situation in relation to the Trinidad and Tobago oil 
industry, "This is obviously a function of the control of 
the industry by the MNOCs and the international division of 
labour created by those corporations which relegate certain 
activities to the peripheral countries, and retain certain 
activities exclusively for the metropole. "28 
28 Farrel op. cit. at p. 277. 
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The case of Nigeria is very illustrative, where activities 
such as, R. & D. information and data -processing, 
petrochemicals and the design and construction of new plant 
equipments are almost exclusively controlled from abroad. 
And after all the statutory and contractual provisions in 
some petroleum contracts requiring the MNOCs to employ and 
train nationals, it has merely resulted in the personnel, 
public relations, legal and services departments being 
dominated by nationals. 
in sum, our findings can be brief ly summarised. The country 
as we saw above appears to have adequate capability with 
respect to areas of 'static technology'. But there seems to 
be insufficient capability with respect to the areas of 
'dynamic technology. The research findings therefore suggest 
that adequate static technology exists with some nucleus of 
dynamic technology - but not across the whole range of 
functions necessary in running the industry independently 
over time. On this basis, it is submitted that Nigeria does 
not at present have adequate technological capability with 
respect to petroleum operations. It is not enough that it 
possesses capability with respect to areas of static 
technology. A concerted effort needs to be made in the area 
of dynamic technology too if the industry is to operate 
successfully and independently over time. 
The next question left for us to address is the questioni 
whether or not the MNOCs have transferred petroleum 
technology to Nigeria. It will be recalled that the 
petroleum industry like almost any other requires a complex 
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or range of technologies f or its operation. It will also be 
recalled that different types of technology across this 
range had to be combined, and in this regard a fundamental 
distinction was made between static and dynamic technology. 
Therefore, transfer of technology in this context has to be 
understood and evaluated in terms of these two different 
facets of technology. 
No doubt in the f act that the MNOCs operating locally over 
the years have of fered and still do on-the-job training and 
award scholarships to staff and other nationals for training 
both in Nigeria and abroad. Inspite of this, the country 
does not after more than 30 years of involvement with the 
MNOCs have effective petroleum technology. In 1986, Mr 
Olorunfemil General Manager, Economic Research and Corporate 
Planning, NNPCI made a similar observation that; 
"the country has not developed the capability 
to manage its petroleum resources by itself; 
all the crude oil is still produced by foreign 
operators. Even though some Nigerians who work 
in the industry occupy important management 
positions, the key management roles are 
performed largely by foreigners". 29 
It is not as though the MNOCs have not at all transferred 
some technology through their various training programmes. 
They have transferred some dynamic technology but most of it 
has been static technology. The net result is that the 
Nigerian oil industry has a highly uneven development of 
skills. Infact, as the research shows, the country does not 
even possess the technology which would enable it run the 
29 Olorunfemi, H. S., " Hanaging Nigeria's Petroleum Resources" (December/January 1986) 
24 O. P. E. C. Bulletin at p. 25-26. Hr Amu L., Hanaging Director NNPC says the same in 
substance, in Platts Oilgram News, New York. lst September 1981 p. 2. 
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industry independently at the exit of the MNOCs, f rom., the 
technical point of view. It is only meaningful to talk about 
multinationals transferring technology if by that the 
country can expect one day to develop the technological 
capability to operate its own industry and determine the 
direction and nature of its development 30 In the case of the 
Nigerian oil industry, this still remains a dream. 
6.4 OTHER SUGGESTED MEANS OF ENHANCING PETROLEUM -TECHNOLOGY 
TRANSFER. 
We saw that an almost exclusive reliance is placed by 
Nigeria on the MNOCs to transfer petroleum technology to the 
country. We saw too that inspite of this, the country in 
more than three decades of its involvement with them has not 
achieved this aim. Now the question arises, should Nigeria 
continue to rely on these companies alone when there exists 
other means which can either replace or supplement the role 
of the latter as "vehicles" for transfer of such technology? 
Bearing in mind that the MNCs generally, do not find it 
profitable to assist a transfer of technology for fear of 
competition and even possible replacement in the market, it 
is not surprising that the MNOCs in Nigeria are reluctant to 
transfer petroleum technology to the country. Thus, this 
clearly suggests, as Beckford puts it, "unless you are 
master in your own yard, you will wait in vain f or f oreign 
multinationals to teach you the tricks of the trade so that 
you can set up your own shop". 31 This means that concerted 
effort is needed on the part of Nigeria to assume a 
30 Farrel op. cit. p. 278. 
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responsibility for its acquisition of technological 
capability without relying wholly on the MNOCs. 
it will be remembered that efforts made by Nigeria, to 
develop a local base for absorption of technology have 
concentrated in the area of manpower and training. National 
efforts at R. & D. and the creation of an attendant goods and 
services industry have been minimal. The NNPC, a good medium 
for realising such local capability has not been utilised to 
its full potential. Comparative analysis shows that the 
country is lagging behind several developing countries in 
this regard. India provides a good example. Although a 
developing country as Nigeria, it has been able to carry out 
state operations through its national oil company. The cases 
of India and Mexico as we saw earlier on are very 
instructive in this regard. 
To reach a similar level, the NNPC would need to explore 
other means apart from its manpower development strategy in 
order to strengthen its local capability in the industry. 
This time, the emphasis must be on acquiring skills in the 
areas of dynamic technology. The following are suggestions 
on how the NNPC can strengthen its local capability with 
little or no reliance placed on the MNOCs as it is at 
present. 
Firstly, through promotion of research and development in 
the industry. This is one of the areas in the Nigerian oil 
industry, as we saw earlier, where local capability is weak. 
I 
31 Quoted in Farrel op. cit. at p. 278. 
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Creation of a local research capability in this area can 
help reduce the dependence which the country has on the 
MNOCs, create a scientific and engineering base, and 
establish a local technology for the local industry. In 
additiont R. & D. can boost import substitution which would 
in turn reduce the foreign exchange paid through royalties 
under the patent system. Another importance of R. & D. is that 
it allows for the adaptation of foreign imported technology 
to local conditions and needs. If a country is to promote 
R. & D. and other related activities, then an adequate budget 
should be provided which can support such activities. 
Because R. & D. programme is usually expensive, it should be 
supplementary to the manpower training programme. 
In some developing countries such as Brazil, India and 
Mexico,, national research and development in the area of 
exploration technology have been progressing for many years 
now. Infact, some of these R. & D. institutes, such as the 
Institute of Petroleum Exploration at Dehra Dun in India and 
the Institute of Petroleum in Mexico, are acting not only as 
domestic sources of oil exploration technology, but also 
suppliers in the international markets. 32 I 
While still on the issue of R. & D. I it is suggested that a 
Petroleum Research Institute be created in Nigeria. When 
founded, it can be made to work in conjunction with the 
Petroleum Training Institute Warri, whenever the latter is 
upgraded to a degree awarding institute. It can also work in 
32 Energy supplies for Developing Countries, 1980, U. N. Doc. TD/B/C. 6/31/Rev. 1, cited 
in Khan op-cit. p. 24. 
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cooperation with the universities, the NNPC R. & D. 
department as well as the MNOCs in all matters concerning 
local research and development. In any interaction the 
proposed Research Institute might have with the MNOCs, it 
should be such that it can tap the finely tuned 
technological capability of the latter. 
Secondly, less reliance on MNOCs for technology transfer can 
occur through cooperation with state oil companies and other 
public agencies in other countries as well as international 
organisations in this area. Such cooperation can assume a 
bilateral, regional or multilateral form. many instances of 
bilateral cooperation in this field of petroleum technology 
abound all over the world. A classic example of government 
to government cooperation is the agreement concluded between 
China and Japan in 1979 for oil exploration and development 
in China under which Japan provided the loans and 
sophisticated technology needed for such a joint venture. 
There are also several examples of bilateral cooperation 
among developing countries themselves in the area of 
petroleum exploration and development. Some developing 
countries possess adequate technological capabilities in 
certain petroleum related areas. The state oil companies of 
some of these technologically more advanced developing 
countries have assisted in exploration and production fields 
in other developing countries. For example, the ONGC of 
India has carried out refinery works in Iran, Iraq, Syria 
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and Tanzania. Also PETROBRAS of Brazil has carried out some 
work in Colombia, Algeria, Iraq and Libya. 33 
Under multilateral cooperation, we have organisations such 
as the Commonwealth Secretariat, OPEC and the U. N. which 
have been involved, for many years now, in rendering 
technical assistance to developing countries in the field of 
petroleum. For example, the U. N., under the auspices of its 
agencies like U. N. D. P. and U. N. R. E. C. has helped carry out 
projects such as conducting a seismic survey for Trinidad 
and Tobago and Chile. Another good example is the World Bank 
which embarks on a policy to advance loans to the developing 
countries for petroleum preliminary surveys and production. 34 
Under this policy, once a country establishes that oil 
exists, capital for development can be easily obtained, 
since today, oil in the ground is said to be a bankable 
asset. Although, since 1984, due to objections by the US the 
Bank's lending policy is influenced by an interest to 
encourage private, not public investment in petroleum 
development. The Bank also encourages state oil companies to 
subcontract to private sector companies, rather than expand 
their own capabilities. 35 In like manner, the Commonwealth 
Technical Assistance Programme provides consultancy advice 
to governments, frequently at short notice and at little or 
33 Petroleum Economist (London) October 1980. p. 453 
34 see generally, zakariya, H. S., "The World Bank and Petroleum Development in the 
Third World', OPEC Review Autumn 1983 p. 237, and by the same author "Financing Petroleum 
Development in the Third World: The Role of the Public International sector", 20 JWTL 1986 
p. 417. 
35 See the presentation by the World Bank entitled Promoting Private Sector Petroleum 
investments in Developing Countries, a World Bank Objective, July 1,1986, Honolulu 
Conference on Petroleum Exploration; Morse, E., Innovative Financing of Petroleum 
Projects: options During the Cyclical Downturn, Presentation for 1986 Honolulu conference; 
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no cost. It has particularly expertise in economic planning, 
negotiating mineral exploitation agreements with MNCs, 
finance and statistics. The programme has professional, 
technical and managerial specialists who can undertake 
assignments in any key developmental area where no qualified 
national is available. Most of its 300 experts come from 
Commonwealth developing countrieS. 36 
The third and final suggestion is to identify those areas of 
technical service which the MNOCs are not able to provide 
except through private specialised firms and then hire the 
services of the latter directly. As a U. N. study has noted, 
most of the relevant technology is owned by such firms. 37 
Therefore, it would be better to approach them directly, in 
those areas a country is interested, without the help of 
intermediaries. This, I belief, can help reduce cost as well 
as provide a contract which is more meaningful to both 
parties. 
in conclusion, this research has demonstrated that after 
more than 30 years of control of the Nigerian oil industry 
by MNOCs local technological capability still does not exist 
in the industry. Although today, majority of workers in the 
industry are Nigerians, yet there has been no real effective 
and Kikdashi, Z., "Oil Funding and International Financial Arrangements", 9 Natural 
Resources Forum, 1985, pp. 283-291. 
36 see Commonwealth Organizations. A publication compiled by the Information Division 
commonwealth Secretariat, Harlborough House, London 1990. 
37 Examples of such specialised firms include - Baker International, Dresser 
industries, Halliburton, Hughes Tools, Schlumberger and Smith International. With the 
exception of Schlumberger which is Franco-American the rest are all U. S. firms. For a 
fuller account see, Energy Supplies for Developing Countries. U. N. Report TD/B/C. 6/31/Rev 
1 1980 p. 12. 
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transfer of technology. No doubt, what will prove beneficial 
in the long run to Nigeria is the acquisition of what we 
described in the study as "dynamic technology". It is only 
through this that the country can greatly improve her 
bargaining position and eventually gain control over its 
petroleum industry. Technology cannot be transferred on a 
platter of gold to Nigeria, and neither can it be effected 
through a purely legal approach. It can only be obtained 
through a more active involvement in the oil industry. 
Exclusive reliance on MNOCs alone without this determination 
will have the same effect. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS. 
This concluding chapter is intended to serve two aims: 
First, it is an attempt to bring together the strands of the 
different chapters' in an effort to appraise what has been 
observed in the study. Secondly, in the light of such 
observations, to project what the future posture of 
Petroleum contracts in Nigeria might look like, what that 
also means for the economic growth of the country and to 
make recommendations. 
From the outset, it would be plausible to recall the main 
thrust of the study as outlined in both the abstract and 
introductory chapter. The thrust of the* study is to analyse 
the petroleum development contracts between Nigeria and the 
MNOCs against the background of the foreign investment and 
petroleum policies of Nigeria and changes in the 
international oil scene. This is done with a view to 
determine whether such contracts strike a balance between 
the contrasting interests of the parties. It will be 
remembered from chapter two that while some of the policy 
objectives of Nigeria in embarking on oil exploitation 
business are, among others, (a) to maximise her foreign 
exchange earnings from the resource, (b) to create 
employment opportunities and (c) to train her nationals to 
acquire technological know-how in petroleum operations, 
those of the MNOCs is mainly to secure raw materials and 
markets to which they can sell for profits their surplus 
technological and managerial expertise. It is against the 
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background of these conflicting interests that the study 
sought to analyse the petroleum contracts in Nigeria to view 
how they safeguard the interests of the parties. It is the 
overall finding of the study that inspite of all the 
ascension by Nigeria on the 'learning curve' and her 
consequent improved bargaining position vis-a-vis the MNOCs, 
attempts by the country to achieve all her desired 
interests, the required level of success has not been 
attained. For example, one finds that after more than three 
decades of engaging in petroleum operations the country is 
not capable of assuming control over its oil industry. This, 
as the study reveals, is mainly because the petroleum 
contracts and some Government policies towards development 
of the hydrocarbons are not adequately designed to 
facilitate local control and full participation as well as 
to have an effective transfer of oil technology. Therefore, 
the study in this part and in the main body makes 
recommendations and proposes revisions which would change 
the status quo. 
From the overall discussions in the study, some deductions 
can be made about not only the petroleum contracts' regime 
but also the political and socio-economic ramifications of 
the position of oil in Nigeria's economy. A summary of these 
deductions and recommendations is provided below as follows: 
7.1 PETROLEUM AND NIGERIAN ECONOMY. 
it is shown in chapter two of the study that f or the past 
three decades, the Nigerian economy has been heavily 
dependent on oil to the neglect of all other sectors such as 
agriculture and indeed it will continue to be so f or the 
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immediate unforeseeable future. No doubt, in the long-run 
there is the high possibility of oil being substituted for 
by other forms of energy currently being explored and 
developed in the industrialised nations. Before that 
happens, it would be a prudent long-run policy for Nigeria 
to spend its large oil revenue in developing a viable non 
oil sector with the hope that such sector would eventually 
be able to stand on its feet and by that minimise the 
country's dependence on oil. And as we noticed, the country 
has a large non-oil sector. It has large and viable 
agricultural and industrial (manufacturing) sectors which 
eagerly await attention and are impetus for growth and 
development. The importance of such a long-run policy cannot 
be over-emphasised for Nigeria. For it is unfortunate that 
inspite of the current wealth from oil, the country is still 
poor and underdeveloped. Furthermore, it has been seen that 
the oil industry has not been properly integrated into the 
overall economy of the country to the extent that is 
required to lead to the country's political and socio- 
econmic development. It goes without saying that so long as 
the oil industry continues to be controlled by the MNOCs, 
the full potential of the industry cannot be realised by the 
country. Only the effective control of the industry by 
Nigeria would make easier the task of integrating the oil 
sector with the other sectors of the Nigerian economy and 
minimise the leakages of the earnings from oil. 
7.2 ISSUES OF OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL. 
It is evident too f rom chapter two of the study that the 
question of ownership of the hydrocarbons in the country is 
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now undisputably vested in the Federal Government of 
Nigeria. This position is not only spelt out in the 
constitutions of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and other 
statutes (local and international), but one also notices 
traces of this affirmation of absolute ownership in the host 
state permeate through the existing patterns of the 
petroleum contractual arrangements. And the exercise of such 
ownership rights by Nigeria over her hydrocarbons are 
recognised and respected by the MNOCs. In other words, 
foreign majority ownership is now merely a shadow of the 
past in Nigeria as well as in other oil producing nations. 
it is pertinent to note that developments in this field have 
been emulated by other producers of mineral resources, e. g., 
among members of the International Bauxite Association and 
the International Council of Copper Exporting Countries. ' 
But it is a commonly held wrong notion to equate ownership 
to control. For instance, in spite of Nigeria's majority 
ownership in the joint venture participation agreements the 
foreign oil companies, being the sole operators of these 
ventures, have the ultimate control over these ventures. 
This example vividly demonstrates how despite majority 
ownership, which is usually insisted upon by developing 
countries, control can be wrested from them, particularly by 
MNCs. it is therefore imperative that to be able to exert 
full control over its oil industry, Nigeria needs besides 
ownership, the necessary technological and managerial know- 
how in the field of petroleum. 
I see centre for Development Planning, Projections and Policies, Department of Economic 
and Social Affairs, U, N, Secretariat, U. N. Doc. /A/9716,1980, P. 5. 
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7.3 REORGANISATION OF THE NNPC. 
Another important point which came out of chapter three of 
the study was about the reorganiBation of the state oil 
company, NNPC, into a commercially oriented integrated 
international oil company whose mission is to profitably 
embark on petroleum development in competition with the 
MNOCs. In other words, NNPC as it is today is not dif f erent 
from all other private oil companies in Nigeria as far as 
their ultimate goal, which is profit' making, is concerned. 
NNPC's new image, as we saw, is designed to give it, and, 
ultimately, the country a robust posture to withstand any 
shock of downturn in business fortune from within or outside 
the Nigerian economy that may threaten the development of 
the national economy in the future% This, in the author's 
view is a commendable step in the right direction because a 
powerful and capable NNPC will no doubt mean a better 
position for Nigeria to compete equally with the MNOCs to 
derive maximum benefits from its oil industry. This is 
because the NNPC can only operate efficiently within an 
atmosphere which is devoid of any bureaucratic bottle-necks 
associated with the civil service system. Moreso, it is the 
NNPC that will in the future replace the MNOCs and allow the 
country to no longer develop its hydrocarbons from a 
position of dependency. However, as also earlier advocated 
in chapter three, I wish agai n to reiterate the point that 
whenever the NNPC Act 1977 is to be revised to accommodate 
these changes, the provisions relating to the appointment of 
members to the Boards should be altered to provide that 
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appointment to the Boards will be on the basis of members 
having some knowledge or experience in petroleum matters. 
7.4 DEPENDENCY FACTORS IN NIGERIAN OIL INDUSTRY. 
Furthermore, it is clear from the study that despite over 
three decades of the business of oil exploitation in 
Nigeria, the country's oil industry is still largely 
dependent on the MNOCs in terms of technological and 
management expertise. It was seen in chapter two that the 
Nigerian oil industry has been from its inception organised 
and controlled by the MNOCs who manage and maintain an 
international network which covers all aspects of the 
petroleum business from up-stream to down-stream operations. 
For these oil companies,, Nigeria is simply one link in a 
chain. The organisation and development of each subsidiaries 
of these MNOCs in Nigeria are basically in response to-the 
world-wide considerations of these 'companies. The 
consequence of this on the country is that Nigeria has not 
been deriving maximum benefits from its oil industry. Of the 
three major contributions that the investment in oil 
development is expected to bring to the host country- 
employment opportunities, foreign exchange and technological 
transfer and local capability- the oil industry in Nigeria 
has made significant contributions to only foreign exchange 
earnings for the country. Despite the importance of the 
industry to the economy of the country, only as little as 
less than 1 per cent of the total labour force (of a country 
with the population of 88.5 million) are employed in this 
sector. Although granted that the petroleum industry per se 
is not a labour intensive industry, the lack of 
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intersectoral linkages of the industry with rest of the 
local economy (which would have led to more job 
opportunities) is what has led to such situation. Also, as 
seen in chapter six, the efforts of the MNOCs to transfer 
technological capability to Nigeria leaves much to be 
desired. The analysis of chapter six showed that although 
the country does possess some oil technology, the kind of 
technology it has got is 'static technology' as opposed to 
'dynamic technology'. Also, the chapter attempted to ask and 
answer the question why has Nigeria after all these years of 
relying on the MNOCs to effect the transfer of petroleum 
technology to the ' country,, such transfer has not 
materialised. 
7.5 FUTURE TRENDS OF PETROLEUM CONTRACTS. 
From the perspectives of the petroleum contracts, it will 
also be recalled from the discussions in chapters four and 
five that the terms of the traditional concession regime 
which operated in the early days of oil development were 
unfavourable to Nigeria. Nigeria modified the terms of these 
agreements through the promulgation of the Petroleum Decree 
1969. It was this Act as well as through OPEC's influence 
which led to the introduction of the policy of participation 
by Nigeria in the business of oil exploitation with the 
MNOCs. We further saw that such quest for Nigerian 
government's participation in petroleum development 
operations has continued unabated, and lately assumed wider 
dimensions, culminating in such contractual forms as PSC and 
RSC. This mainly came about to borrow Moran's expression 
through Nigeria's ascension on the 'learning curve' as a 
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result of her experience over the years and through her 
membership of OPEC. Consequently, the role of the MNOCs 
which was that of an "autocrat" under the traditional 
concession regime and subsequently was transformed to that 
of a "partner" under the joint participation agreements, has 
finally been reduced to more modest one of a "contractor"- 
provider of technical and management services. 2 Laudable 
though the transitions may sound, after three decades of 
direct involvement in oil development activities with the 
MNOCs, Nigeria is yet to manage or operate its oil industry 
by itself. As a result, today a great quantity of petroleum 
in Nigeria is developed under joint participation agreements 
under which the NNPC is a non operating partner and the 
MNOCs are the sole operators. Even the existing PSC and RSCs 
have done little to improve the country's position from that 
under joint participation agreements. Although they contain 
terms that are more favourable to the country in matters of 
assertion of ownership over the hydrocarbons and taxation, 
they are not different from the traditional concession and 
joint venture agreements in the sense that the MNOCs are 
still the sole operators under these contracts. The NNPC's 
role under these contracts is that of an approval agency; 
its participation as an operator in the joint venture 
operations is discountenanced. In a sense, it is kind of 
reversal to the traditional concession regime under which 
the concessionaire supplied the risk capital, technology and 
managerial expertise with the host country acting as a mere 
2 This expression is owed to Zakariya, H. S., "New Directions in the search for and 
Development of Petroleum Resources in the Developing countries", op. cit at p. 568. 
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"tax collector. " As such, a framework in which the NNPC can 
participate also as a co-operator in joint operating 
agreements with the MNOCs needs to be introduced into these 
contracts. Furthermore, it is recommended that less reliance 
be placed on the MNOCs as the only "vehicles" for the 
transfer of oil technology to the country. In chapter six, I 
adduced several recommendations on how Nigeria can 
strengthen her local capability (as well as bargaining 
position) in respect of "dynamic technology" with little or 
no reliance placed on the MNOCs. They included such measures 
as promotion of R&D efforts through establishing a 
Petroleum Research Institute in the country, cooperation 
with state oil companies and other public agencies in other 
countries as well as international organisations working in 
the area. The kind of cooperation envisaged here can be 
either bilateral, regional or multilateral. All these 
alternative sources are quite capable of effecting the 
transfer of technology because as seen in the study, the 
MNOCs do not actually own the technology required for 
petroleum operations. The fact, as can be recalled, is that 
in today's world, the oil technology is owned not by the 
MNOCs, but by private specialised firms which sell their 
services to anyone, usually f or af lat f ee and not f or a 
share of the profits. While it is true that in the oil 
producing developing countries these specialised f irms work 
to a large extent for the MNOCs, this is so because the 
governments of these countries usually leave the control of 
their oil industries to the MNOCs. Otherwise, by and large, 
any government which is willing to engage the services of 
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these firms directly can obtain them without recourse to the 
MNOCs. Although, one is also quite aware of the constraint 
most developing countries face in terms of not having the 
capital to pay for the services of these specialised firms 
and therefore they rely on the MNOCs who can af ford to do 
so. But with the current World' Bank's policy of granting 
loans for petroleum development projects to countries who 
cannot afford the risk capitall a developing country does 
not need to look up to the MNOCs for capital any more. 
Moreso, given the importance of oil in the world today, 
aside f rom the World Bank, such loans can also be obtained 
from international agencies, commercial banks, regional 
agencies or countries that are anxious to secure future 
supplies of oil. 3 
Through such direct contact with these firms, a country can 
also negotiate technology transfer agreements with' them and 
in the long-run acquire the desired technological and 
managerial capability to run the industry independently. The 
technical services agreement concluded recently between NNPC 
and BECHTEL, as seen in the study, offers a ready example of 
this process. According to the agreement, BECHTEL is to 
transfer technical know-how to NETCO (one of the new NNPC 
subsidiaries) within the span of 10 years. Without appearing 
to sound too optimistic, I believe that whenever -that goal 
is achieved, be it in a decade's time or more,, the, NNPC will 
then be capable of engaging in the development of the 
3 For fuller survey, see Walde, T., "Investment Policies in the international Petroleum 
industry - responses to the current crisis, " in N. Beredjick and T. Walde, Petroleum 
investment Policies in Developing Countries, op. cit. pp. 18-22; and Mikdashi, Z., "Oil 
Funding and International Financial Arrangements, " 9 Natural Resources Forum 1985, 
p. 283. 
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country's oil with little dependence on the MNOCs. When the 
NNPC reaches that stage the posture of the petroleum 
development contracts in Nigeria, I believe will also adjust 
with the NNPC playing greater role as the sole operator or 
jointly with the MNOCs to reflect such status. This will 
also immensely improve the country's bargaining power with 
the MNOCs. Whichever form such contracts may assume, their 
major point of departure from the present ones will be that 
the NNPC will act as the operator while the MNOCs as mere 
"purchasers" of the oil or they will be engaged from time to 
time to perform specialised duties in return for a fee. 
Yet another finding of the study in relation to petroleum 
contracts is that, all the contracts had no mechanisms for 
renegotiation of the terms of the contracts whenever such 
need arises. As a result of such lacuna, it has been noticed 
that the common practice in Nigeria in cases of 
renegotiation has been done either through passing a 
Government Notice or by promulgating a new legislation to 
that effect. It goes without saying that such practice will 
be easier if renegotiation clauses were inserted in every 
contract. 
The debate in support of this notion is that changing 
economic situations especially in view of the unstable 
nature of the present international economic order, provides 
a valid justification for a host country to renegotiate its 
contracts with the MNOCs. In view of the well known 
principle of "rebus sic stantibus, " one can but agree that 
renegotiation clauses have legitimacy and should be insisted 
upon by Nigeria in all her contracts with MNOCs. It is 
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further recommended that while drafting these contracts, 
certain minimum operational conditions affecting the 
transaction be inserted into these contracts, by that making 
renegotiation automatic on the fulfilment of these 
conditions. This will have the ef fect of bringing such 
clauses in line with that of force majeure. 
7.6 THE ROLE OF OPEC. 
As a study of an OPEC oil producing country, it would be a 
gross oversight not to mention in this concluding part the 
important role such Organisation had played in relation to 
the subject matter of this study. It will be recalled from 
the discussions in chapters two and three that OPEC was 
founded in 1960 and Nigeria became a full member of the 
Organisation only in 1971. Since its formation, OPEC has had 
great impact on its members as well as on the international 
petroleum industry. It has been described as the main 
strategic vehicle for its members to regain sovereignty over 
their natural resources. 4 It did so through its chains of 
resolutions irr which it encouraged the growth of 
participation and third generation agreements i. e. such 
contracts as PSC and RSC. 
perhaps the greatest impact which OPEC hap had on its 
members is-the wresting away from the erstwhile oil "majors" 
the power to determine levels of oil production, as well as 
prices of oil in the world oil market. The assumption of 
such powers by OPEC changed the structure of the 
international petroleum industry. In the pre-OPEC days, the 
4 See Gordon, R. L., An Economic Analysis of World Energy, MIT Press, 1981, p. 227. 
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world oil market was 100 per cent controlled by the 
"majors. " OPEC's arrival on the scene changed all that, such 
that today, the "majors" are relegated to the background. 
strategic decisions of the international petroleum industry 
have now become the decisions of OPEC and governments of 
non-OPEC oil exporting countries, because host countries 
have now improved their bargaining positions with the MNOCs. 
However, the most important strong bargaining points they 
are left with at the moment are in the areas of oil 
technology and managerial expertise. 
We also saw that despite OPEC's role in the international 
petroleum industry, opinions are divided in Nigeria over the 
country's continued membership of the Organisation. As I 
said before, it is my f irm conviction that Nigeria should 
remain in OPEC. The main argument of the opposition side is 
that when Nigeria opts out,, she can produce and sell more 
than twice her presently allotted OPEC quota, which 
invariably means more foreign exchange for the country. 
Doing so, in my opinion, will not make Nigeria better of f 
than she presently is, especially in terms of her interest 
in the long-run to become less dependent on the MNOCs. And 
by less dependence here one means Nigeria getting the 
necessary technological capability to operate her oil 
industry independently of the MNOCs. In that way, the 
country will retain full control over the development of her 
hydrocarbons f rom exploration to marketing stages and get 
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100 per cent of any oil found. one writer simply calls this 
the "100 per cent state-control role. 115 
In the decades ahead, I believe, things will change for the 
better in that, for instance, some OPEC members may make a 
breakthrough in acquiring oil technology. When that happens, 
all membercountries will benefit from it as members are 
known for their practice of emulating each other. it is for 
this and other reasons which were adduced in chapter two 
that I believe Nigeria should continue with her membership 
of the Organisation. 
In the f inal analysis, in this day and age, just as war is 
too important to leave to the military, so oil is too 
important to leave to the MNOCs. This fact is recognised by 
the developed and developing oil exporting countries alike 
where their governments have set up integrated state-owned 
oil companies to do everything from exploration and 
producing oil to operating refineries. If the ultimate goal 
of Nigeria is to have all her oil resources used f or the 
maximum benefit of her teeming populace it is extremely 
important that the country assumes full control over the 
exploitation of such vital resources because as Nigeria's 
Minister of Petroleum recently noted: 
"Petroleum is the only commodity, which, in 
commercial quantities and properly utilised, 
will attract capital investment, bring 
sustained revenue earnings, import other 
downstream projects and give employment 
opportunities as well as diversify to establish 
linkages with Agriculture and other Industries 
5 Tanzer, H., "Oil Exploration strategies: Alternatives for the Third World", in 
T. Turner and P. Nore, (eds) Oil and Class Struggle, Zed Press 1980 at p. 90. 
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and promote the 
Technology. "6 
acquisition of science and 
Prof. Jibril Aminu "Oil Development and Africa. " Address delivered at the Royal 
institute of International Affairs, in Chatham House, London 29 October, 1991. 
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APPENDIX A: A map of Nigeria Showing the thirty States of the 
Feqeration. 
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APPENDIX B: A Sectional map of Nigeria showing 
the Oil producing Niger Delta basin. 
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APPENDIX 
OIL COMPANY ACTIVITIES IN NIGERIA 
COMPANY YEAR YEAR OF CURRENT REMARKS 
STARTED DEPARTURE NO. OF OPL 
AND OMLS 
Shell Pet. Dev Co 1937 44 Still very active 
(Formerly Shell/ as operator in a 
B. P) joint venture 
with NNPC (60%) 
mobil 1955 4 Still very active 
as operator in a 
joint venture 
with NNPC (60%) 
Tenneco 1960 4 Tenneco is in a 
joint venture 
with Sunray and 
Mobil as operator 
Gulf IL961 IL6 Still very active 
as operator in a 
joint venture 
with NNPC (60%) 
Texaco/Chevron 1961 6 Still very active 
as operator in 
joint venture 
with NNPC(60%) 
Texaco(20%) 
Chevron(20%) 
Agip 1962 4 Still very active 
as operator in a 
joint venture 
with NNPC (60%) 
Phillips (20%) 
and Agip (20%) 
Phillips 1962 1 operator and sole 
assignee of one 
block 
Elf (formerly IL962 4 Still very active 
SAFRAP) as operator in a 
joint venture 
with NNPC (60%) 
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Esso Exploration 1965 1965 
Union Oil IL967 1970 
Great Basin 1968 1970 
Niger Oil 1970 IL978 4 
Resourses 
(formerly Japan 
Petroleum) 
Niger Pet. Co/ 1971 1976 4 
Deminex 
American 1971 1974 4 
Occidental 
NNPC 1971 - 48 NNPC currently 
(formerly NNOC) takes major explo 
ration programmes 
in its acreages 
Pan Ocean 1972 2 Still very active 
(formerly Delta) as operator in a 
joint venture 
with NNPC (60%) 
Henry Stephens 1972 1977 1 
Ashland 1973 - 2 The two blocks 
100% held by NNPC 
Ashland is a 
producing sharing 
contractor to 
NNPC on the two 
blocks 
Agip Energy 1979 6 Owned 100% by 
and Natural NNPC. AENR 
Resources operates under a 
(AENR) service contract 
arrangement in 
one of the blocks 
(OPL 472). others 
have been relinq- 
uished in 1984 as 
per the terms of 
the contracts. 
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ELF Aquaitaine 1979 2 EANS shot over 
(Nig) Services 16,000 KK of 
(EANS) seismic lines and 
drilled seven 
wells in the 
three OPLs with- 
out any discover- 
ies. The service 
contract on these 
blocks expired in 
1984. 
Nigus Petroleum 1979 2 Nigus shot about 
Nigeria 680 KH of seismic 
lines but drilled 
no wells before 
the service cont- 
racts expired in 
1983. 
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APPENDIX D. 
OIL EXPLORATION LICENCE BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF NIGERIA ON 
THE ONE HAND, AND SHELL OVERSEAS EXPLORATION CO. LTD. AND 
WARCY EXPLORATION CO. LTD. ON THE OTHER, DATED 16 JULY 1949 
THIS DEED made the Sixth day of JULY, 1949 BETWEEN HIS 
EXCELLENCY HUGH MACKINTOSH FOOT, Companion of the Most 
Distinguished Order of Saint Michael and Saint George, 
officer of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire, 
Officer Administering the Government of Nigeria (hereinafter 
referred to as the Governor of Nigeria shall include the 
Governor and Commander in Chief in and over Nigeria and any 
officer for the time being Administering the Government of 
Nigeria) OF THE ONE PART and the D'ARCY EXPLORATION COMPANY 
LIMITED Jointly (hereinafter referred to as the Licensee) OF 
THE OTHER PART : 
WHEREAS the Licensee has applied to the Governor, for an oil 
Exploration Licence in respect of the lands specified in the 
Schedule hereunder written (hereinafter referred to as "the 
said lands") 
NOW THIS DEED WITNESSETH as follows 
1. In consideration of the sum of one hundred pounds which 
has before the execution hereof been paid to the Accountant- 
General on behalf of the Governor right and licence in 
respect of that area of the said lands being within the 
Trust Territory and the sole right and licence in respect of 
that area of the said lands being outside the Trust 
Territory are hereby granted by the Governor to the Licence 
for a term of three years from the 1st of January, 1949, 
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subject to the rights of private owners of the, surf ace and 
subject to the restrictions conditions and provisions 
hereinafter contained to explore and search the surf ace of 
the lands described in the Schedule hereunder written 
petroleum and for that purpose to make geological, 
geophysical and topographic examinations and to dig and turn 
up the surface of the land and drill geological information 
bore holes which shall not except with the consent of the 
Director of Geological Survey exceed a depth of five hundred 
feet, reserving nevertheless to the Governor full power and 
liberty at all times to enter into and upon and to grant or 
demise to any persons whomsoever liberty to enter into and 
upon such Crown land and land declared to be native land 
under the Land and Native Rights ordinance as may be 
included in the said lands for all and every purpose other 
than that for which the sole right and licence under this 
Licence is granted and subject otherwise to the rights of 
the License under this Licence. 
2. Subject to the rights of surface owners, the licensee may 
erect and bring upon the said lands such temporary huts, 
sheds and structures, steam and other engines, machinery and 
conveniences, chattels and effects as shall be proper and 
necessary for effectually carrying on the operations hereby 
licensed and subject as foresaid the Licensee shallý be 
entitled at any time to dismantle and remove the same. 
3. The Licensee shall before commencing any operations in 
the said lands furnish to the Director of Geological Survey 
the name and address of the Manager resident in the locality 
of the said lands under whose supervision such operations 
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are to be carried on - Any notice which the Governor or any 
person authorised by him is in accordance with the term of 
this Licence required or entitled to serve upon the Licensee 
shall be sufficiently served if the same shall be delivered 
or sent by post to such Manager at such address. 
4. The Licensee shall with all reasonable despatch commence 
to examine geologically and/or by geophysical methods the 
said lands and shall during the subsistence of this licence 
continue with due diligence to carry out such geological 
and/or geophysical work as may be necessary to determine the 
structure of the said lands. 
5. The Licensee shall pay (a) to any persons in lawful 
occupation of the said lands, such compensation for 
disturbance of surf ace rights. and (b) in the case of land 
within the said lands, which is either Crown land nor land 
within declared to be native land under the Land and Native 
Rights Ordinance to the owner or owners of the land such 
compensation for the exercises of the rights powers and 
liberties conferred by this Licence as the Governor may from 
time to time determine. 
6. All excavations or borings which may have ben made on the 
said lands during the subsistence of this Licence shall, 
unless the Director of Geological Survey otherwise 
determines be filled up, and so far as possible the surface 
of the land shall be restored to its condition prior to such 
excavations or borings, and the Licensee 
; 
halýl indemnify the 
Governor against all claims and dempds which may be made by 
any other person for damage shown to result from the 
exercise of the powers hereby conferred. 
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7. The Licensee shall permit the Director of ý Geological 
Survey or a Geologist or Geophysicist of the Geological 
Survey Department nominated by the Director to accompany the 
officers, agents or servants of the Licensee exploring and 
searching for petroleum under this Licence and to have 
access to the field records of such searches and 
exploration. 
8. The License shall furnish to the Director of Geological 
survey a quarterly report (which he hereby undertakes to 
have prepared) indicating the progress of his operations 
under this Licence in and upon the said lands and containing 
a map, on a scale to be agreed between the Director of 
Geological Survey and the Licensee, which shall show the 
true topographic position of any land geologically or 
geophysically surveyed examined or mapped. The' quarterly 
report and map shall include full particulars of any 
discovery or indication of petroleum or petroleum bearing 
strata,, and of any mineral of commercial value -other than 
petroleum. Any officer authorised by the Director of 
Geological Survey may at all reasonable times inspect and 
make abstracts or copies of any logs records plans or maps 
prepared by the Licenses in, the course of his operations 
under this Licence. All such information so supplied by the 
Licensee shall (except with the consent in writing of the 
Licensee, which shall not be unreasonably - withheld) be 
treated by the Director of Geological survey as 
confidential, and shall not be published until the 
expiration or determination of this Licence except to the 
Government of the United Kingdom and its advisers but the 
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Director of Geological Survey shall nevertheless be entitled 
at any time to make use of any information received from the 
Licensee fro the purpose of preparing and publishing 
aggregated returns and general reports on the extent of oil 
prospecting or oil mining operations in the said Colony and 
Protectorate and for the purpose of any arbitration or 
litigation between the Governor and the Licensee. 
9. ý The Licensee may remove any specimens or samples of 
petroleum found by him in or upon the said lands in the 
course of his operations under this Licence, but shall 
furnish the Director of Geological Survey as soon as 
possible with full information of all such specimens and 
samples so removed and shall upon demand made within 30 days 
of the receipt by the Director-of Geological Survey, of-such 
information provide the Director of Geological Survey,, with 
such representative specimens and samples as, may be 
required, not exceeding one half of any individual specimen 
or sample or sample so removed by - the Licensee and' the 
Director of Geological Survey shall be entitled to retain 
any specimen or sample so delivered. 
10. The Licensee shall not enter'upon anyparcel of land for 
the purpose of this Licence until an officer' of the 
Government of Nigeria has been able to explain to the 
natives residing in the vicinity of the said land, if any, 
the reasons for such entry, in order to allay* any anxiety 
which the said natives may have as, to disturbance'of their 
rights. 
11. The Licensee shall not form or endeavour to form or 
procure or permit to be formed anyý Company Syndicate or 
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Association incorporated or - unincorporated not make any 
public appeal by means of a prospectus, or otherwise for 
money for the purpose of exploiting the lands which are the 
subject of this Licence or any portion thereof without the 
permission in writing of the Governor, and then only upon 
such terms and conditions as the Governor may prescribe and 
the decision of the Governor in these respects shall be 
final and binding on the parties hereto. 
12. The Licensee shall not grant or assign any interest 
under this Licence nor part with the' possession of any of 
the rights hereby granted to any person or persons 
whomsoever without the previous consent in writing of the 
Governor. 
13. The Licensee shall not assign or attempt to assign ihe 
rights granted by this Licence to any person other than a 
British subject or a Company incorporated in Nigeria or in 
some other part of His Majesty's dominions, save in respect 
of the areas of the said lands being within the Trust 
Territory. 
14. if the Licensee shall cease to be a British subject or a 
company incorporated in the Colony and Protectorate or in 
some other part of his Majesty's dominions he shall 
forthwith inform the Governor and apply to him for his 
consent to an assignment of the rights granted by this 
Licence in accordance with clause 12 (consent to assignment) 
hereof and in the event of the Licensee failing to obtain 
such consent within such time as the Governor may in his 
discretion appoint, the Governor may revoke this Licence. 
The revocation of this Licence in pursuance of the foregoing 
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provisions of this clause shall be subject and without 
prejudice to any obligation or liability imposed by or 
incurred under the terms and conditions hereof, save that 
the provisions of this clause shall not apply in respect of 
the right and licence granted hereunder in respect of that 
area of the said lands being within the Trust Territory., 
15. if the Licensee being a Company shall be or become 
controlled directly or indirectly by an alien or a company 
incorporated outside His Majesty's dominions or if the 
Licensee shall with the consent in writing of the Governor 
assign the rights granted by this Licence in respect of the 
said lands or any part thereof to a Company controlled 
directly or indirectly by an alien or by ýa Company 
incorporated outside His Majesty's dominions then and in any 
such case 
(a) The Chairman and the Managing Director, if any, 
and the majority of the other Directors and the 
Chief Local Representative shall be British 
subjects. 
(b) At all times during the term hereby granted or any 
renewal thereof a majority of the persons employed 
by the Licensee in or about the said lands in 
connection with the exercise of the rights granted 
by this Licence shall be British subjects, 
save that the provisions of this clause shall -not apply in 
respect of the rights and licence granted hereunder in 
respect of the Trust Territory. 
16. This Licence shall be determined if the Licensee shall 
be or become controlled directly or indirectly by a national 
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of or by a Company incorporated in any country the laws and 
customs of which do not permit British subjects or companies 
incorporated in His Majesty's dominions to acquire hold and 
operate petroleum concessions on conditions which in the 
opinion of His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for 
the Colonies are reasonably comparable with the conditions 
upon which such rights are granted to nationals of that 
country with the addition, of conditions corresponding to 
those imposed by this clause and the immediately preceding 
clause hereoff save that the provisions of this clause shall 
not apply in respect of the right and - licence granted 
hereunder in respect of the Trust Territory. 
17. In the event of the inclusion by inadvertence ý in the 
said Schedule of lands or areas over ý which it may 
subsequently be proved that the Government are not entitled 
to the oil rights or of lands or areas in respect of which 
the oil rights have already been granted to other 
individuals or companies, the Licensee shall immediately 
release to the Governor any such lands or areas when 
required to do so by the Director of Geological-Survey. 
18. Notwithstanding the rights conferred on the Licensee 
under this Licence, the Governor shall have power at any 
time to require the exclusion from the lands included'in the 
said schedule of any area or areas which may f rom. time to 
time be required for villages, new villages, village 
extensions, water reserves or any other public purpose, 
provided that during the subsistence of this Licence, , the 
area or areas so excluded shall not exceed in all 50 square 
miles and provided further that if the Licensee ý shall 
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satisfy the Governor that the exclusion of 'such area or 
areas will interfere with his proposed ý operations he shall 
have the right to indicate other areas from which the said 
50 square miles can be selected with the least interference 
to his operations. 
19. If the Licensee shall at any time refuse or 'neglect to 
observe or perform any of the terms and conditions' of this 
Licence the Governor may by notice in writing signed by him 
and served upon the Licensee summarily declare that the 
Licence granted shall thenceforth determine and the Licence 
and all rights and liberties conferred hereby or enjoyed 
hereby or hereunder shall forthwith determine without 
prejudice to the rights' and remedies of the Governor in 
respect of any prior breach or non-performance of any or all 
of the terms and conditions hereof on the part of - the, 
Licensee. Provided always that the aforesaid power shall not 
be exercisable unless and until notice has been given to'the 
Licensee specifying the particular'breach complained of and 
if the breach is capable of remedy, requiring the Licensee 
to remedy the breach and, in any case, requiring the 
Licensee to make compensation in money for the' breach', and 
if the Licensee fails, within a reasonable time, thereafter', ' 
to remedy the breach if it is capable of remedy, and to make 
reasonable compensation'in money, to the satisfaction of the 
Governor for the breach. 
20. The Governor may at his discretion on- an 'application 
made in that behalf by the Licensee on three months' notice 
in writing grant a renewal of this Licence in , respect"of the 
whole of the said lands or any part thereof f or af urther 
305 
term of twelve months subject to the payment by the Licensee 
of an appointed part of the sum mentioned in clause 1(fee) 
hereof based upon the proportion which the area retained 
bears to the area originally licensed hereby. 
21. The Governor shall not during the period of the Licence 
hereby granted to the Licensee grant to any otherýperson or 
Company licence to explore or search for petroleum in the 
said lands save in respect of that area of the said lands 
being within the Trust Territory. 
22. on or before the expiration of this Licence or any 
renewal thereof the Licensee observing and performing the 
terms and conditions herein contained shall- have a, right 
(subject to the provisions prescribed in any written law or 
regulation then in force for granting oil Prospecting 
Licences) to an Oil Prospecting Licence or Licences in 
respect of so much of the said lands as the Licensee may 
select: Provided that, the grant of any such Oil Prospecting 
Licence shall not entitle the Licensee to the grant of a 
lease for mineral oils save in accordance with such terms 
and conditions whether in respect of the, composition, of the 
body or company to which such lease may be granted or 
otherwise whatsoever, as the Governor may determine at--the 
time of the grant of such prospecting licence. 
23. (1) Failure on the part-of the Licensee to fulfil any of 
the terms, and conditions of this Licence shall not give, the 
Governor any claim against the Licensee - or be _ deemed a 
breach of this Licence in so far as such failure arises from 
force majoure and if through force majourý! the fulfilment by 
the Licensee of any of the terms and conditions of this 
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Licence be delayed the period of such delay shall be added 
to the periods fixed by this Licence. 
(2) In this clause the expression "force majeure" 
includes the act of God, war, insurrection, riot, civil 
commotion, tide, storm, tidal wave, flood, lightning, 
explosion, fire, earthquake and any other happening. which 
the Licensee could not reasonably prevent or control. 
24. if at any time during the continuance of this Licence 'or 
after the determination thereof any question or dispute 
shall arises regarding this Licence or any matter or thing 
connected therewith or the powers duties or liabilities of 
the Licensee hereunder then and in all such cases the matter 
in difference shall be referred to arbitration in accordance 
with the provisions of the Arbitration ordinance (Chapter 9) 
or any ordinance or law amending or replacing the same for 
the time being in force. 
25. The marginal notes are for convenience only and do not 
form part of this Licence. 
26. For the purpose of this Licence 
(1) "petroleum" includes any mineral oil or relative 
hydrocarbon and natural gas existing in its natural 
conditions in strata but does not include coal or bituminous 
shales or other stratified deposits from which oil can be 
extracted by destructive distillation. 
(2) "His Majesty's dominions" shall be deemed to include 
British Protectorates and protected states and territories 
under United Kingdom Trusteeship. 
(3) "British subject" shall be deemed to include a 
person under His Majesty's protection. 
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(4) "Trust Territory" means the Cameroons under United 
Kingdom Trusteeship. 
27. The provisions of Section 7 of the'Minerals Ordinance, 
1945, shall apply mutatis mutandis to this Licence. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the Governor has set his hand and caused 
the Public Seal of Nigeria to be affixed and Robert Hendry 
Bugler as attorney of the said Licensee by virtue of Powers 
of Attorney granted by the D'Arcy Exploration Company 
Limited and the "Shall" Overseas Exploration Company Limited 
dated the 2nd day of November, 1948, and 'recorded at pages 
47 and 40 respectively in volume 785 of the Lands Registry 
in the Of f ice at Lagos has hereunder set his hand and Seal 
the day and year first above written. 
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APPENDIX E 
PARTICIPATION AGREEMENT BETWEEN NIGERIAN NATIONAL PETROLEUM 
CORPORATION AND ELF NIGERIA LIMITED 1985 
THIS AGREEMENT is made the ......... day of ....... ý 1985 
BETWEEN the NIGERIAN NATIONAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, a body 
corporate established under the laws of the Federal Republic 
of Nigeria whose office is at Falomo Office Complex, -Ikoyi, 
Lagos, Nigeria (hereinafter called "NNPC" which expression 
shall, where the context so admits, include its predecessor, 
successors and assigns), of the one part, and ELF NIGERIA 
LIMITED, a Company incorporated under the laws of Nigeria 
whose Head Office is at 35, Kofo Abayomi Street, Victoria 
island, Lagos, Nigeria (hereinafter called the "COMPANY", 
which expression shall, where the context so admits, -include 
its predecessors, and assigns). 
WHEREAS by the Agreement made between the FEDERAL MILITARY 
GOVERNMENT OF NIGERIA (hereinafter called "the Government", 
which expression shall include its successors) and SAFRAP 
(NIGERIA) LIMITED (now called ELF NIGERIA LIMITED) dated 
31st May, 1972, the Government acquired with effect from 
12th April 1971 an undivided thirty-five per cent (35%) 
interest in the Oil Mining Leases, the Assets and the 
Working Capital, all as hereinafter defined; 
WHEREAS with effect from the lst day ol April, 1974, the 
Government owned an undivided fifty-five per cent (55%) 
interest in the Oil Mining Leases, the Assets and the 
Working capital; N 
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WHEREAS the Government, by virtue of the Nigerian National 
Petroleum Corporation Act, 1977, has transferred to NNPC 
without the requirement for any further, assurance,, -the 
rights, interests and obligations arising from all contracts 
and instruments entered into by the Government for any 
purpose for which the former Ministry of Petroleum-Resources 
had responsibility; 
WHEREAS NNPC with effect from 1st July,, 1979, acquired an 
additional undivided five per cent (5%) interest, in the oil 
mining Leases, the Assets and the Working Capital; and 
WHEREAS the parties hereto have agreed to consolidate all 
previous agreements and arrangements between the parties 
hereto relating to or resulting from the acquisition of 
interest by the Government or NNPC in and to the Oil Mining 
Leases, the Assets and the Working Capital and the rights, 
interests and obligations of the parties relating thereto. 
NOW THE PARTIES HERETO AGREE as follows: 
ARTICLE ONE 
Acquisition of Participatinq Interest 
1.01 It is hereby acknowledged and confirmed as follows: 
a) The Government acquired, with effect from 12th April, 
1971, an undivided thirty-five per cent (35%) interest 
(any such respective undivided interest from time to 
time held by the Government, NNPC, or the COMPANY is 
hereinafter referred to as a "Participating Interest") 
in 
i) the Oil Mining Leases, particulars of which are set 
forth in Annex 1 (hereinafter called "Oil Mining 
310 
Leases"); 
ii) the fixed and movable assets of the COMPANY in 
Nigeria, including without limitation, the COMPANY's 
exploration, development, production transportation, 
storage, delivery and export operations and 
associated assets such as offices, housing and 
welfare facilities (hereinafter collectively called 
the "Assets"); and 
iii) The working capital applicable to the operations of 
the Oil Mining Leases including without limitation, 
material stocks including those in transit, debts of 
staff debtors, property rents, concession rents, 
insurance and other repayments (hereinafter referred 
to as the "Working Capital"); 
b) The Government acquired, with effect from Ist April, 
1974 an additional undivided, twenty per cent (20%) 
interest in the Oil Mining Leases, the Assets and the 
Working Capital; 
c) NNPC acquired, with effect from 1st July, 1979 an 
additional undivided five per cent (5%) interest in the 
Oil Mining Leases, the Assets and the Working Capital; 
d) The Government has paid or caused to be paid to the 
COMPANY a total sum of Six Hundred and Seventy-One 
Thousand Five Hundred and Twenty-Nine Point Five One 
(671,, 529.51) Nigerian Pounds between 1972 and 1974 
being the full and final consideration"for the 
acquisition of an undivided fifty-five per cent (55%), 
interest in the Oil Mining Leases, the Assets and the 
Working Capital; and 
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e) With effect from 12th April 1971, the Government or 
NNPC, as the transferee of the Government, and the 
COMPANY have been responsible for all the liabilities, 
obligations, costs and expenses relating to the oil 
Mining Leases and the Assets in the proportion of their 
respective Participating Interests. 
ARTICLE TWO 
Transfer and Assiqnment 
2.01 In consideration of the amounts payable to the COMPANY 
by NNPC pursuant to Article Three hereof, the COMPANY hereby 
transfers and assigns to NNPC and NNPC hereby acquires an 
additional undivided five per cent (5%) Participating 
interest in the Oil Mining Leases, the Assets and the 
Working Capital effective from the Ist day of July, 1979 
(the "Effective date"): 
2.02 In consequence of the transfer and assignment set forth 
in Article 2.01 hereof and the provisions of Article One 
hereof the parties hereto covenant and agree that, as from 
the Effective Date, the Oil Mining Leases, Assets and 
Working Capital formerly owned by NNPC and the COMPANY as 
participants in the operations in the respective 
Participating Interests of 55% and 45% shall be held, ý owned 
and contributed to in the following proportions: 
NNPC 60% 
COMPANY 40% 
As from the Effective Date, NNPC and the COMPANY shall each 
be responsible for all liabilities and obligations relating 
to the Oil Mining Leases, Assets and. Working Capit al in the 
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proportion of their respective Participating Interests, that 
is to say NNPC 60% and the COMPANY 40%. 
ARTICLE THREE 
Consideration 
3.01 The consideration to be paid by NNPC for the additional 
five per cent (5%) Participating Interests in the Oil Mining 
Leases, Assets and working capital acquired as set forth in 
Article 2.01 hereof shall be a total sum of One Million One 
Hundred and Twenty-Six Thousand and Thirty-Two Naira (N 
1,126,032.00), the evaluation of which is set forth in Annex 
11 attached hereto and forming part hereof, and which sum is 
made up of the sums set forth in Articles 3.02 and 3.03. 
3.02 The consideration to be paid by NNPC for the Oil Mining 
Leases and the Assets acquired pursuant to Article 2.01 
hereof shall be One Million, Five Hundred and Twenty-Nine 
Thousand, Seven Hundred and Twenty-Nine Naira 
(N 1,529,729.00), the evaluation of which sum is set forth 
in Annex III attached hereto and forming a part hereof, and 
is based on Fiscal Book Value as on the Effective Date. 
Fiscal Book Value for this purpose is defined as: the sum of 
all qualified capital expenditures (including construction 
in progress) as defined by the Nigerian Petroleum Profits 
Tax Act, and all exploration costs, intangible drilling 
costs and similar and related expenditures less 'the 
cumulative capital allowances and allowable deductions based 
on such costs and which were utilised by the COMPANY to 
reduce the COMPANY's Nigerian tax liability up to the 
Effective Date. 
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3.03 NNPC also assumed as of the Effective Date a liability 
In respect of Working capital in the sum of four Hundred and 
Three Thousand, Six Hundred and Ninety Seven Naira 
(N 403,697.00), the evaluation of which sum is set forth in 
Annex IV attached hereto and forming part hereof. 
3.04 NNPC shall in addition pay to the COMPANY the sum of 
Eight Hundred and Twenty Three Thousand,, Four Hundred and 
Sixty Three Naira (N 823,465.00) which sum comprises 
compound interest on the consideration payable to the 
COMPANY pursuant to Clause 3.01 hereof at the rate of ten 
per cent (10%) per annum from 1st day of July 1979 to 31st 
March 1985 as set forth in Appendix A to Annex II attached 
hereto and forming part hereof. 
ARTICLE FOUR 
Payment 
4.01 NNPC and the COMPANY agree that payments under Article 
3 hereof shall be made either in cash within 30 (thirty) 
days of the signature of this Agreement or by deliveries of 
mutually agreed grades of crude oil on dates to 'be agreed 
mutually between NNPC and the COMPANY free on board a vessel 
or vessels to be designated by the COMPANY. ' The total 
quantity of cruel oil to be so delivered shall be calculated 
on the basis of the Official Selling Prices for those grades 
ruling on the dates of loading. 
4.02 The amount to be paid in accordance with Article Three 
hereof shall be certified by an independent auditor selected 
by NNPC and acceptable to the COMPANY on or bef ore the one 
314 
hundred and eightieth day following the signing of this 
Agreement. If discrepancies are f ound as a result of the 
audit, then the amount of consideration shall be adjusted as 
appropriate and the differential payment or repayment shall 
be made within ninety days following the date of completion 
of such audit and such differential payment shall not bear 
interest. 
4.03 Payment by NNPC of such certified amount or such deemed 
certified amount and receipt by the COMPANY thereof shall be 
binding and represent full, fair and final settlement of all 
claims between NNPC and the COMPANY with respect to the 
transfer and assignment of the said five per cent (5%). 
ARTICLE FIVE 
Operations Provisions 
5.01 The Parties hereto acknowledged that, from the Ist day 
of April, 1973 the COMPANY,, as "Operator",, has conducted 
petroleum operations under the Oil Mining Leases for itself 
and on behalf of the Government or NNPC as transferee of the 
Government interest therein. As Operator, the COMPANY shall 
not receive any remuneration. 
5.02 The Parties hereto acknowledged and confirm, that'as of 
and with effect from the Effective Date they have, each 
contributed and shall continue to contribute their 
respective Participating Interest shares , of all funds 
expended in -the conduct of the joint operations by, the 
COMPANY as Operator. \ 
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5.03 As soon as practicable after the execution 'of this 
Agreement NNPC and the COMPANY shall enter into an operating 
Agreement (the "Operating Agreement") with an Accounting 
Procedure both of which shall be in the form commonly in use 
in the petroleum industry for petroleum joint venture 
agreements, subject nevertheless to changes as may be agreed 
upon by the Parties hereto, ad which shall provide"for the 
joint control,. supervision and direction of operations by 
mutual agreement of the Parties. The Operating Agreements 
shall further provide, without limitation, for the 
following: 
a) the payment by the Parties of their respective 
Participating Interest shares of all funds required by 
the Operator to conduct operations; 
b) the right of the Parties to their respective 
Participating Interest shares of each grade of all 
Available Production from the ares of the said oil 
Mining Leases; 
C) the establishment of an operating committee consisting 
representatives of the Parties hereto for control of 
the operations; 
d) the production,. and off-lifting by the Parties of their 
respective Participating Interest shares in accordance 
with the Heads of Agreement made between the parties 
hereto dated the ....... day of ........... 1985; 
e) the payment by each Party of royalty in respect of the 
crude oil won and saved for its account and all taxes 
for which it is liable; 
f) change of Operator; and 
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g) the furnishing information (including technical and 
financial) by the Operator to the other Party'as may be 
required from time to time by the other Party. 
ARTICLE SIX 
Existinq Agreements 
This Agreement supercedes all previous agreements and 
arrangements between the Parties hereto relating to the 
acquisition of an undivided percentage interest by the 
Government 'or NNPC in and to the Oil Mining Leases, the 
Assets and the Working Capital of the -COMPANY and the 
rights, interests and obligations of the Parties relating 
thereto. 
ARTICLE SEVEN 
Arbitration 
In the event of any dispute or dif ferenc'e ari sing '"between 
the Parties concerning the interpretation or performance of 
this Agreement or anything there contained 'Or 'in connection 
therewith or the rights and liabilities of either of the 
Parties and if the Parties should f ail to settle such 
difference or dispute by agreement, then either Party may 
serve on the other a demand for arbitration. 
Within thirty (30) days of such demand being served, each 
Party shall appoint an arbitrator and the two arbitrators 
thus appointed shall within a further fifteen (15) ''days 
appoint a third arbitrator who shall be of a nationality 
different from that of either of the Parties or the 
arbitrators (the nationality of a Company being the 
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nationality of the majority of its shareholders or 
controllers) and id either Party f ails to appoint the 
arbitrator to be appointed by it such arbitrator shall be 
appointed by the President or Vice President of the 
international Court of Justice on the application of either 
Party (notice of the intention to apply having been duly 
given in writing by the applicant Party to the other Party) 
and when appointed, the third arbitrator shall convene 
meetings and act as Chairman thereof. If an arbitrator fails 
or is unable to act, his successor will be appointed in the 
same manner as the arbitrator he succeeds. The arbitration 
rules and procedures and the award of the arbitrators, shall 
be determined by a majority of the arbitrators or, in the 
absence of agreement by the two arbitrators by the Chairman 
alone. The arbitration award shall be binding upon the 
Parties and expenses of the arbitration shall be borne by 
the Parties in such proportion as provided for in the award. 
Save as aforesaid the Nigerian Arbitration Act Cap. 13 of the 
1958 Revised Edition of the Laws of the Federation of 
Nigeria shall govern the conduct of the arbitration. The 
venue of the arbitration shall be Lagos, Nigeria. 
ARTICLE EIGHT 
Governinq Law 
All rights and obligations under this Participating 
Agreement shall be construed,, interpreted and governed in 
accordance with and by the laws of Nigeria. 
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IN WITNESS whereof of the Parties hereto have caused their 
common Seals to be hereunto affixed the day and year first 
above mentioned. 
SIGNED, SEALED AND DELIVERED 
for and on behalf of 
NIGERIAN NATIONAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION 
By ...... 
in the presence of Name ................... 
Signature ................... 
Address : ..................... 
SIGNED, SEALED AND DELIVERED 
for and on behalf of 
ELF NIGERIA LIMITED 
By : ............................... 
in the presence of Name ...................... 
Signature : ................... 
Address : ...................... 
.............................................. 
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APPENDIX G 
PRODUCTION SHARING CONTRACT BETWEEN THE NIGERIAN NATIONAL 
PETROLEUM CORPORATION AND ASHLAND OIL (NIGERIA) COMPANY 
THIS AGREEMENT is made this ........ day of ..... 1986, 
BETWEEN the NIGERIAN NATIONAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, a 
Corporation established under the Laws of the Federal Republic 
of Nigeria whose head office is at Ten Storey building, Falomo 
office Complex, Ikoyi, Lagos (hereinafter., referred to ' as 
"NNPC" which expression shall where the context so admits 
include its predecessors, successors-in-title, and assigns) of 
the one part and ASHLAND OIL (NIGERIA) COMPANY, an unlimited 
company incorporated in Nigeria under the Companies Act of 
1968 whose registered office is at No. 10, Bishop Aboyade Cole 
Street Victoria Island, Lagos (hereinafter referred to as 
"Ashland", which expression shall where the context so admits 
include its predecessors, successors-in-title, and assigns) of 
the other part. 
WHEREAS,, NNPC and Ashland entered into a Production Sharing 
Contract dated 12th June, 1973, as amended by the agreement 
between the Parties dated the Ist day of April 1977, 
hereinafter collectively called the "Contract" and 
WHEREAS, by a Letter of Understanding dated the Ist day of 
September, 1985, NNPC and Ashland agreed to amend the Contract 
to incorporate the terms and conditions contained in the said 
Letter, into this Agreement as hereinafter set forth; 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration, of the premises and covenants 
herein contained, it is hardly agreed as follows: 
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^V ýTTr-" I 
DEFINITIONS, EXCLUDED CLAUSES AND CONTRACT AREA 
(a) DEFINITIONS 
(i) "Effective Date" means lst September,, 1985. 
_ 
(ii) "Accounting Procedure" beginning with the Effective -Date 
of this Agreement means Annex "A" attached hereto-and 
made a part, hereof. 
(iii) "Contract Area" means that area described in subclauses, 
(c) of this Clause 1. 
"Cost Oil", "Tax Oil" and "Participating Interest Share" 
as defined under the Contract shall have no further 
application to the Contract and this Agreement except 
with respect to transactions pertaining to periods, Prior 
to the Effective Date of this Agreement. 
(v) "Operating Costs" beginning with the Effective. Date of 
this Agreement means expenditures made and obligations 
incurred in carrying out Petroleum Operations as 
determined in accordance with the Accounting Procedure. 
(vi) "Net Realized Price "per barrel beginning with the 
Effective Date means the amount, determiped by using a 
net-back valuation method of determining Net Realised 
Price which method shall, be in accordance with 
procedures to be mutually agreedýbetween the Parties as 
soon as feasible following the\execution of this 
Agreement. 
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(vi. i) All terms not def ined in this Agreement shall have the 
same meaning as those-defined in the Contract. 
(b) EXCLUDED CLAUSES 
Paragraph (i), subclauses (i) of Clause 5 and Clauses 6 
and 7 of the Contract in their entirety,, shall be of no 
further force or effect regarding Petroleum Operations 
conducted by Ashland under the Contract beginning with the 
Effective Date. It is the intent of the Parties hereto that 
all matters formerly covered by the said Clauses shall now be 
governed exclusively by the provisions of this Agreement, as 
from the Effective Date. Except as specifically amended by 
this Agreement, the Contract, as amended effective lst April, 
1977 shall remain in full force and effect. 
(c) CONTRACT AREA 
Pursuant to Clause 3(i) of the Contract, fifty percent 
(50%) of the Contract Area has been excluded. Since the date 
of the said exclusion and for all purposes under this 
Agreement, the Contract Area shall consist of such area as is 
reflected on the maps attached to this Agreement as Annex -"B"., 
NEW WORK PROGRAMMES 
(a) Ashland shall conduct the following programme in the 
Contract Area: 
(i) Three-D shallow/deep water seismic coverage over a 
minimum area of 150 sq. kms in OPL 98, including the 
Adanga North, Bogi, Mimbo, Ukpam and Ebughu. prospects; 
(ii) Commence a two well exploration drilling programme in 
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OPL 98, by 15th October, 1986; 
(111) Drill two wells in each of the Mimbo and Bogi OPL 98 
Fields beginning in 1987; 
(iv) Commence drilling one onshore (OPL 118) exploration well 
by 15th July, 1986 and 
(v) The programmes set forth in this subclause (a) may be 
modified from time to time by mutual agreement. Such 
modifications could be dictated by economic, capital, 
operational or other conditions. 
(1b) Should the exploration wells provided for under subclause 
(a) of this Clause 2 be completed as a part of the Contract 
Area and not under a sole risk programme as hereinafter 
provided result in the discovery of Crude Oil, the Parties 
shall agree on whether to proceed with an appraisal programme. 
(c) Should the appraisal programme be completed as a part of 
the Contract Area and not under a sole as hereinafter 
provided, the Parties shall agree on whether to commence with 
a development programme. 
(d) Should one of the Parties decide not to commence with an 
exploration programme or thereafter not to proceed, with an 
appraisal programme or a development programme with respect to 
a field, the other Party shall have the option to proceed with 
such a sole risk programme under provisions to be mutually 
agreed between the Parties as soon as feasible following the 
execution of this Agreement. 
CLAUSE 3, 
NATURAL GAS 
2 
(a) All Natural Gas discovered in the Contract Area be the 
sole property of NNPC and shall' not be covered by this 
Agreement. However, NNPC shall give Ashland first 
consideration on sales of such Natural Gas. 
(b) In the event that Ashland discovers a commercially viable 
gas field,, and NNPC requires Ashland to investigate and submit 
proposals for the commercial development of the gas field for 
NNPC's consideration, any costs incurred after drilling ýand 
-temporarily abandoning any discovery well for later re-entry 
shall be for the sole account of NNPC. Unless otherwise 
agreed, NNPC shall advance all funds necessary to conduct all 
operations involving the said gas field commencing with re- 
entry operations. 
(c) With prior approval from NNPC,, Ashland shall use, at no 
cost to it, such quantities of associated natural gas produced 
with any Crude Oil in the Contract Area as may be required f or 
use as fuel for production operations, gas recycling, 
secondary recovery by gas injection, gas lift, or any other 
economical secondary recovery schemes, stimulation of wells or 
artificial lift necessary in the commercial fields discovered 
and developed by Ashland which use shall be in accordance with 
industry standards and Ashland conduct of operations as a 
prudent operator. 
(d) it is understood and agreed that the primary objective of 
this Agreement is the exploration for and exploitation of 
Crude oil within the Contract Area. 
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CLAUSE 4 
RECOVERY OF COSTS AND PROFITS 
(a) Ashland shall pay to NNPC all Royalties and Petroleum 
p, rofits Tax payable with respect to the Available Crude Oil in 
accordance with Clause 6 of this Agreement. Ashland shall also 
pay for all other expenditures and obligations incurred in 
carrying out the Petroleum Operations. Ashland shall recover 
such costs and expenditures as provided under this Clause 4. 
(b) Proceeds, (defined as the amount determined by multiplying 
-the Net Realised Price by the number of barrels of Available 
Crude oil marketed) shall be allocated in the following order 
of priority: 
To Ashland: 
(1) Royalties 
(2) Petroleum Profits Tax 
(3) Operating Costs 
(4) Carryover, as defined in subclause (d) of this 
Clause 4. 
To NNPC and Ashland, their respective Profit Share as 
defined in subclause (e) of this Clause 4. 
(c) Proceeds shall be allocated on monthly basis, subject to a 
yearly adjustment, all in the manner as provided for in the 
Accounting Procedure. 
(d) Carryover occurs when the combination of Royalties, 
petroleum Profits Taxr Operating Costs, as well as any 
Carryover brought forward from the previous month, exceed the 
Proceeds for that month. 
(e) Profit Share consists of the amount of the Proceeds 
remaining after deducting Royalties, Petroleum Profits Tax, 
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operating Costs, and Carryover. Such Prof it Share, if any, 
shall. be allocated between, the Parties depending on the 
average daily production rate for the month as follows: 
Average Barrels of Crude oil 
Per Day For The Month 
First 30,000 
Next 20,000 
Next 50,000 
Over 100,000 
Prof it Share 
Percentaqe 
Ashland NNPC 
45 55 
41- 59 
39 61 
33 67 
CLAUSE 5 
ALLOCATION OF AVAILABLE CRUDE OIL 
(a) Each Party shall be entitled to market a portion of the 
Available Crude Oil. Such portions shall be referred to as 
"Lifting Allocations". Ashland Lifting Allocation shall . 
be 
equal to the equivalent barrels of Available Crude Oil 
required for the recovery of Royalties, Petroleum, Profits Tax, 
operating Costs I Carryover,, and Ashland share, of the Prof it 
Share. NNPC's Lifting Allocation shall be equal to the 
equivalent barrels of NNPC's share of the Profit Share. 
(b) At least 60 days prior to the f irst day of each calendar 
quarter, Ashland shall calculate for such calendar quarter the 
estimated Lifting Allocation which each Party is entitled to 
market sharing the said quarter in accordance with Schedules 4 
and 4A of the Accounting Procedure. NNPC's Lif ting Allocation 
shall be marketed by Ashland unless NNPC upon written notice 
30 days prior to the first day of any qalendarýquarter revokes 
Ashland authority to market on its behalf all or a part of 
NNPC's Lifting Allocation during such calendar quarter. 
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(c) JnipC may propose to make lif tings f rom Ashland Lifting 
Allocation by giving notice to Ashland at least 90 days prior 
to MIPC's proposed lifting, provided this shall not conflict 
, with Ashland obligations incurred under agreements, contracts 
and arrangements mado by Ashland prior to NNPC's proposal, and 
fur-ther provided that Proceeds due Ashland for all such 
previous liftings shall have been received by Ashland pursuant 
-to subclausas (c) of Clause 6. Such NNPC proposals shall 
indicate the price per barrel ("NUPCs proposed price") 
including all adjuntinants at which NNPC shall value such 
liftingn, and the volume it proposes to lift. With ten (10) 
days after the receipt of such notice from NNPC, Ashland shall 
notify IMPC regarding Ashland intention to meet NNPC's 
proposed price. if such notice in not given within the said 
ten (10) day puriod, IMIT shall market the proposed lifting 
and account to Ashland at IMPC's proposed price pursuant to 
subclaunan (c) of Clause 6 and the Accounting Procedure. 
Should Ashland givo notice to inoet NNPC's proposed price, then 
Ashland shall be free to make such lifting and account at such 
price in accordanco with Clause 4 and the Accounting 
Procedure. in the ovunt that such lifting are made by Ashland 
pursuant to thin pubclauooa (c), the Net Realist Price for 
that lifting for the purpose of determining the Proceeds under 
subclauses (b) of Clause 4 and the Accounting Procedure shall 
be equal to IIIIPC's proposed price. 
(d) Ashland shall be entitled to take and'receive and export 
the Crude oil which it in entitled to market hereunder subject 
to the general conditions of sale and purchase of Nigerian 
crude oil relating to prohibited dosvinations. 
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(e) ýEach of the Parties shall have the right to take and 
di. spose of its Lifting Allocation. 
(f) Title to the Available Crude Oil allocated to the Parties 
hereunder shall pass at the wellhead. 
__ y. nn I 
PAYMENTS 
(a) Ashland shall pay monthly,, in U. S. Dollars, into a bank 
account designated by NNPC, the following: 
_(i) 
Royalties within 60 days of the last day of the month 
in which production takes place or within such other period 
as is permitted under applicable Nigerian laws; 
(ii) Petroleum Profits Tax liability instalment for the month 
computed in accordance with sublease (d) of this Clause 
(iii) NNPC's Profit Share, for the month (based on total Crude 
oil lifted by the Parties) within 60 days of the last 
day of the month in which the relevant Crude Oil is 
lifted. 
(b) In the event that NNPC markets its Lifting Allocation 
pursuant to Clause 5 hereof, the Proceeds pertaining to the 
quantity of Crude Oil so marketed shall be applied against 
Ashland payment obligations under subclauses (a) of this 
Clause 6 as provided in the Accounting Procedure. 
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(c) 
1, 
Should NNPC market Ashland Lifting Allocation pursuant to 
subclauses (c) of Clause 5 then the value of such lif ting 
thereof as determined thereunder shall be applied to the 
recovery by Ashland of its costs and prof its under Clause 4 
and, as reflected in Schedule 2 of the Accounting Procedure 
filed with NNPC for the month following such lif ting by 
payment to Ashland in U. S. Dollars into Ashland des ignated 
banký account within sixty (60) days of the last day of the 
month in which the lifting-is made, the value of the lifting 
determined under subclauses (c) of Clause 5. in the event that 
any amount due from NNPC hereunder is unpaid amount shall be 
applied against payments due NNPC under subclauses (a) of this 
Clause 6 as provided in the Accounting Procedure. 
(d) The amount payable by Ashland to NNPC for the purpose of 
payment of Petroleum Profits Tax ("PPT") by NNPC shall be 
computed in accordance with the Petroleum Profits Tax Act 1959 
and its amendments provided, however, that the applicable PPT 
rate for each field that commence production after the 
Effective Date of this Agreement-shall be 65.75% for the first 
five years. of production from each such field commencing from 
the first day of the month of first sale therefrom. NNPC shall 
make all required PPT payments to the Federal Inland Revenue 
Department in respect of Available Crude Oil from the Contract 
Area and the payment by Ashland to NNPC in accordance with 
this subclauses (d) shall fully discharge Ashland PPT 
liability. Any payments of PPT made by Ashland that exceed or 
is less than the amount required under the provisions of this 
subclauses (d) shall be offset against or added to, as the 
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case may be, Ashland payment obligations under subclauses (a) 
of this Clause 6. - 
NATIONAL INTEREST PRODUCT 
As soon as feasible after execution of this Agreement, (but 
before 31st December, 1986), Ashland shall at its sole cost 
provide and install in the Petroleum Training Institute, 
Warrij,, Pertal State, a petroleum laboratory of a kind and cost 
acceptable to the Parties. The provision and installation cost 
of the laboratory shall not be chargeable as Operating Cost. 
OTHER PROVISIONS 
(a) Ashland, in keeping with the standards observed in the 
conduct of Petroleum Operations by companies engaged in 
international petroleum exploration and production, shall take 
out and maintain with the' National Insurance Corporation of 
Nigeria (NICON) for the duration of this Agreement insurance 
coverages adequate to protect the interests of Ashland and 
NNPC with regard to Petroleum Operations undertaken pursuant 
to this Agreement. All such coverage shall name NNPC as a co- 
insured with a waiver of subrogation in favour of NNPC. ' 
Ashland shall deliver to NNPC a copy of such insurance 
policies. 
(b) NNPC shall use its best endeavors to ensure that any 
incentives of general application granted by government to the 
oil industry is extended to Ashland. 
(c) in the performance of the Contract and this Agreement, 
Ashland shall be liable as provided by Nigerian law for its 
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own acts of gross negligence or wanton or wilful misconduct 
including those of its employees and agents engaged in the 
performance of the Contract and this Agreement and shall be 
liable for payment of damages to the extent not covered by its 
insurance. 
(d) The implementation of projects hereunder shall be in 
accordance with procedures to be mutually agreed between the 
Parties as soon as feasible following the execution of the 
Agreement. 
(e) Scheduling and nominating of lifting hereunder shall be in 
accordance with procedures to be mutually agreed between the 
Parties as soon as feasible following the execution of this 
Agreement. 
AS WITNESS the hands of the duly authorised representatives of 
the Parties the day and year first above written. 
Signed and delivered for and on behalf of 
NIGERIAN NATIONAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION 
BY: ............................ 
Designation: ................... 
IN the presence of: - 
Name: ............................................ 
Signature: ....................................... 
Designation: ..................................... 
Address: ......................................... 
Signed and delivered for and on behalf of 
ASHLAND OIL (NIGERIA) COMPANY 
By: ..... oo .. 00-0.000000 ....... 000-0.0 
Designation: o.. oo. oo. oo. oo. o. o. o.. oo .... o 
IN the presence of: - 
Name: ....... o. o. oo ..... o ... ooooo ..... oo ... ooo-... oo. o. o 
Signature: ............................................ 
Designation: .......................................... 
Address: .............................................. 
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